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FINANCING THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 
CHAPTER 1.-Fl:NDINGS AND CoNCLUSIONS 
This examination of the question of financing the .electric utility industry in 
the remainder of the 1970's reveals important areas of general agreement, as 
well as areas where reasonable and informed men and women may differ. The 
details of the study are contained in t~ chapters that follow. This summary 
chapter first presents those widespread areas of agreement. Subsequently, the 
key policy alternatives are compared and specific recommendations offered. 
AREAS OF GENERAL AGREEMENT 
It is apparent to anyone who has ever studied the electric utility industry 
that this is a key sector of the economy and that it has tremendous need for capi-
tal equipment. In fact, it is the single most capital-intensive industry in the 
American economy. Although individual analysts differ in the precise numbers 
that they develop, all agree that the planned capital expansion of the investor-
owned electric utilities is a very ambitious undertaking. In this study, those 
capital needs are estimated at $140 billion for 1974-80. 
mstorically, the utilities have had relatively little difficulty in raising the 
large amounts of cwpital that they required. The very stable nature of their 
earnings and the large proportions that they-regularly paid out made their stocks 
and bonds attractive to investors, especially to retired persons and others inter-
ested in the safety of their investments. Events in the last few years have seri-
ously undermined this situation. Very substantial increases in costs-for fuel 
(basic "raw material" of electric utilities), for interest, and for the construction 
of new powerplants-have, at least for the time being, ended the steady growth 
of utility earnings. Many utilities have experienced substantial declines in 
earnings and numerous traditional dividend increases have not been forthcoming. 
Compounded by a general deterioration of the securities markets and the weak-
ness of many of the firms in the securities industry, the results have been 
profound for utilities. Their historically low level of retained earnings has not per-
mitted them to finance major capital programs from internal sources. Some elec-
tric utilities must have not been able to raise sufficient capital. Others have 
developed new methods of raising needed capital, which often ha:ve turned out 
to be more expensive than the traditional means. Many others reluctantly have 
postponed, cut back, or canceled capital projects (see Figure 1). One utility exec-
utive has estimated that, as a result of these cutbacks, the reserve margins be-
tween demand and generating capacity may get dangerously low later in this 
decade. John M. McGurn, chairman of the Virginia Electric Power Company, 
has estimated that generating reserves in the late 1970's will be "in the range 
af 13 percent---'below the desired-level of 15 to 18 percent even if growth is lesR 
than 8 percent per year." 1 
The recent financing difficulties of electric utilities have become so obvious that 
the newspaper coverage has frequently been moved from the finanical section 
to the front page. It is fair to say that the widespread differences of opinion 
that exist relate not to whether the industry has serious financial problems but 
to alternative means of dealing with those pro·blems. 
The investment requirements of the electric utility industry for the remainder 
of this decade are very heavy--on the order of $20 billion a year. It is not a fore-
gone conclusion that they can be achieved. Yet. the forecasts of capital needs 
presented here are attainable. That will require a combination of public and pri-
vate actions, ranging from rate increases to improved regulatory practices to 
managerial innovations to achieve a more economical and efficient use of 
electricity. 
Although there is great variation in the specifics of the different proposal!!! to 
deal with these financing problems, several comi;Don themes run through most 
of them. First of all, it is generally agreed th!lt it will not be feasible to meet 
1 Gene Smith. "Cuts in Expansion Spread at Capital-Short Uttltties," The New York 
Times, July 29, 1974, p. 33. . 
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th" financial requirements of electric utilities with present rate levels; the dif-
ferences of opinion, and they are substantial, occur over how much of the prob-
lem can or should be handled through general rate increases. 
There is also considerable, but far from universal, agreement that both regula-
tory efficiency and private productivity should be increased. Furthermore, it is 
generally recognized that success in dealing with the national (and in many 
respects worldwide) problem of inflation will substantially alleviate the utility 
industry's financial pressures. 
Utilities' Money Shortage 
As Their 
Costs Rise, 
Investors 
Grow Aloof 
Construction Plans 
For Nuclear Plants 
Canceled by Utility 
Consumers Power Co. 
Calls Off Stock Offer, 
Hints fay out to Stand 
General Public Unit 
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;But Buyers Shy Away 
CanEdtoCut$40-Million I 
From Construction Plans 
Utility Stocks Aren't for Widows Anymore 
FIGURE 1 
PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CREDIT GUARANTEES 
One approach which has received considerable attention is the proposal for 
federal guarantees of electric utility bonds. This proposal has been advanced in 
most detail by William Rosenberg, chairman of the Michigan Public Service 
Commission. A draft bill has been prepared by Lee White, a former chairman 
of the Federal Power Commission. 
There is a certain surface attractiveness to the Rosenberg plan. Government 
guarantees should enable utilities to issue bonds at lower interest costs. They 
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should also permit the issue of a larger proportion of such low-cost bonds and a 
smaller proportion of stock (dividends are higher cost to the utilities because 
they are not tax deductible, as are interest payments). Thus, the Rosenberg plan, 
by reducing a major element of utility costs, should permit some significant 
slowdown in the recent pattern of rapid utility rate increases. The result should 
be appealing to speculators, customers, and the companies themselves. 
The traditional role of the economist has been to serve as the 'vet blanket, 
dampening the enthusiasm of many proponents of simple solutions. Unfortu-
nately, the present is a striking case in point. A detailed examination of the 
Rosenberg plan and the accompanying White bill, as is done in the body of this 
report, reveals fundamental shortcomings. 
Boiled down to its basics, government guarantees of utility bonds really involve 
putting "the monkey" on someone else's back. They do not increase the amount 
of investment funds available to the economy. Rather, to the extent they succeed, 
they merely take capital funds away from other sectors of the economy and lead 
to similar requests for aid by those sectors. These government guarantees also 
tend to raise the level of interest rates in the economy, including the rates on 
Treasury debt which is a cost borne by the taxpayer. That added cost alone is 
estimated at $145 million a year. 
To the extent that the utilities would be paying less Federal tax than other-
wise, the result would be either a greater burden on other taxpayers or a higher 
budget deficit, which would exacerbate the already severe inflationary pressures. 
Moreover, there are severe legal obstacles to the implementation of the Rosen-
berg Plan. Many utilities cannot issue substantial amounts of additional bonds 
without violating the provisions of their agreements with existing bondholders. 
A Congressional statute abrogating those agreements would be of doubtful con-
stitutionality. Even if such statute survived a constitutional challenge, many 
large investors (trusts, mutual savings banks, etc.) would be prohibited from 
purchasing many of these bonds because of restrictions in existing state laws. 
Moreover, the savings in interest costs that are estimated for the plan are 
substantially overstated. Despite the claims of the proponent, vrivate bonds with 
a federal guarantee do not sell at the same low interest rate as do Treasury 
~onds themselves. We can conjecture over the reasons, but that is the fact of the 
matter. 
To the extent that the government guarantees would result in lower unit costs 
of capital to the electric utilities, it would unwittingly provide an incentive for 
more capital-intensive operations. The result would be to further increase the 
total capital needs of the industry, and thus the size of the base on which rates 
are based. 
F'inally, the federal guarantee plan would shift a substantial portion of private 
and state-local decision-making to the federal government. That is not mere con-
jecture on the part of an industry that is traditionally nervous over the growing 
federal role in power generation and distribution. Rather, it is the obvious con-
clusion that emerges from merely reading the provisions of the proposed White 
bill. That draft bill would give the Federal Power Commission authority over 
ma-ny aspects of the electric utility industry which traditionally have been 
reserved for the state utility commissions or the private managements of the 
companies. It would be a major step toward federal control of the electric utility 
industry. 
THE BENEFITS OF NEW TECHNOLOGY 
Another family of proposals to solve the financial problems of the electric 
utilities relate to the possibility of introducing new technology. Until recently, 
it has been technological improvements that have generated the productivity to 
offset rising operating costs and thus avoid rate increases. 
One such proposal is the adoption of a national grid. The attractiveness of the 
suggestion is apparent. Regions of the nation with surplus power could transfer 
the excess to regions with temporary shortages, thus reducing the need for new 
facilities to provide for "peak" requirements. 
Detailed examination is disillusioning. The benefits are not likely to be very 
significant because peak periods in the various regions tend to coincide. The costs 
of a national grid, in contrast, would be quite substantial. On reflection, it appears 
that most of the proposed advantages is already obtained from the widespread 
use of a series of regional grids. 
Other proposals for new technology are of a longer term nature. The National 
Science Foundation and other agencies such as the Federal Energy Administra-
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tion have sponsored a series of studies designed to develop more efficient methods 
of producing, distributing, and using electricity. Such efforts surely deserve 
strong support. Yet, it is unlikely that the results, if successful, will be opera-
tional in time to significantly reduce the financial requirements of electric 
utilities in the critical1974-78 time period. The lead-time involved in developing 
new technology and incorporating it into operational electric generating and 
distributional facilities is simply too long for solving the current financial prob-
lems of the industry. Hopefully, technological advances will help to prevent a 
subsequent period of financial distress. 
CHANGES IN UTU..ITY RATES AND REGULATIONS 
Although experts differ as to the precise effects, it is likely that the recent 
increases in the price of electricity have dampened down the usage to some 
extent. This effect has been reenforced by the Federal Government's formal 
energy conservation efforts. 
Thus, in the first quarter of 1974, federal agencies used 7,350,000 megawatt 
hours of electricity, down about 1,213,000 megawatt hours from anticipated con-
sumption, according to the Federal Energy Administration. In the four-month 
period October 1973-January 1974, the industrial sector of the economy achieved 
an approximately 5 percent reduction of energy use per unit of output. 
The methods used to achieve these reductions in use of electricity ranged 
from more efficient use of NASA wind tunnels to eliminating continuous opera-
tion of demonstrator appliances by retail stores. We surely should not develop 
new long-term estimates of energy demand on the basis of three or four months 
of new experience. Yet, we need to recognize that, to some extent, tJie rapid rise 
in the price of electric power may tend to result in somewhat lower requirements 
for· new facilities than previously planned. Though some of the recently an-
nounced cutbacks in new projects reflect primarily the short-term difficulties 
being experienced by utilities in raising capital funds, some downward revisions 
in expansion programs may be a sensible long-term adjustment. 
Several factors point to further changes in the structure (not necessarily in 
the overall level) of electric rates which could also dampen down future capital 
requirements : 
(1) The rising interest in using the rate structure not to encourage additional 
consumption but to slow down the demand for energy. 
(2) The shift in the electric utility industry's long-term cost structure from 
declining average costs to rising average costs, thus making serving additional 
demand more expensive than meeting existing demand. 
(3) The growing awareness of dtiferential seasonal and time-of-day charges 
as a means of lowering the extremely expensive peak loads of the electric utility 
industry. 
Although this study has not been devoted to a detailed analysis of the technical 
area of utility rate-making, it would appear that some of the traditio:qal practices 
which were developed to meet earlier circumstances, no matter how well-suited 
they may have been in the earlier period, may not be appropriate under current 
circumstances. This should not be interpreted as a plea for the simple-minded 
and erroneous approach that would charge all customers a single rate re-
gardless of the substantial differences in the cost of serving them. 
Indeed, many traditional practices-such as the need to relate rates to the 
cost of providing service-are as appropriate today ·as ever. But the specific rate 
structures needed to adhere to these principles may well require some up-
dating. 
Certainly, the procedures followed by the regulatory agencies are in need of 
modernization. The comparisons of regulatory decision-making in earlier chap-
ters showed the substantial variation that exists between the most progressive jurisdictions and the least progressive. There are numerous changes in pro-
cedures that could be instituted by state commissions that would reduce the 
frequency and size of rate increases. Many of these needed changes relate 
to reducing the expensive •and time-consuming delays that are involved in the 
regulatory process. 
Reduction of "Regulatory Lag" 
Governmental agencies with responsibilities in this area should take affirma-
tive steps to see that adequate and timely rate relief is provided to the nation's 
electric utilities. These steps could take a variety of forms. Policy statements 
could be issued recognizing that prompt and effective rate relief will be neces-
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sary for many utilities in the years ahead. This action itself would have a salu-
tory effect of investors and the financial markets in which the utilities raise their 
capital funds. 
Uniform state laws could be enacted authorizing the use of projections, tem-
porary rates, "filing" statutes with limited suspension periods, and automatic 
adjustment clauses and surcharges. To deal with the lag in recovering fuel 
costs, the present time period in the effective application of adjustment clauses, 
which is now approximately two months, could be shortened. 
Considerable capital and operating costs arise simply from the increased delays 
now encountered in obtaining approvals for new facilities. Repetitious hearings 
and prolonged delays now add substantially to utility costs. More effective 
pr:ocedures need to be adopted for granting authority to construct needed 
utility facilities and thus to reduce these avoidable costs. 
Changing Accounting Practices 
One way of strengthening the finances of electric utilities would be to change 
some accounting practices used for rate making purposes so as to allow for 
a higher cash flow while leaving the consumer no worse off in the long run. 
One method of increasing cash flows, and thus reducing the need for external 
financing, would be to switch from "flow through" of tax incentives to "nor-
malization" in the states which have not yet done so. 
Even more significant would be the inclusion of construction work in progress 
in the rate base. If this had been done, it would have reduced utilities' need for 
external financing by approximately $1 billion in 1972/ol 
Reduction of Discriminatory Taa:es 
Governments at all levels tend to tax public utilities more h~vily than other 
forms of business. This procedure should be recognized for what it is-a method 
whereby political decision-makers can substitute utility rate increases for prop-
erty and other direct tax increases. When utility costs were declining, these 
extra taxes were absorbed with minimum difficulty. But in the present environ-
ment of rapidly rising rate increases, this discriminatory form of taxation exac-
erbates a situation that already is extremely serious. 
At the Federal level, the Congress should give prompt attention to increasing 
the 4 percent investment tax credit for utilities to 7 percent, which is the level 
available to companies in all other industries. 
At state and local levels, legislatures and county and city councils should con-
sider reduchig or perhaps even eliminating the multitude of special taxes on utili-
ties. There is no justification for local officials-as some are now doing---{)pposing 
requested utility rate increases and, at the same time, recommending increased 
utility taxes in lieu of raising property tax rates. The fundamental inconsistency 
of such an approach needs to be understood more widely, This situation is in 
striking contrast to the low level of taxation borne by publicly-owned utiilties. 
The needs of public policy are clear : the tax system should be used neither to 
subsidize nor to penalize the electric utilities. They should pay their fair share of 
taxes. 
Why Worry About Electric UtiUty Stock1wlderst 
Aside from any concern over fairness of treatment, there is a very hard-nosed 
reason why public policy needs to be concerned with the situation facing the 
stockholders of electric utilities. Because this most capital-intensive industry has 
a relatively low rate of retained earnings compared to other industries, a dispro-
portionately small part of its massive capacity expansion program can be financed 
internally. This means that a disproportionately large part of the funds for new 
capacity must come from investors who purchase utility stocks and bonds. 
The typical utility is limited in the amount of bonds that it can issue. So-called 
''indenture" agreements that accompany existing bonds usually require that oper-
ating income be twice (or more) than the interest payments that are required to 
be made on the utility's bonds. With the rapid rise in both interest rates and oper-
ating expenses, a very substantial decline has been occurring in the average inter-
est "coverage" ratio for the industry, perilously close to the minimum required 
to meet the legal obligations to existing bondholders. 
Thus, many utilities already are or soon will be facing the situation where they 
cannot issue additional ·bonds, at least not a-t current rates of income and expense. 
2 Irwin M. Stelzer, Electric Utilities' Oapital Supply: the Regulator's Challenge, a paper 
presented before the Western Conference of Public Service Commissions Annual Meeting, 
Las Vegas, Nevada, June 12, 1974, p. 17. 
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The result, of course, is to increase the amount of capital to be raised by selling 
more stock. But why should investors buy more stock in tbe utilities when they 
see what is happening to existing shareholders? In many cases, the company's 
common stock is selling below the book value of existing shares. 
We might say that bygones should be treated as bygones. But in the case of the 
electric utilities, prospective new stockholders have reason to be concerned that 
a similar fate awaits them. Yet why should the average citizen and especially the 
taxpayer worry? Because, as we have already seen in several highly-publicized 
instances, if the utility companies are unable to :finance needed expansion on 
their own, the answer is to cut back on their investments in the additional capac-
ity to meet the electricity needs of a rising population, or the government picks 
up the tab for this essential service. Moreover, if a government agency winds up 
owning the powerplants, unlike a utility company, it is exempt from many taxes. 
Thus, the burden on the taxpayer is increased further. 
There is a role also to be played by the utilities in improving the productivity 
of their operations. The great majority have shifted their advertising from those 
areas that would accentuate peak demand problems to practices that would pro-
mote greater efficiency in the use of electricity. Electric utilities throughout the 
nation have embarked on programs to encourage energy conservation by their 
customers .This represents a fairly fundamental redirection in management think-
ing. The present generation of utility management grew up in a period of techno-
logical advancement which led to declining long-run average costs whereby the 
more electricity was consumed the lower the average rate would be. 
Tne basic situation is now far more complicated. Certain increased uses of 
electricity, such as spaceheating in off-peak winter periods, can still serve to 
reduce average costs. But rising use of air conditioning and similar peak-period 
uses would only bring average costs higher still. More fundamentally, the needs 
of national policy have changed: although a dynamic society always develops 
new requirements, the current and foreseeable emphasis is on conserving our en-
ergy resources rather than developing and using them to the limit. 
Growth of electricity usage surely will continue. Recent experiences of fuel oil 
shortages and natural gas curtailments should lead to greater rather than lesser 
dependency on electricity in the future. But the changing economics of the electric 
utility industry mean that it is no longer a fundamental necessity for the individ-
ual utility to constantly seek ever-larger markets. 
Rate Increases 
Despite the improved outlook for regulatory and utility productivity, the gen-
eral inflation in the economy as a whole makes an upward trend in utility rates 
both a likely and necessary prospect. Although it may be difficult for those un-
familiar with the industry to grasp the notion quickly, the way to maintain rel· 
atively low utility rates in the long-run is to grant adequate rate increases in 
the short run. The basic reason is that payments to bondholders and other sup-
pliers of capital are a very major share of total utility costs. A utility that im-
presses potential investors as providing a relatively assured return on their in-
vestment thus can raise new capital at lower rates than companies that are con-
sidered to be higher risks. 
Many of the specific recommendations contained in this report should help to 
slow down electric rate increases. But there is no reasonable approach which 
would avoid the likely prospect of further increases in the cost of producing 
electricity and hence in its price in the period ahead. Proposed subsidies which 
would result in shifting a portion of the cost from users to taxpayers would be 
worse than merely moving the bill from one pocket to another. Rather, in this 
period of national concern over wise energy use, such subsidies would artificially 
inflate the demand for electric power. 
OTHER CHANGES IN PUBLIC POLICY 
Many of the problems facing the electric utilities, perhaps the great bulk of 
them, are not unique to the electrical industry. Hence, sensible public policy 
should not be geared to thi!:l one industry but to the basic problems-inflation, 
high interest rates, an inadequate supply of saving, and weakness in the securities 
industry, as well as lack of public understanding of the functioning of the eco-
nomic system. 
Although public opinion polls now register inflation as the number one problem 
on the minds of the American public, actions to deal with inflation usually fail 
to gain popular support. Upon reflection, the reasons are obvious. Anti-inflation-
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ary measures are often painful and unpleasant. I!'ighting inflation means saying 
no to large and powerful groups-"no" to advocates of tax cuts, "no" to propo-
nents of further expenditure increases, "no" to many potential borrowers, and 
"no" to labor, business, and government practices \Yhich reduce productivity. 
Proposals to protect the public against inflation by cutting taxes, as is sug-
gested from time to time, must surely merit a special prize for economic irrespon· 
sibility. In the long run, tax reform does have a role to play. But it is a different 
one than envisioned by the advocates of larger personal exemptions or standard 
deductions. 
Rather, the government's :fiscal policy needs to be geared to dampening down 
consumption while increasing the incentive to saYe, thus making available the 
resources necessary for investment. The resultant higher levels of productive ca-
pacity will generate the output to reduce the basic inflationary forces. The federal 
budget deficit should be reduced in order to curtail government borrowing and 
hence increase the funds available to the private sector. The decline in govern-
ment borrowing will also help to relieve the pressures in credit markets and thus 
help to bring down interest rates. Simultaneously, the goven1ment must refrain 
from relying on subterfuges, such as credit programs, which technically are out· 
·ide of the budget but which effectively reduce the supply of investment funds 
available to truly private borrowers. 
It would also be helpful to reduce if not eliminate tht! numerous government 
rules and regulations that restrict productivity and output and thus give an 
inflationary bias to the economy. 'l'hese include subsidies to agriculture and 
labor, as well as to business. 
More fundamentally, an economic environment needs to be created that is more 
conducive to private saving and investment. Unless this nation acts on both the 
tax and expenditure fronts-to encourage private saving and reduce government 
competition for investment funds--we must seriously consider the very real 
possibility that the United States has entered a period in which the demand for 
capital tends to outrun the supply of savings to finance it, and a high level of 
interest rates is likely to be the resulting balancing factor. That would be a situ-
ation fraught with great difficulty for electric utilities and other capital-intensive 
private industries. 
Eugene ,V, :\'!eyer, a vice president of the investment :firm of Kidder, Peabody 
and Company, contends that the crux of the utility :financing problem lies in the 
fact that "The people can understand paying for the labor but they can't under-
stand paying for the capital ... " He urges creating an atmosphere of public 
acceptance wliere the average citizen appreciates the role of profit, capital, and 
free enterprise.3 
In essence, the financial problems facing investor-owned electric utilities are 
severe, but in total they are not unique to the private sector of the American 
economy. The basic solution is to achieve greater public recognition of the need 
to provide adequate capital funds to meet the growing needs of the American 
society in the years ahead. Although an examination of the investment banking 
business is beyond the purview of this study, the demise or decline of many 
investment houses has made the situation more difficult. 
THE OUTLOOK FOB THE INDUSTRY 
A recent analysis in Fortune magazine presents two alternative "scenarios" 
for the electric utility industry: 
1. A "dev·astating" scenario in which money remains tight, inflation remains 
out of control, and demand for electricity is flat. This combination would imply 
reduced profits, smaller dividends, and still lower utility stock prices. 
2. A "cheerful" scenario in which fuel prices, inflation, and money rates all 
fall. This combination also would presumably bring substantial gains for utility 
stockholders. 4 
It is unlikely that P.ither of these two extreme situations will come to pass. 
The rate of inflation is likely to remain painfully high, but not beyond the control 
by tough monetary and fiscal policy. Regulatory commissions are likely to respond 
to the demonstrated need for higher utility earnings, but-in part as a result 
of consumerist pressures- not as rapidly as the utilities or investors believe 
to be justified by the facts of the circumstance. · 
3 Eugene W. 1\Ieyer. How About The Wise Use of Capitalf, an address before the 42nd 
Annual Convention of the Edison Electric Institute, New York City. June 5, 1974, pp. 2, 9. 
'A. F. Ehrbar, "Utility Stocks Aren't for Widows Anymore," Fortune, June 1974, p. 105. 
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A Pollyanna attitude toward the very real financiai problems facing investor-
owned electric utilities surely is unwarranted. As pointed out by then Federal 
Reserve Board member Andrew Brimmer, unless public utilities are able to over-
come these financing obstacles in the next few years, "consumers are likely to 
bear the real costs of such failure in the form of energy shortages, much higher 
prices, and severe constraints on the improvement of consumer welfare." • 
Yet, a number of authorities have looked beyond the immediate financial 
squeeze being experienced by many companies and have come up with a 
basically favorable long-term appraisal of the electric utility industry. For ex-
ample, Ashby Bladen, senior vice president for investments at the Guardian Life 
Insurance Company, recently described electric utilities as follows: 
As a regulated industry providing an essential service that is still 
price well below its economic value in most areas and possessing a 
legally enforceable right to a reasonable profit, electric utilities must 
be basically better situated to cope with instability than most other in-
dustries . . . I suspect that in the end, Consolidated Edison will tum 
out to have played the role of salutary horrible example in this in-
dustry ... e 
SUMMARY 
These are the policy highlights of this study of financing investor-owned elec-
tric utilities. The reader is urged to examine the body of the report for 
supporting detail and necessary qualifications : 
The Financial Oondition of Electric Utilities 
1. The pressures facing investor-owned electric utilities attempting to finance 
needed capital expansion programs in the current economic environment are real 
and serious. The industry's capital needs are likely to total $140 billion in the 
197 ~80 time period. 
2. The importance of the industry and the seriousness of the situation requires 
key changes in public and private policies. 
Ohanges in Regulatory Policies 
3. There is no escaping the need for substantial increases in electric utility 
rates. These can be justified on grounds of financial need as well as economic 
efficiency. None of the other proposals individually or collectively--obviate the 
need for this unpleasant but necessary course of action. 
4. The decision-making procedures of many state regulatory commissions need 
to be modernized. There is too large a gap between the most-advanced and the 
least-advanced standards and policies. 
5. Rather than a matter of luck or happenstance, every utility should be al-
lowed to use automatic fuel pass-through clauses, future test years, normaliza-
tion of tax incentives, charges for late payments, and interim increases. 
6. Regulatory lag should be reduced. Only 28 percent of the cases settled 
during 1971-73 were completed in six months or less. One out of every four 
cases took longer than one year. These delays contribute to the "revolving door" 
phenomenon whereby no sooner is a utility granted one rate increase then it 
applies for another. 
7. Utility rate st~ctures should be revised in order more effectively to dampen 
down "peak load" demand and encourage usage during off-peak periods.' These 
changes should be consistent with the basic princi'Ple that charges to given 
classes of customers should reflect the costs of providing service. 
Ohanges in Management Practices 
8. Utility managements are changing and should change their ·basic outlook 
from the historically-relevant notion of market expansion to the current need 
for economy and efficiency in the use of electric power. This shift in priorities 
in good measure is now feasible because of the earlier successes of the industry 
in developing the uses of electricity. 
9. Those electric utilities which have not already shifted their advertising away 
from peak-demand uses should do so. An even greater · emphasis should be put 
on educating customers in how to use electricity more efficiently. Reduction of 
11 Andrew F. Brimmer, Public Utility Pricing, Debt Financing, and Oons.umer Welfare, 
remarks presented to the Wharton School Club of Washington, May 22, 1974, p 2. 
8 Ashby Bladen, "lnfiatton or Crash: Shuttling Between Horns of a DUemma," Money 
Manager, July 1, 1974, p. 16. 
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peak usage will directly ea:se the industry's capital requirements and financing 
needs. 
Ohanges in Government TaaJ Treatment 
10. Congress should promptly raise the 4 percent investment credit for utilities 
to the 7 percent available to all other industries. This differential treatment is 
not justified under present circumstances. 
11. Sta•te and local gQVernments should refrain from instituting or increasing 
special taxes on electric utilities. These companies should pay the same tax ra.tes 
as firms in other industries. It wou~d be helpful---1llthough given the political 
realities not very likely-if the existing special taxes on utilities were to be 
repealed. 
Ohanges in General Economic Policy 
12. Changes in government legislation ·and: policy should give grea·ter weight oo 
fostering an economic climate that is more conducive to private saving and in-
vestment. The basic way to provide more capital for the needs of the nation 
is not to subsidize a given industry but to increase tlle size of the pool of invest-
ment funds for which all borrowers can compete. 
13. The federal government itself should reduce the massive extent to which 
it now competes with the private sector for the limi·ted supply of investment 
funds. During this inflationary period, the budget deficit and federal credit sub-
sidies should be reduced if not eliminated. Proposals for federal guarantees of 
utility bonds are misguided in principle and unworkable in practice. 
14. Future changes in the tax system should give great weight to saving than 
to consumption. It is private saving that is the basic source of financing of the 
capacity to provide for future consumption. 
15. Government restrictions and regulations which give an inflationary bias to 
the economy-be they subsidies to labor, agriculture, or business--should be 
sharply curtailed, especially those that reflect the needs of the 1930's rather than 
the 1970's. 
Ohanges in Public Attitudes 
16. The average citizen needs to realize t'hat public policy has to be adopted to 
changing circumstances. So much of current policies and attitudes reflect the de-
pression years when vast reservoirs of capital were underutilized because of a 
shortage of consumer demand. Literally, the tide has ·turned. The Puritan ethic 
was wrong for the 1930's ; it is appropriate, at least in modern dress, for the 
current inflationary environment and period of inadequate savings. 
17. As a nation, we have exhausted the easy or even simple answers to the eco-
nomic problems of the present. In the difficult domestic and international en-
vironment that faces us, we should be suspicious of new policy solutions that 
appear to be · quick or easy or comfortable. The serious economic problems that 
exist require sustained and difficult actions which likely will require sacrifice on 
the part of many producers and consumers alike, and in the private sector as 
well as in the public sector. 
The proposals in this report ·are designed to spread the burden ·as equally as 
possible in the belief that good national policy is the equal distribution of 
dissatisfaction! 
CHAPTER 2. INTRODUCTION 
Utilities for a long-time had been considered by the public an important but 
a very specialized part of the American economy. But now they often take the 
center of the public stage. They are at the forefront of developing public pol-
icy in the areas -of environment, energy and resources, safety, land use plan-
ning, taxation, :finance, and inflation. Prior to evaluating the various policy 
alternatives that have been proposed, it is necessary to examine the nature of 
the problems that have arisen. 
CONTENT OF THE BEPOBT 
Following this brief introductory section, Chapter 8 is devoted to a detailed 
examination of the present economic position and • :financial conllition of the 
electric utility industry. Chapter 4 analyzes the industry's capital requirements 
for the next several years, which are the pacing element in public policy. 
Because of the close and often little understood connection between prices 
charged and capital :financing, Chapter 5 is an explanation of the role of utility 
rates. The :first four chapters thus constitute a prelude to the examination of 
possible changes in public and industry policies and practices, to which the rest 
of the report is devoted. 
Chapter 6 analyzes in considerable detail the major proposals for change in 
:financing electric utilities. These center on recommendations for fe'deral guar-
antees of electric utility bonds. Other possibilities for changes are covered in 
Chapter 7, including bath governmental policies and industry practices. The 
study's conclusions on how electric utilities can be :financed in the period ahead 
are contained in Chapter I. 
N A TUBE OF THE INDUSTRY 
The electric power industry in the United States began in the late 1870's 
as a street lighting and electric railway business, principally by electric com-
panies. Through the years it has grown to become one of the nation's largest 
group of business enterprises. Municipally-owned electric systems were estab-
lished in a desire to provi'de street lights and to replace arc lighting systems dur-
ing a depression period when electric companies were unable to secure funds 
for expansion. The Federal Government entered the commercial power industry 
only incidentally; electric power was produced as a byproduct of irrigation 
development and flood control. Power not needed in the operation of the projects 
was sold commercially. Preference was given in the sale of this ·surplus power 
for municipal purposes. Later the preference was changed to "public bodies 
and cooperatives." In 1932, electric companies owned 93 percent of the gen-
erating capacity in the country; municipally owned electric systems owned al-
most 6 percent ; other government power agencies accounted for the remainder. 
Beginning in 1988 the segments of the industry owned and :financed by gov-
ernment became more important. Numerous Federal multipurpose projects, 
including power, were undertaken. The Tennessee Valley Authority and the · 
Bonneville Power Administration were formed and became major commercial 
power enterprises. The Public Works Administration provided loans and grants 
for the formation of new state and district power agencies and municipal electric 
systems. Rural electric cooperatives were formed with :financing provided by 
the Federal Government. 
There are presently :five ownership segments of the electric power industry-
all important power producers. Four of these-Federal Government power agen-
cies, state and district power agencies, municipal electric systems, and R.E.A. 
:financed rural electric cooperatives-receive advantages not accorded the 
investor-owned electric power companies. These benefits are in the areas of 
regulation, financing, and taxes. 
By 1971 the share of the electric power industry owned by the electric 
companies had decreased to 78 percent, when measured by either sales or 
generation of electricity. The Federal Government's share was close to 11 percent 
(489) 
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(a decrease .frof!l its big~ of over 13 percent in 1965) ; municipals had 6 percent; 
state and distnct agenCtes almost 4 percent· and cooperatives the remainder . 
. Electricity service is .cu~omarily viewed as' consisting of three parts: produc-
tl~n .of :power, trans~ss10n of the energy over high-voltage lines, and local 
distn~ution for short distances over low-voltage lines to :final consumers. Nearly 
all private :firms are vertically integrated, providing generating transmitting 
and distributing services as a single :firm or through separate ~ompanies con~ 
trolled by the same holding company.1 
THE BOI.E OF REGULATION 
It was recognized nearly two centuries ago that certain commercial services 
are e~sential to the hef~:lth and welfare of the public but that competition nmong 
suppliers of th~se services would result in unnecessary duplication of fadlities 
and needless high costs to the public. Electricity supply is one such Sf~rvice; 
ga~ and telephone services are oth~rs. The principal solutic•n to this problem, 
which has been evolved over a considerable number of years is to permit fran-
chised mo~opolies to operate under government regulation. ' 
Regulation serves as a substitution for competition and strives to assure 
that the economies resulting from using a single supplier are passed on to the 
customers se~ed .bY. thf~:t supplier. In the United States, regulation of investor-
owned electnc utilities IS generally performed at the state lflVel, although with 
many exceptions. 
Electric utilities are regulated by state commissions in 46 states. In Nebraska 
there are no private utilities. In Texas and Minnesota municipal governments 
r~gulate within city boundaries. In South Dakota a Mediation Board settles 
disputes among electric suppliers. The primary emphasis o1 state commissions 
has been on regulation of rates. In 8 states that exercise regulation on the 
sta~e level, local political subdivisions also have authority for rate regulation 
subJect to appeal to the state commission. The activities of state commissions 
are not confined to rates, however. Their activities extend into many phases 
~f c.ompan¥ operations: ~ranting the basic franchise, approving :financing, estab-
lishing umform accountmg systems, auditing, reviewing depreciation policies 
safety and adequacy of service, environmental factors, etc. ' 
On the Federal level, the Securities and Exchange Commission has certain 
regulatory' authority over utility holding compq.ny systems. The Federal Power 
CommissiOn regulates wholesale rates of all companies operating in interstate 
commerce. As a practical matter this includes about 95 percent of the companies. 
Th~ F.P.C. als<? approves the is::'uance of securities for certain companies, pre-
scribes ac<:ountmg systems, reqmres extensive and detailed reporting, and passes 
upon appllcations for the development of hydroelectric projects on navigable 
rivers. 
One of the most important functions of regulatory commissions-perhaps the 
most crucial ose-is to determine the proper level of return or profit that can be 
allowed. This in turn requires that the commission validate the expenses of the 
utility and arrive at conclusions concerning the "cost of capital." To these tasks 
are also added the job of verifying that prices charged to different classes of 
custom~I'~ are just and reasonable and based on an equitable distribution of cost 
responmbllity. 
·In carrying out their functions, regulatory commissions are concerned that their 
current decisions do not jeopardize the capability of the regulated companies to 
~ul!lll their obligations to serve customers in the future. This obligation to serve 
Is mt~nsic to the nature of a utility franchise, representing one of the major 
conditiOns for the granting of a monopoly. Thus, current regulatory decisions 
attempt. to take account of the future needs of the customers to be served and 
t!Ie capital required to provide the facilities to meet these needs. The long lead 
~Imes which characterize electric utility plant construction mean that new facil-
Ities must be planned and financing arranged many years in advance of the time 
that the facilities enter into service. 
1 Stephen G. Breyer and Paul W. MacAvoy, Energy Regu'fatlon bu the Federal Power 
Oommjsslon, Washington, Brookings Institution, 1974, p. 90. 
CHAPTER 3. THE PRESENT FINANCIAL CoNDITION OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY 
INDUSTRY 
THE SIZE OF THE INDUSTRY 
Output ana SaZes 
The production of electric power is one of the most important industrial activi-
ties carried out in a modern economy. The generation of electric energy is a use-
ful measure of a nation's economic strength and progress. During 1973, nearly 
1.95 trillion kilowatt hours (kwhr) were generated in the U.S. by utility and 
industrial power plants. Total U.S. electricity porduction was more than twice 
that of the world's next largest producer, the USSR. Utilities accounted for 
nearly 95 percent of the U.S. total. The remainder is generated by industrial or 
commercial firms for their own use. 
Within the electl"ic utility industry, investor-owned companies generated more 
than 78 percent of the 1.85 trillion kwhr of output. This report will concentrate 
on the investor-owned segment of the industry in view of the unique nature of 
the problems facing it. The problems of raising capital for non-investor-owned 
utilities are quite severe and may be comparable in many ways tQ those covered 
in this report. Where appropriate data are not available, information on the 
total electric industry will be used and so labeled. 
·Some 78.3 percent of the ultimate electric customers in the U.S. were served 
hy investor-owned utilities. Sales of electric energy to these ultimate customers 
represented 78.3 percent of all kwhr sales in 1973 and were allocated to residential, 
business, and other users as shown in Table 1. 
TABLE I.-SALES OF ELECTRICITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1973, BY INVESTOR-OWNED UTILITIES 
Category users 
Kilowatt 
hours (in millions) Percent 
ResidentiaL _______ ___ -- ------------------------------------------------------ 416, 851 31. 2 
Small businesses ___ _______ -------- - ------------ ---------- --------------------- 323,018 24. 2 
Large businesses ____________ -------------------------------------------------- 545, 912 40.9 Other ___________________ ______________________ _______ _______ ---- - -________ --- 48, 615 3. 7 
-----------------------------------TotaL_---------- · --- --- -- -- ------------ -- ---------- - -- ----- --- -------- 1, 334, 396 100.0 
Source: Edison Electric Institute. 
Revenue of investor-owned utilities from sales to ultimate customers totaled 
$26.3 billion in 1973. A breakdown of this tlgure is contained in Ta:ble 2. 
TABLE 2.-sALES OF ELECTRIC POWER, 1973, BY INVESTOR-OWNED UTILITIES 
Category of user 
Amount (in millions) Percent 
ResidentiaL ________________________________________ ---_--- __ ----------------- $10, 590 40.2 
Small business------------------------------------------------- - -------------- 7, 808 29.7 
Large business---------------------------------------------------------------- 6, 876 26.1 Other________________________________________________________________________ 1, 043 4. 0 
-------------------------------------TotaL_---------------------------- - ----------------------------------- 26, 317 100.0 
Source: Edison Electric Institute. 
RoZe in the IiJconomy 
At the end of 1972, the investor-owned electric utility industry had a total gross 
invest~ent in electric plant and equipment of more than $117 billion, or about 
(441) 
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$4.50 for each dollar of revenue, which was larger than any other industry in 
the United States. The petroleum industry, the next largest in terms of physical 
investment, reported $78 billion of gross plant and equipment, or one-third less. 
This difference in ranking between revenue and investment reflects the capital-
intensity of electric supply operations, a subject which will be discussed later in 
this report. 
On the other hand, the investor-owned electric utilities are not among the 
largest users of labor, although their work forces are significant in absolute 
numbers. During 1972, 401,500 persons were engaged in electric operation and 
construction work, an increase of only 18.2 percent over 1962. Over this same 10 
year period the industry raised its total annual output by more than 18 percent, 
demonstrating the significant improvement in output per unit of labor achieved 
by electric utilities. This trend has been characteristic of electricity production 
since the inception of the industry. 
THE COST STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY 
The predominant characteristic of the electric utility industry's cost struc-
ture is its capital intensiveness. Gross plant investment of nearly $4.70 is re-
quired on average to produce $1.00 of annual revenue. After adjustments for 
depreciation, net assets equal nearly $4.00 to generate $1.00 revenue. This com~ 
pares with much lower ratios of assets to sales in other industries (see Table 10 
and accompanying text) . 
Being capital intensive, the cost of capital plays an important part in deter~ 
mining the ultimate price the electricity industry must charge for its product. 
Likewise, the other fixed charges associated with investment--depreciation, in-
surance and property taxes-weigh heavily in the total cost of delivered energy. 
To keep its total cost per unit of output as low as possible, a utility must seek 
to spread these fixed costs over the largest output possible. Thus, load factor is 
important in utility economics. Load factor is the ratio of actual output to the 
potential output associated with around-th~clock use of maximum annual sup-
ply. To the extent that the load factor is increased, the portion of total costs 
per kilowatt hour represented by fixed costs will decline. 
Fi:ceil Costs 
Normally, more than 50 percent of the total cost of electric service can be 
termed "fixed" or not directly related to output. This percentage can vary from 
year to year primarily as a function of fuel costs, which is by far the largest 
component of variable cost. Table 3 outlines the evolution -of fixed and variable 
costs as percentages of total revenue over the past 10 years. To a substantial 
extent, the data on fixed costs are understated. 
A major portion, perhaps three-fourths or more, of the expenditures for main~ 
tenance and other operating expenses (mainly labor) need to be continued if the 
utility system is to be in viable operation at all. It is more likely that purchases 
of materials can be deferred during periods of financial stringency or slack 
demand. If an adjustment were to be made for these factors, the share of fixed 
costs would rise to perhaps 70 percent. 
TABLE 3.-FIXED AND VARIABLE ELEMENTS OF COSTS OF PRODUCING ELECTRICITY 
Cost category 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Variable costs : 
FueL _____ ---- ___ -----_ 15.4 15.4 16.0 16.1 16.8 17.3 19.8 21.9 22.5 24.4 Maintenance ____________ 6.8 6. 8 6. 7 6. 9 6. 7 6.9 7. 3 7.1 7.3 7.2 
Other operating expenses_ 19.6 19.6 19.4 19.2 19.0 19.2 19.1 18.8 18.6 17.5 
Subtotal, variable costs_ 41.8 41.8 42.1 42.2 42.5 43.4 46.2 47.8 48.4 49.1 
Fixed costs : 
Depreciation __ --------- 11.8 11.8 11.5 11.9 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.4 11.0 10.9 Taxes ________________ __ 23.0 22. 3 22. 1 21.6 22.0 20.9 18.3 17.4 17. 2 16.5 
Operating income after 
23.4 24.1 24.3 24.3 23.8 24.0 23.8 23.4 23.4 23.5 taxes ______________ __ 
Subtotal, fixed costs_ 58.2 58.2 57.9 57.8 57.5 57.0 53.8 52.2 51.6 50.9 
Source: Edison Electric Institute Statisticlll Yearbook of the Electric Utility Industry 1963-72; data for 1973 estimated 
443 
Th data in table 3 reveal the burden that fixed costs represent for an electric 
utility. The fact that utilities have been earning less than adequate returns on 
equity capital over the past several years actually serves to lower the share 
of fixed costs in this tabulation l>ecause it uses revenue from sales as a proxy 
for total cost. The latter is only equal to revenue from sales when the full cost 
of equity is being eamed. 
Present trends are likely to keep fixed cost at about 50 percent of revenue 
in the next few years. Thereafter, it can •be expected to climb unless load factors 
are noticeably increased. In the short run, the dramatic escalation of fossil fuel 
prices will tend to keep operating costs at a historically high proportion of 
revenue. As new and more expensive plant is added to utility systems and as 
nuclear energy supplies an increasing share of total generation, the relative 
importance of plant costs will increase and that of fuel costs will decrease. 
Trends in Plant Costs 
Over most of the history of the electric utility industry, plant costs per kilo-
watt of capacity remained stable or showed a downward trend. Economies of 
scale available in production, transmission, and distribution were normally 
sufficient to offset the effects of in:flation. Today economies of scale still exists, 
though perhaps to a lesser degree than in the past. Since the late 1960's, how-
ever, the gains from advancing technology and increasing plant size have been 
more than offset by the costs arising from in:flation. The current dollar cost of 
additional capacity is above the embedded or historical costs of facilites already 
in service. Figure 2 shows how this trend has developed since 1950 and how one 
authority on the subject has projected it to develop over the next four years,, 
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Some of the rise in plant investment per kilowatt is due to the installation 
of more complex, capital-intensive plant. These upward pressures would exist 
even if inflationary forces were nil. In effect, they result from the construction 
of facilities which are noticeably different in characterstics from existing equip-
ment. Nuclear power stations are a primary example of such new plant. Fossil 
1 Edwin Vennard, A Ohanging Induatry in a Ohanging World, Edison Electric Institute, 
Graduate Management Course, p. 44. 
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fuel stations equipped with elaborate environmental protection devises can 
also be considered as belonging to a new class of facility. The same can be said 
of underground distribution plant in areas where, in the past, overhead lines 
have been installed. 
lnfiatlon impacts on fixed costs not only in terms of higher investment costs 
but in higher costs of capital necessary to finance the investment. An example of 
how fixed costs rise in response to both increased unit investment and risina.t 
money costs of financing is given in the following example: 
1968 
Investment per kilowatt •• ___ ------- _________ -----------------_---- __ -----------_ $350. 00 Annual fixed charge rate (percent)._______________________________________________ 13. 2 
Dollars per year ___ ._-------- ____________________ ------ ____________ -----________ $46.00 
Kilowatt-hours at 60 percent load factor (8,760 times .60>---------------------------- 5, 256 Fixed cost per kilowatt-hour (cents)_______________________________________________ 0. 87 
Increase from 1968 to 1978 (cents) _______ ----------- __ ------ __ ------ _________ ----- ____ ----------
1978 
$490.00 
15.2 
$74.50 
5,256 
1. 42 
0.55 
This example assumes a constant load factor of 60 percent. An increasing load 
factor would attentuate the increase in fixed charges but a decreasing load factor 
would further increase costs per kilowatt hour. In the above illustration, raising 
the load factor by ·l percent would reduce the absolute increase in fixed charges 
(1968-1978) by 4 percent. 
Improvements in load factor depend on the ability of the electric utility to 
market off peak uses of electricity. Electric heating is perhaps the most promising 
load in this regard for utilities with summer peaks. The prospects for more stable, 
or even declining, fuel costs which will accompany the growing use of nuclear 
power should aid the competitiveness of electric heat versus other energy forms 
used for space heating. 
Load Factor and Rate of Return 
The significance of load factor is very substantial. Each 10 percent point 
change (i.e. from 60 percent to 70 percent) in load factor is equivalent to one 
whole percentage point change (i.e. from 6 percent to 7 percent) in return on the 
investment. 
It would require a 10 percent increase in price to accomplish the Harne thing. 
For the same percent return on the investment, the price to the public at 60 percent 
load factor can be one-tenth lower than it would bl' at nO percent. 'fhe following 
calculation illustrates the snmP point using one kilowatt as the example. (Using 
data supplied by Edwin Vennard) : 
(1) Plant ------------------------------------------------------- $500.00 (2) Gross Revenue (5300 kWh (60% LF) at 1.9¢) ------------------- 100. 00 
(3) Return--6% of (1>------------------------------------------- 30.00 
(4) Increased KWH at 10 11ercentage points increase in L.F.=10o/o of 
8760 hours in year= --------------------------------------- 876 kWh (5) Increased Net Revenue 
Increased Gross Rev. 1.6¢ (not 1.9¢) 
IncrensNl Fhcpemm .4¢ (mostly fnPl) 
Increased Net Before tax 1.2¢X876kWh=--------------------
(6) FPderal Jnrome Tax-50%-------------------------------------
(7) Increased Return---------------------------------------------
(8) New Return (3)~(7>----------------------------------------­
(9) New Percent Return (8) divided by (1>-------------------------
10.00 
!).00 
5.00 
35.00 
7% 
A graphic representation of the Load Factor-Return relationship is presented 
in Figure 3. 
Percent 
Return 
445 
LOAD FACTOR and 
PERCENT RETURN 
9 ~ 
7 ~ ~ 
~ P""""" 
~ .,. 5 
Ill"""' 
3 
1 
30 40 50 60 70 80 
Percent Load Factor 
FIGURE 3 
be:~~~~7k.Edwfn Vennard, A Study and Forecast of the Electric Power Business, Novem-
PROFITABILITY OF THE INDUSTRY 
Allowable Rates of Return 
.A~. already noted, one of the key fuJ?ctions .of regulations is determining a per-
Im.&nl.Jle l~vel. of profit or return. In mdustnes sul.Jject to normal market forces 
this functwn .Is left to competitive pressures, in the uelief that the a'Ppearance of ah:qor~ally ~Igh profits in a given activity will elicit the entry of new competitors 
who ~.Ill drive ~rofits l.Jack down to a more normal level. The monopoly nature 
of utility operatwn, however, precludes direct competition. Thus by regulating 
profits •. the governmental regulator fulfills a role analogous to that oi competitive 
forces m the market economy. 
Determining the a~propriate level. of return on equity is frequently one of the 
more comp~e.x tas~s m a rate heanng. Expert testimony is often sought from 
people familia: WI~h the n~t!on's capital markets. Conclusions must ue reached 
as to the r~lativ~ ris~ of utility versus other securities and to the differentials in 
returns whziCh Will fnzrly reflect the differences in risk. 
In view of the strategic role of investor evaluations in determining a utility's c~pital c?.sts, it is instruc~ive to examine the statement of Rouert w. Burke, th~ 
VIc~ preszdent of Moody s Investors Service responsible for the widely-used 
ratmgs: 
The requirements of the utility investor are not unreasonable. On the 
whole, he has a conservative orientation. The utility common need not 
41-160 0 - 75 - 29 
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pr~vide exciting earnings growth but should at least promise steady and 
reliable progress over the years. The bond buyer expects no more interest 
than the going market rate will provide, but he does want reasonable 
assurance of continuing quality.2 
Mr. Burke estimated two years ago that rate increases will have to aver~ge 
"better than 5 percent annually" over the next five years to arrest dilution in 
debt coverage. He w!lrns that "It will take a lot of fortitude on the part of regu-
lators to.gran.t the higher rates that must come." 3 A similar sentiment was voiced 
by a semor vice president of the First National City Bank of New York: 
With today's intlation, and with today's expansion requirements, utility 
r~tes d~termined on last year's rate base just do not tly from a financial 
viewpomt. Investments and costs are reasonably predictable for a number 
?f years ahead, and rate patterns must begin taking these future years 
mto acco~~· There has been a move in this direction, but not far enough. 
~hat utlhties really need i:s rate regulation that provides steady pre-
dictable and satisfactory growth in their earnings.4 ' 
It thus. ap~rs that t.h~ ~ey risk .for !in investor-owned electric utility at the 
p;esent time IS the possibihty that It Will be prevented from raising rates suffi-
Ciently to offset sharply rising costs, costs which have continued to rise 
In granting or a~thorizing an increase in rates, regulatory commissio~s fre-
quently do noL specify the level of permisr.;ihle return on common equity hut in-
stead announce a pet;nitted rate of return; that is, the total of profit plus interest 
as a pe.rcent of ca.pital (the latter is usually referred to as the "rate base"). 
Dependmg on th.e capital structure of the utility and the costs of debt and pre-
ferred stock, a given overall rate of return may imply varying rates of allowable 
profits on common stock equity. 
Some idea of the differing views held by various state regulatory agencies as 
to the necessary return on equity can be gleaned by comparing data on returns 
requested with returns granted over the past few years. In 1973 out of some 45 
firut! rate decisions .surveyed, 39 had involved requests for after-tax returns on 
eqmty of 12 percent or more. However, only 29 of the final orders permitted 
ret:nrns at or above the 12 percent level. The average rate of return (un-
weighted) granted in the 45 decisions surveyed in 1973 was 11.9 percent, compared 
to the average requested of 13.15%. Table 4 also contains comparable data for 
1972 and 1971. 
TABLE 4.-RATES OF RETURN REQUESTED AND ALLOWED, ELECTRIC RATE CASES SETTLED, 1971- 1973 
Period of decision: 
Average Average 
unweighted unweighted 
return return 
Number of sought granted 
decisions (percent) (percent) 
40 12.62 11.90 
57 13.11 12.24 
45 13.15 11.92 
~~~~ - - ---- --- -- ------- -- ------ -------------------------- ----
1973- - -- ---- - -- --- -- ------ --- - - -- ----------------- --- - ------
-- -------·-... -- -- ---· .. .. .. ..... ---- .. .. ---------------................... ---
Source : Edison Electric Institute. 
Data collected by the Federal Power ·Commission 5 show that the range of 
actual return on common .equity extends from below 5 percent to over 18 percent. 
However, 'Of the comparues covered by this survey, the percentage earning 12 
percent or ~ore on common has declined since 1969. In that year 45 percent of 
the compames had a rate of return on equity of 12 percent or more. In 1970 
the figure. was 40 percent, in 1971, 39 percent, and in 1972, 40 percent. 
On an. mdustn: wide basis, data reported in the same FP.C •Survey show that 
the .earnmgs available for common stock as a percentage of average common 
eqmty have declined noticeably sin~ 1966 (see Table 5). 
2 Robert W. Burke. Electric Utilitu Bond Ratings, an address before the Fortieth Annual 
Conve.ntion of the EdiRon Electric Institute, San Diego California June 7 1972 p 6 
3 lbul .• p. 5. ' ' • • · · 
'Willinm A. Lockwood. Capital Resources for a Capital Intensive Industru a speech 
hPfore thf' General Electric Sixth Electric Uttltty Executives Conference Hot Springs 
Virginia, September 17, 1973. p. 7. ' ' 
U •tFederal Power Commission, Statistics of Privately Owned Electric Utilities in the n~ ed States. 
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TABLE 5.-EARNINGS APPLICABLE TO COMMON STOCK EQUITY OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES 
Year: 
1966 _______ ---------------------- ------------- ----------- ---------- . ----------- ----- ---
1967----------------- - ------------------------ -- --- ----- ------------------------ ----- --
1968 _____ ----- -------------------------------- --- ------------------------------ ----- -- -
1969 ____ ----------------------------------------------------------------- --------------
1970 ____ --- - - - --- ------- - -- - ------- - - --------------------------- - ---- -- -- --------------~~~t::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
Source : Federal Power Commission. 
Inflation and UtiUtieB 
Earnings 
r.vailable for 
common stock 
as li percent of 
average common 
equity 
12.8 
12.8 
12.3 
12.2 
11.8 
11.7 
11.8 
Although intlation is a serious problem for most sectors of the economy, it is 
especially significant for the electric utilities because of their tremendous need 
for new capital. A typical utility requires about $4 of capital to generate one 
dollar of revenue. In contrast, the average manufacturing company needs only 
75 cents to produce a dollar of revenue. Inflation not only increases the cost of 
capital, but magnifies the amount needed. 
Most manufacturing operations have equipment with a much shorter life. 
The more rapid turnover of plant and equipment investment enables the manu-
facturing company to react more quickly in pricing its products. They are also 
able to adjust prices, control expenditures, vary product and inventory lines, 
and effect other internal policies with greater freedom.11 
Utilities, however, must provide service wherever and whenever the public 
demands it and are subject to the dictates of regulation. The result for utilities 
during a period of high intlation often is an erosion of earnings, a decline in the 
proportion of internally generated funds, an overreliance on debt financing, a 
lowering of overall quality~ and a loss of investor confidence. 
As Professors Kamerschen and Wallace of the University of Missouri have 
stated it: 
Regulated industry is exposed to more risk than non-regulated industry during 
periods of intlation in that regulated firms cannot readily adjust prices to com-
pensate for the effects of intlation, whereas non-regulated industry historically 
has had the a1bility to adjust prices promptly in response to intlation. Regulated 
industry must await the effects of intlation on earnings before an application 
can be made for an adjustment in rates. After an application has been made, 
there is an additional waiting period to allow for consideration of the applica-
tion by the commission. This increases the risk of intlation for regulated indus-
try. Also, regulated utilities have less opportunity to exit from old markets and 
enter new ones than do industrial firms because of the large fixed investment 
tied to a particular market and the necessity of obtaining authorization to make 
such changes which itself is a costly, time-consuming task.7 
The after-tax return on investment in electric utilities typically is below the 
average for other leading industries. The average return on net worth for lead-
ing electric and gas utilities of 10.8 percent in 1973 was significantly below the 
returns of large non-financial corporations (13.2 percent) and of large manu-
facturing companies (14.8 percent) .8 Given the new higher level of risk in electric 
utility operations, such differentials no longer seem to be appropriate. 
Trend.y in Dividenrl-9 Payments 
As will he explained in a later section, investor-owned electric utilities have 
sought to maintain their dividend payout ratios for common stock in spite of 
11 Professor Reuben E . SlPsinger of the University of Pittsburgh, "UtiUties and Regula-
tion: <:omnatahtltty in a Dynamic Environment.'' Public Utilities Fortnightly, Novem-
hPr 2H. 1 fl72, p. 24. 
7 Dnvic1 R. Kamer~;chen and Richard r,. Wallace, "Opportunity Cost and the Attraction 
for Utilit;v Ratf' Regulation." Pu.blic Utilities Fortnightl1/, February 15, 1973. p. 44. 
R First National City Bank, Monthl1f Economic Letter, April 1974, pp. 8- 9. The data 
on nPt worth cover stockholders' investment applicable to both common and preferred 
shares. 
increased requirements for funds for construction programs. A slight downward 
trend has been evident since 1968 as illustrated in Table 6. 
TABLE 6.-AVERAGE PAYOUT RATIOS FOR ElECTRIC UTILITIES 
(Dollar amounts in thousands) 
Year: 
1968 ____ ---- •• - ----- ·---------.------ ·----.------ ·-------- •• -
1969 ____ -- - - - - - ------------.-.-.----------.-.-.-----.--------
1970 ____ ----. - ---- . ---------.-------------- •• -.--. --.------.-1  ___________________________________ _________________ _ 
1972 _____ _____ - ----. ·--. -· - --·- . -- -- ·-- -·-- - ------.- ---------
1973 _________ ··- ·----- ----- -· ------------- •• •• - --· ------ ·-. --
Source: Edison Electric Institute. 
Earnings 
available 
for common 
stock 
$2,681 
2,823 
2,972 
3,281 
3,721 
4,083 
Common 
dividends 
$1,838 
1,880 
2,022 
2,191 
2,402 
2,656 
Payout 
ratios 
0.686 
.660 
.680 
.668 
.646 
.651 
The modest increase in the percentage of earnings thus retained by the 
industry has permitted a slight recovery in the portion of construction expendi-
tures financed by retained earnings (see Table 7). 
TABLE 7.-RETAINED EARNINGS AND CONSTRUCTION OUTlAYS OF ElECTRIC UTILITIES 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Year: 
1968 ___ ----- •• ------------ --------------------------------.--
1969·-----------------------··------·-·---------------------· 
1970 ____ ------------------ --·-- ------.---. -· ------------.----
1971 _____ -----------.--------.------------- - -- ---------------
1972. _____ --.--.------ •• -.----.----.---.------.- •••• --.-.----
1973 ____ ---- ••• --·--·- ·- ---- --· ·--- ---- - -- - · ---.----- - -------
Source: Edison Electric Institute. 
Trenas in Utility Stock Indices 
Electric 
construction 
expenditures 
$7,168 
8, 323 
10,182 
11,938 
13,435 
14,979 
Retained 
earnings 
$843 
943 
950 
1,090 
1,319 
1,427 
Retained 
earnings 
as a 
percent of 
construction 
expenditures 
11.8 
11.3 
9.3 
9.1 
9.8 
9.5 
The particular financial problems of electric utilities have compounded the 
etrects of a stagnant stock market on utility shares. Declining interest coverage 
ratios have required an increased reliance on common stock sales with their dilut-
ing efr'ect on earnings per share. All of this has occurred at a time when placement 
of additional shares must be made at prices below book values because of the 
depressed state of the equity markets. 
Data on the comparative performance of the Moody's 125 Industrials and 24 
Utilities averages reveal the acute difficulty being experienced by utility com-
panies (see Table 8). Since 1970, the utility index has failed to track the in-
dustrial average during market rises. The year 1972 was especially significant 
in this regard. While the 1972 average price level of the industrials was 14 per-
cent higher than 1971, the utility index was 5 percent below 1971. Both indices 
declined over 1973. The utility average fell by 11 percent, compared to only 2 
percent for the industrials. Figure 4 shows the trend of both measures over the 
period 1968-1973. 
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FIGURE 4 
source: Moody's Industrial Manual, 1974 Edition, Vol. I. Moody's Investors Service, Inc. 
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TABLE B.-MOVEMENTS IN UTILITY AND INDUSTRIAL STOCK PRICES 
Year and date: 
Moody's 24 utilities average: 
1974: June ••••• __________ • ___ _______________ ------ __ • __________ __ ___ _______ _ 
March ••• . ________ • _____ __________ ••• __ . __ ----- •••• --.------ -----------
1973 : 
December·---------------- ---------------------------------- --- --------September •• ----- __ ----- -- _______ . __ ___________ ____ . _________ _ -------- _ 
June ••••• __ ____________ ----------------- ______ ________________ ______ _ _ 
March •• ______ • ____________ •.• __ -- . --.---.---.-------------------------1972 : Decsmber ___ __________ ________________ . ____ ------- __________ -------- __ 
Moody's 125 industrials average: 
1974: June ••••• __ ___ • ___ • ___________________________ • _____________ . ________ • 
March • • ----- ______________ --- ___ --- ______ -----------------------------
1973: 
December·-------------------------------------------------------------~~~~~~~~~:::::===============:::===:======================:=========== March·----------------------------------------------------------------1972: December _______ •• _. ___ • _____________________ •••••••••• _ •. _. __ -----.--
1 Preliminary. 
Price/earnin~s 
ratio 
6.0 
8.6 
8.1 
9.5 
9.2 
9. 7 
10.8 
10.6 
11.8 
12.4 
14.4 
15.1 
17.3 
19.2 
Note: Earnings per share are for 12 months ending with the quarter on or near date shown above. 
Source: Moody's Investors Service, Inc. 
Earnings 
per share 
7.23 
7.15 
7. 55 
7.60 
7.63 
7. 78 
7. 73 
131.60 
24.70 
29.18 
23.77 
27.15 
23.95 
24.42 
Poorer performance on the part of the utility index was undoubtedly due to the 
stagnation in per share earnings growth. Between December 1972 and June 1974, 
average earnings per share of the industrial group rose by nearly 30 percent 
while that of the utility group declined by 6.5 percent (see Table 8). 
Deterioration of utility stock prices has been further aggravated since October 
1973 by reduced earnings resulting from conservation induced reductions in sales 
of electricity. For those electric companies not fully covered by fuel adjustment 
clauses, the explosive rise in fossil fuel prices has also contributed to declines in 
earnings. Even those companies having such clauses in their rates not only have 
faced much higher finance charges on fuel inventories, but have experienced 
delays between the time the added cost is incurred and the point at which it is 
reflected in higher billings. The extent of stock price deterioration can be appre-
ciated from the following list which compares August 26, 1974 closing prices of 
51 electric utility stocks with corresponding book values as of December 31, 1973 
(Table 9). The average price of stocks in the list as of August 26 was more 
than 32 percent below December's average book value. Only 4 of the 51 stocks 
were selling above book value and one listing, that of Consolidated Edison, had 
an August 26 price less than 25 percent of book. 
THE PHYSICAL CAPITAL INTENSITY OF THE INDUSTRY 
The electric utility industry has the highest ratio of investment to revenue 
of any sector of the industrial economy.11 For investor-owned electric utilities this 
ratio has consistently averaged near 4, as data for the 10-year period 1964-1973 
illustrate (see Table 10). 
Other industries normally have much lower ratios of net assets to revenues. 
After electric uti'lities the next most capital intensive industry is communica-
tions where revenue equals assets once in just under 3 years. Railroads normally 
require more than 2¥:! years for revenues to match assets, and gas utilities and 
pipeline companies require about 2 years. The great bulk of manufacturing indus-
tries, however, turn over their assets in less than one year. Table 11 compares 
1972 asset/revenue ratios for several major industrial groupings. 
11 Agriculture has a higher ratio of investment to revenue than any industry, due to the 
dominance of land, a nondepreciable asset, in its investment total. 
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TABLE 9.-COMPARISON OF MARKET VALUE TO BOOK VALUE, 51 ELECTRIC UTILITY COMPANIES 
Company 
Allegheny Power System ____________ ___________________ ------- ____ _ 
American Electric Power. __________ ______ --------------------- ____ _ 
Arizona Public Service ____ . _________ ________ ----------- ___________ _ 
Baltimore Gas & Electric. ___________ ______ --------------------- ___ _ 
Boston Edison. ___ . ____ . ___________ _____ -------_--------- ________ _ 
Carolina Power & Light_ _____________ ______ ---------- _____________ _ 
Central & South West__ ___ ---------- -------------------------------Cincinnati Gas & Electric •... ______________________________________ . 
Cleveland Electric Illuminating _____ ------ _______ --------------------Commonwealth Edison _________ ____________________ . ___________ . __ _ 
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York--------- ---------- -------------
Consumers Power ________ ---- ----------_-------------------------_ Dayton Power & Light.-------- -__________________________________ _ 
Detroit Edison. ____ . ________ . __ __________________________________ _ 
Duke Power. ___ ------------- ___ --------- ___ ------ _______________ _ 
Duquesne Light ••• __ ___ ----- ____ • _______________ ----- ____________ _ 
Eastern Utilities Associates _____ _____ ._. ___ ------- _____________ ____ _ 
Florida Power Corp ____________ ______________________________ . ____ _ 
Florida Power & Lig.ht__ __ ________________________________________ _ 
General Public Utilities. __ _ --------- ____ __________ __ . ___ • __ . ------_ 
Gulf States Utilities _____ . ___ ___________ --------- - _________________ _ 
Houston Lighting & Power__ _______________________________________ _ 
Illinois Power------ ---- ---- -----. __________________ ------- _______ _ 
Long Island Lighting ____ __ --- ----- ________________ ------ ____ ------_ Middle South Utilities ___ _____ _______ . ___________________ __________ _ 
New England Electric System. _____ • ________ • ____ -------------- ____ • 
New England Gas & Electric·- --------------------------------------
New York State Electric & Gas--------------------------------------
Niagara Mohawk Power__ __________________ ------------- -----------
Northeast Utilities _______ ____________ _ ----- __ ------_------- _______ _ 
Northern Indiana Public Service. ____ _____________ . ___ .. __ . ________ • 
Northern States Power ____ _ . _____ ._. __ ______ ________ . _____________ _ 
Ohio Edison. __ ._ . ____ .. _______ . _______ ------- ______ ---- ______ •. __ 
Oklahoma Gas & Electric. ______________ ------- ____________________ _ 
Pacific Gas & Electric .. __ . __________ . ____ . ______ . ________________ •. 
Pacific Power & Light__ ___ _ ----- _____ ._. ________ ---- _____ .. ___ • ___ _ 
Pennsylvania Power & LighL .. __ --- _______________ -----. __ . --- ___ . 
Philadelphia Electric _____ ____ . __ . _______________ •. ________________ _ 
Potomac Electric Power._. _ .. __ . _______________________ ._ . • ____ . __ . 
Public Service Co. of Colorado _____________________________________ _ 
Public Service Electric & Gas .. _____ . ___ . ____ • ______ . ___ ------ ___ .. _ 
Public Service Indiana _______ ._. ____________ ---- ____ -------_--- ___ _ 
Rochester Gas & Electric . _______ . _________ ------- __ . ___________ . __ _ 
San Diego Gas & Electric .. __ ---_.---. __________ --- ___ ._. ____ . _____ _ 
South Carolina Electric & Gas ___ . ___________ . _________ . ____________ _ 
Southern California Edison . ____ . _____________ ----. __ .. __ ._. ___ ._. _. 
Southern Co ••• . _____ . __ _ .. ______ . ___ ___ .. . . ___ • __ ---. ___ ---.---.-
Texas Utilities __ __________ _____ . _______ • _____ . ____________ --- ____ _ 
Union Electric .•• __ . ______ . ___________ . _____ ._. ____ . ______ .---- __ -
Virginia Electric & Power__ _________ . ______ ... ____ . ________________ . 
Wisconsin Electric •. ------ -___ ___________ .. __________ .. _. ____ ._---. 
Average __ __ _ .. __ ____ ___ • _____ .. ___ ._._._._---. ___ . _____ .•.• 
1 Argus Research Corp. and Kidder, Peabody & Co. Inc. 
2 Wall Street Journal, Aug. 27, 1974. 
1973 
Yearend 
book value 1 
$18.00 
20.40 
20.70 
26.10 
31.70 
22.70 
12.00 
17. 70 
23.80 
26.60 
31.00 
27. 90 
18.70 
19.90 
20.60 
19.50 
17. 90 
29.40 
24.20 
22.10 
13.40 
24.20 
19.90 
18.40 
15.90 
22.70 
15.50 
29.50 
16.50 
12.20 
16.70 
21.90 
15.30 
14.10 
27.80 
18.10 
22.30 
20.20 
15.40 
17.60 
24.80 
25.70 
21.90 
17.00 
17.60 
28.90 
18.20 
15.30 
15.40 
18.60 
24.70 
20. 73 
Market value Market value 
at close as percent of 
Aug. 26, 197 4 z book value 
$13.750 73.9 
14.625 71.7 
13.250 64.0 
14.500 55.6 
16.250 51.3 
12.625 55.6 
12.875 107.3 
15.250 86.2 
23.125 97.2 
21.000 78.9 
7.250 23.4 
11.625 41.7 
12.000 64.2 
9.875 44.6 
10.750 52.2 
14.750 75.6 
9. 750 54.5 
14.500 49.3 
15.750 65.1 
10.375 46.9 
10.125 75.6 
20.750 85.7 
16.500 82.9 
10.875 59.1 
10.625 66.8 
13.375 58.9 
9. 625 62.1 
18.500 62.7 
9.125 55.3 
6.875 56.4 
13.625 81.6 
18.000 82.2 
14.375 94.0 
18.000 127.7 
19.375 -69.7 
16.000 88.4 
17.000 76.2 
11.000 54. 5 
10.375 67. 4 
10.000 56.8 
12.375 49.9 
32. 000 124.5 
12.500 57.1 
10. 500 61.8 
10.125 57.5 
16.750 58.0 
9. 750 53.6 
19.625 128.3 
10. 500 68.2 
8, 250 44.4 
18.000 72.9 
14. 17 68.4 
TABLE 10.- CAPITAL INTENSITY OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Year 
1963 ____ ----------------- ---------------------- -- ----------------
1964. --- --------------- ---- :. ----------------------------- --------
1965. --------------- --- -- ---- ---------------- ---- ----------------1966 _______________ __ ______ _____________________________________ _ 
1967-------------------- ---------- -------------------------------
1968.---- ------------ --- ·----- ----- ------------------ ------.-----1969 ___________________________ ___ ______________________________ _ 
1970_----------------------.-----.- ----.-.------.----------------
1971.-.-•• -------.-------.- •• -.---- ---- -- ·---.--- --.-------- -----
1972 •• ---.---------------------.--- ----- -·------. -. ----- ---- -- -- -
1973.-.---------.--••• ---.-.--.---- -.--------.-.-.---.---.--.----
Source: Edison Electric Institute. 
Average assets 
for the year 
$45,012 
46,963 
49,243 
52,260 
56,299 
61,346 
67, 365 
75,090 
84,742 
95,861 
108,234 
Electric Assets/revenue 
revenues ratio 
$11,577 
12,211 
12,887 
13,773 
14,569 
15,810 
17,164 
18,830 
21,230 
24,133 
27,526 
3.89 
3.85 
3.82 
3. 79 
3.86 
3.88 
3.92 
3.99 
3.99 
3.97 
3.93 
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TABLE H .-ASSET/REVENUE RATIOS FOR VARIOUS INDUSTRIES, 1972 
Industrial groups 
Electric utilities • •• __ --- - --------------- __ • __ ••••• ___ ----- •• ___ ---- ••••• __ ••••• --- •••••••• ___ •• Communications _______ __ ____ ___________ __ ___________________________________________________ _ 
Railroads ••• ••• __ . _. __ __ _ •••••• -----. __ • • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• -- •••••••.••••••••• Investor-owned las utilities and pipeline industry ___ ------- ______________________________________ _ 
¥:g~::t£o:~~;::r~~~~~~~::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::: == ::::::::::: = :::: ~::: ::::::::::::: 
rYr~:~~~~!r:~~~d~~~~~~~:s:_:_:_:_:_:_:_:_:_:_=::~:::::::::::::::::::: :::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
Assets/ 
revenue 
3.97 
2. 75 
2.67 
2.00 
.98 
.86 
• 75 
.58 
.44 
• 75 
Source: Based on data from Moody's Utility Manual, Association of Americar. Railroads; Gas Facts; Federal Trade 
Commission-Securities and Exchange Commission quarterly financial report for U.S. manufacturing corporations. 
THE FINANCIAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY 
Debt/Equity RatioB 
The investor-owned electric utility industry is characterized by a highly lev-
eraged capital structure, a far higher proportion of debt to stockholders invest-
ment than is present in most other industries. Reliance on long term debt pluH 
preferred stock has been justified historically by the past pattern of stability of 
net income growth. This is a characteristic which, at least in the past, has been 
associated with regulated utilities as a general proposition, shareholders of a 
company are wary of large amounts of debt because the payment of interest on 
this indebtedness take precedence over the payment of dividends. 
This stability in earnings growth hence was quite important. It allowed the 
common equity investor to view high debt ratios with little concern because of 
his confidence in the availability of adequate earnings. Other industries, which 
lack stable growth in their net income, have depended less on debt financing and 
normally seek to generate a large portion of their new capital internally. When 
outside financing is needed, firms in these industries more often resort to the 
sale of new equity. 
Over the past few years, electric utilities have seen their interest burdens 
increase rapidly because of two factors: (1) long term interest rates have risen 
dramatically and (2) steadily expanding construction programs required more 
capital. Since 1964, yields on utility bonds have nearly doubled while annual 
construction expenditures have more than quadrupled (see Table 12). 
TABLE 12.-ELECTRIC UTILITY CAPITAL OUTLAYS AND BOND YIELDS 
Year 
1964 •••• -------------------------------- ------ -- - --- - -------- ---------
1965 ••••••• -- --------------------------- --------- - ------------ ---------
1966 •••••• -- ---------------------------- - --- --- -- -- --- - - --- -- ----------
19&7 ------------------------------------ ----- ------ -- --------- ---------1968 ______________ ------------------------ -- -- ----- - -- -- - ---- ----------
1969 ••• --------------------------------- -- -------------------- ---------
1970 ••••••• ----------------------------- ----- - ------ ---------- ---------
1971. •••• ------------------------------- ---- - --- - -- -- --------- ---------
1972 ______ ------------------------------ --- - - --------- ---.- -· . ----·.-.-
1973 ••••••• ------------------------------ ---.--- --.- -· ---- --- ----------
Source: Moody's Investor Service; Edison Electric Institute. 
Overall average 
yields on utility 
bonds end of 
year average (percent) 
4. 53 
4.85 
5.63 
6. 56 
6.85 
8. 57 
8.29 
7.87 
7.48 
8. 21 
Electric construc-
tion expenditures (millions) 
$3,567 
4,050 
4, 962 
6, 140 
7, 168 
8, 323 
10, 182 
11,939 
13,435 
14,979 
Together these two developments have meant that maintenance of previous 
debt/equity ratios could only result in a substantial climb in the annual level 
of interest charges on long term debt. Reacting to these pressures, electric util-
ities have attempted to alter the mix of their incremental long term financing 
by expanding their sales of preferred and common stocks. This has led to some 
reduction in the share of long term debt in the industry's capital structure, from 
55.3 percent in 1970 to 52.9 percent in 1973 (see Table 13). 
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TABLE 13.-PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL SOURCES, ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 
Mortgage Other long- Total long- Preferred Common Total Capi-
Year bonds term debt term debt stock stock talization 
1964 •••• •• -- ------- - --- 48.3 3.5 51.8 9.6 38.6 100 1965 _____ ________ ______ 47.9 3.8 51.7 9.5 38.8 100 
1966 ••••• • -- - ---------- 48.8 3. 7 52.5 9.5 38.0 100 
1967-- --- -- -- . --------- 49.5 3.8 53.3 9. 7 37.0 100 
1968 ••••• -. -- ---------- 50.1 4.0 54.1 9.6 36.3 100 
1969 .... - - ---- --------- 50.9 4.1 55.0 9.5 35.5 100 
1970 •••• -- ------------. 51.6 3. 7 55.3 9.8 34.9 100 
1971.. •• - -------------- 51.1 3.6 54.7 10.7 34.6 100 
1972 .... - ----------- --- 49.4 4.3 53.7 11.7 34.6 100 
1973.. •••••• ----------- 48.0 4.9 52.9 12.0 35. 1 100 
Source: Edison Electric Institute. 
The above figures illustrate the changing importance of the major sources of 
the industry's capital over the past 10 years. From a peak of 55.3% in 1970, 
long term debt has declined to 52.9% in 1973. The decline of the share of common 
('apital stock equity which continued from 1964 to 1971 has only recently showed 
a small upturn. It has been mainly the increase in preferred s tock sales which 
has permitted .a reduction in the long term debt ratio. 
Trends in the mix of new long term financing illustrate the relative shift away 
from debt as a means to fund new construction since 1968 (see Table 14). 
TABLE 14.-COMPOSITION OF NEW LONG-TERM CAPITAL 
[Percentage distribution) 
Year 
1968 ••••• -- --------------------------
1969 .... - ---- ------------------------
1970 .... -- - --------------------------
1971 .... -----------------------------
1972 .... -----------------------------
1973 ••• ------------------------------
Source : Edison Electric Institute. 
Long-term 
debt 
64.3 
65.3 
57.6 
50.0 
45.3 
45.9 
Preferred 
stock 
9.3 
7.2 
12.7 
17.1 
20.1 
15.1 
Common 
stock 
9.2 
11.5 
19.3 
24.5 
23.0 
1.6.6 
Retained 
earnings 
17.2 
16.0 
10.4 
10.8 
ll.6 
12.4 
Total 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
In addition to the markedly heavier reliance on common stock, the pronounced 
increase in the use of preferred stock is clearly evident. Viewed by many as 
quasi debt, preferred stock has been an instrument for fixed interest financing 
when I,roblems of diminishing coverage ratios threatened the expansion of debt. 
'.rhe question of coverage has become an important factor in both utility financing 
strategies and rate increase requests. 
1\Iost electric utility mortgage indentures require the company to maintain a 
specified minimum ratio of earnings to interest charges (either on a before or 
after-tax basis). As this ratio declines toward the specified minimum, addi-
tional debt financing becomes increasingly difficult. In addition, the utility's bond 
rating is likely to be reduced which means an increase in the interest cost of 
new debt and further aggravation of the coverage problem. Ii'or the electric utility" 
industry as a whole, the coverage of interest charges has declined steadily since 
1965 (see Table 15) . 
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TABLE 15.-INCOME AND INTEREST OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Year 
1965.----- --- ------------- -- - - - ------ ---------------------
1966. - --------------- -- -- . -- --------- ---------------- -----
1967----------------- ---- --------- -. -- --------------------
1968. - ------------------------ -- --------------------------
1969.---------------------- -- -- -- --- ----------------------
1970.--------------------- -- - --- - --- - ---------------------
1971.-----------------------------------------------------
1972.-----------------------------------------------------
1973.---------------------------------------- - ------------
I Less allowance for funds used during construction. 
Source: Edison Electric l;~stitute. 
Income before 
interest charges 1 
$3,454 
3,692 
3,948 
4,179 
4,548 
5,009 
5,545 
6,302 
7,134 
Interest on 
long-term debt 
$953 
1,040 
1,180 
1,373 
1, 621 
2,010 
2,447 
2,849 
3, 271 
Ratio 
3.62 
3. 55 
3.35 
3.04 
2.81 
2.49 
2.27 
2. 21 
2.18 
An indication of further upward pressures on interest charges can be obtained 
from examining the calendar of refinancing of the industry's existing debt. 
About $8.2 billion of public utility bonds and notes will mature during the 
period 1974-78, approximately $1.2 billion of this amount in 1974 and $2.4 
billion in 1975. Over half of the public utility debt to be refunded during 1974 
and 1975 carries coupons of less than 4 percent (see Table 16). The implications 
of refunding this debt at prevailing rates, even assuming some ease in money 
and credit markets, are very substantial. 
TABLE 16.-MATURING PUBLIC UTILITY BONDS AND NOTES 
(In millions of dollars) 
Interest coupon on maturing issues, in percent 
1.00 to 2.00 to 3.00 to 4.00 to 5.00 to 6.00 to 7.01 to 8.01 to 9.00 to 10.00 to No 
1.99 2.99 3.99 4.99 5.99 6.99 7.99 8.99 9.99 10.99 coupon Total 
l~~t=== ~ ========= 129 545 24 6 -------- 75 284 53 50 --------823 520 20 13 ~~ 1 738 314 --·- ---- 1 1976 ____________ --- 573 182 61 10 225 332 68 -------· -- ------1977--------------- 402 545 93 116 298 166 25 10 ------- ---------1978 ____________ --- 60 794 93 82 247 150 ----------- ------- ------------:!-
1974-78__ _________ - 1, 987 2, 586 291 227 580 617 1, 379 445 50 
I Includes: Issues of electric, gas and water utilities and telephone companies. 
1,166 
2, 430 
1, 485 
1, 654 
1, 425 
8,160 
Source: Moody's Public Utility Manual 19731 as cited in Andrew F. Brimmer, Public Utility Pricing, Debt Financing, c.nd Consumer Welfare, remarks presented to tne Wharton School Club of Washington, May 22, 197~o. 
Treml in Bond Ratings 
The concurrent rise in capital requirements and interest rates has produced a 
rate of increase in debt service charges exceeding the growth of electric utility 
earnings. This in turn has led to a steady decline in the ratio of earnings to in-
terest, a decline so pronounced that for many companies this key index bas 
fallen to the minimum level permitted by indenture restrictions and effectively 
arrested the issuance of addition at debt. An inevitable result of the deteriorat-
ing earnings coverage has been a series of utility bond deratings by the major 
rating organizations. Each derating signals a higher cost of debt for the utility 
concerned and further restricts the potential market for future bonds. 
During the period 197~1973, deratings occurred with great frequency. In 
total, 13 electric utilities had their credit ratings lowered at least once by 
Moody's Investors Services, one of the two principal firiDS involved in credit 
evalution. Over the same period the industry's combined earnings/interest cov-
erage ratio declined from 2.5 to 2.2, measured on a basis which excludes AFDC 
from income totals. With the onset of the serious problems in utility earnings 
which accompanied the "energy crisis" of the winter of 1973-1974, the number 
of deratings has increased sharply. Between January and June 1974, the bonds 
of the following 14 electric utilities were downgraded by Moody's Investor 
Services: 
From To Category 
February 1974: 
Consolidated Edison of New York·---------- --- ---------- --- ----- - - - -- AA Public Service of New Hamsphire ____________ _________________________ A 
Baltimore Gas & Electric------ ------------- -------------------------- AAA 
AA 
Apri11974 : 
Western Massachusetts Electric • •••• ---------- ___ ._ ____________________ AA 
Detroit Edison . _-- ----- - ____ ---------------- __ --------------------- - AA Columbus & Southern Ohio ___________________________________________ AA 
A 
May 1974: 
Iowa Electric Li'ht & Power .... -------------------------------------- AA Savannah Electnc & ·Power _______ ____________________________________ A 
Baa 
Consumers Power __ • ___ ___ _____ • __ __ _ ---------------------------- ___ A 
Baa 
Eastern Utilities Associates & Subsidiaries _____________________________ Baa 
A 
Florida Power ________________ -------------------------------------- AA 
June 1974: 
g~~'i:,~~~fs~:~~ -~ -~i~~~== : : = = =: =: = == = == = : : = = = = = == = = == :: = :: == ::: = ==== ~A 
Virginia Electric Power----------------------------------------------- ~A 
Baa 
Baa 
AA 
A 
A 
A 
A 
Baa 
A 
Baa 
Ba 
Baa 
Ba 
Ba 
Baa 
A 
A 
Baa 
A 
Baa 
Mortgage bonds. 
Do. 
Do. 
Debentures. 
Mortgage bonds. 
Do. 
Do. 
Debentures. 
Mortgage bonds. 
Do. 
Debentures. 
Mortgage bonds. 
Debentures. 
Mortgage bonds. 
Do. 
Preferred stocks. 
Mortgage bonds. 
Do. 
Do. 
Debentures. 
The effect of deratings is, as noted, to raise the cost of debts and constrain 
its marketability. The higher cost effect is apparent from the figures .in table 
17 which relate percent cost to rating level for 65 investor owned companies 
surveyed by the EEl Investor Relations Committee. As bond ratings move down-
ward from the highest (AAA) grade, the percentage of companies surveyed 
paying more than 8% for debt in 1973 increased. 
For the years 196!>-1972, industry wide averages prepared from Moody's data 
for utility stocks and bonds likewise reveal the cost effect of credi~ or quality 
deratings. These averages are set out in table 18. 
TABLE 17.- DISTRIBUTION OF 65 PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES, BY BOND RATINGS VERSUS COST OF 
DEBT INCLUDED IN COST OF CAPITAL USED FOR ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS (DISREGARDING CAPITAL STRUCTURE) 
Cost of debt AAA 
Bond rating Distribution, 
by cost 
AA A Less than A of debt 
9 2 14 
3 1 1~ . 9 1 
5 11 2 19 
3 3 ------------ 6 1 1 1 3 
Up to and including $7..-------- -----------------
1
1 $7.01 to $7 .50 ________ _____ ----- ----------------. 
U:~l ~~ U:sic~::::: :: :: :::::: ::::::::::::::::: f $8.51 to $9 __ _______ ____ __ _____ ______________ ............. .. 
$9.01 to $9.50 ...... __ __ • ______ •• _________ ------------ -- ____ _ 
23 65 --------------------------~------~ Distribution, by bond rating________________ 5 30 
Note: Data refers to 65 of the 70 respondents to the 1974 poll of members of the EEl Investor Relations Committee. 
TABLE lB.-MOODY'S AVERAGE YIELDS ON UTILITY BONDS AND STOCKS, BY MOODY'S BOND RATINGS AND STOCK QUALITY GROUPS, 1965-73 
(In percent) 
Bonds Preferred stocks Common stocks 
High quality Good quality Medium quality ~ Overall Rating Hi h Good Medium Earnings/ Earnings/ EarninJS/ 
quafity 
price price pnce 
End of month average 1 Ana A a A Baa quality quality Yield ratio2 Yield ratiot Yield ratio t 
1973: 
December_----------- __ _ -- --------- __ 8.21 7.90 8.10 8.24 8.59 8.04 8.35 8.24 8.06 11.27 8.24 10.91 7. 75 10 September---- _____ ____ __ _________ ____ 8.07 7. 76 7.92 8.08 8.52 7. 72 8.04 8.08 6.84 9.52 6.92 9.97 7.08 9 June •. ___________ _______ __ ---- ____ - -_ 7. 73 7.53 7.63 7. 78 7.97 7.53 7.62 7. 75 6.88 9.65 6.93 10.38 7.26 10 March _______ _______ ___ -- _-- -__ -_- - --- 7. 76 7.44 7.52 7. 69 8.01 7.39 7.53 7.60 6.42 9.34 6.69 9.80 6. 72 9 
1972: 
December __ ----- ---- -- ----- - - - --- ---- 7.4rs 7.29 7.39 7. 51 7. 74 7.32 7.56 7. 77 5.52 8.07 6.07 8.91 6.27 9.05 September----- _____ ________ __________ 7.63 7.42 7.50 7.04 7.96 7.37 7.61 7.82 6.12 9.18 6.47 9. 72 6.94 9.58 June •• ___ ____________ _____________ ___ 7. 77 7.41 7.57 7.80 8.30 7.28 7.43 7. 71 0.37 9.31 6. 73 9.93 6. 72 9.40 
March _____________ -- __ -_ - - -- --- ------ 7. 81 7.53 7.69 7. 70 8.25 6.90 7.26 7.58 5.96 8.55 6.23 8.88 6.42 8.87 
1971: 
December_------------- - - ------ ------ 7.87 7. 50 7. 76 7.80 8.40 3 7.15 8 7. 39 7.87 5.65 7.84 5. 81 8.25 6.06 8.31 September------- ____ __ _____ ______ .. __ 8.10 7. 70 7.95 8.23 8.45 7.28 7.55 8.06 0.23 8.56 61.8 8.99 6.46 8.98 
June ••• ------------ - ---- -- --------- - - 8.35 7.98 8.20 8.45 8. 77 7.31 7.58 8.13 5.95 8.00 5.65 7. 91 6.17 8.32 March _____ • ______ --_----- -- ---------- 8.03 7.56 7.98 7.99 8.59 6. 91 
1970: 
7.11 7. 74 5.55 7. 51 5.36 7. 71 5.80 7.83 
December __ -------- ---------- -- ---- - - 8.29 7.80 8.20 8.23 8.91 7.30 7.55 8.43 5. 77 7.69 5.23 7.52 5.89 7.95 September------ ___ _________ ______ _ • __ 8. 75 8.33 8.63 8. 79 9.24 7. 76 8.00 8.56 6.38 8. 76 6.15 8. 99 6. 75 8. 92 June. _____ ._. __________ ____ • ___ _____ _ 9.20 8.89 9.00 9.22 9.67 7.84 8.13 8.56 6.88 9. 51 6.85 10.24 7.36 9.96 
March _______________ -- ------- - --- --- - 8.37 8.10 8.18 8.26 8.94 7.26 7.47 8.43 5.62 7. 71 5.29 7.99 6.14 8.08 
1969: 
December _____ --------- ---------- - -- - 8.57 8.05 8.40 8. 76 9.05 7.54 7.80 8.53 5.63 7.98 5.42 8.27 6.04 8.34 September--- -- _______ ____ _____ _______ 7. 79 7.40 7.67 7.82 8.27 7.09 7.08 7. 71 5.48 7. 79 5.31 8.01 6.36 8.69 June. _______ _______ __ __ --_- ___ _______ 7.47 7.13 7.38 7.45 7.90 6. 71 6.87 7.32 5.15 7.16 4.75 7.16 4.88 6.57 March _________ _ ---- ------------------ 7.37 7.09 7.23 7.40 7. 74 6.39 6.58 7.13 4. 75 6.54 4.47 6. 75 5.18 7.20 1968: 
December _________ ----------- ___ --·-- 6.85 6.52 6. 75 6.87 7.23 6.32 6.52 6.97 4.45 6.20 4.35 6.54 4. 91 8.40 September ______ -- - ---- ____ ---------- 6.27 6.03 6.12 6.27 6.67 5. 97 6.17 6.64 4. 77 6. 73 4.57 6.88 4.96 6. 72 June ••• _________ --- _____ - ___________ • 6.60 6.32 6.46 6.62 7.01 6.17 6.33 6.84 4.55 6.36 4.49 6.89 4.85 6. 78 
March ••••• __ --_- -----_-------_------- 6.39 6.13 6.26 6. 41 6. 75 6.04 6.28 6.63 4.85 7.01 4.69 7.41 5.28 7.52 1967: 
December_- - - --- ------ ___ ------------ 6.56 6.33 6.41 6.63 6.88 6.25 6.46 6.98 4.59 6.58 4.67 7.05 5.13 7.30 September ____ -- -- --- ----- -- ___ - -- - -_ 6.04 5.84 5. 91 6.06 6.33 5. 70 5.86 6.23 4.43 6.29 4.41 6.85 4.85 6.93 
June •• _--------- -------------------- - 5.90 5.69 5. 75 5. 91 6.23 5.49 5. 76 5.96 4.47 6.21 4.29 6.62 4.80 6.83 March. ___________ _ • __ _ - --- ____ -- -- -- 5.37 5.16 5. 20 5. 38 5.74 5.15 5.47 5. 71 3.89 5.83 3.90 6.23 4.60 6.59 1966: 
December ____ --------- - ----------- ___ 5.63 5.34 5.43 5.67 6.07 5.46 5. 72 5.94 3.89 5. 78 3.69 6.03 4.51 6.47 September _____ ---------------------- 5. 78 5.52 5.69 5.83 6.07 5.56 5. 72 5.86 4.32 6.36 4.49 6.90 4. 79 6.87 June ______________________ -- ________ - 5.33 5.18 5.21 5.42 5.52 5.12 5.35 5.56 4.06 5.88 4.14 6.29 4.47 6.26 March. ____ ------ ------ - __ - --- - ------ 5. 23 5.08 5.15 5.29 5.38 4.96 5.21 5.29 3. 79 5.44 3.92 5.92 4.31 5.98 1965: 
December __ ----- --- ---· ·-· ---- - _____ _ 4.85 4. 76 4. 78 4.86 4.99 4.72 4.94 5.00 3.46 4.83 3.45 4.98 3.89 5.51 September __ •• ·-----·----_------···- - 4.66 4.55 4.59 4.65 4.83 4.57 4.80 4.87 3.31 4.90 3.33 5.06 3.83 5.42 June ••• • __ _ ----- -- ______ --. __ _______ • 4. 57 4.47 4.50 4.53 4. 78 4.56 4. 74 4.83 3.22 5.08 3.34 5.16 3.84 5.60 ~ March ••• _. ---.---- ••• -.--- - -- ------- 4.52 4.43 4.44 4.50 4.69 4.43 4.59 4. 77 3.07 4.52 3.22 4. 77 3.59 5.06 
1 Average yield for 40 utility bonds, 10 in each of the 4 top-quality ratings shown. , Note: Yields shown undu pref&rred stocks and common stocks represent averages of 10 companies 
r Ratio in percent is obtained by dividing earnings per share by market price per share. in each quality group. 
a Revised. Source: Moody's Investors Service. 
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LegaZ and other .Restrictions on Le'Verage 
In all utility long-term debt indentures there is a limitation on the issuance 
of debt securities, usually referred to as the "covera·ge requirement." The gen-
eral effect of this limitation is that the company may not issue new bonds or 
debentures if the ratio of earnings to interest charges has been less than 2.0 for 
twelve of the :fifteen months prior to the month in which the new securities 
are to be issued. 
In a few indentures, the ratio is as low as 1.75 and in some cases over 3.0. 
In the majority of cases, the required coverage ratio is 2.0. The effect of this 
limitation is that new long-term debt cannot be sold if the company's earnings, 
before the payment of federal income tax, is not at least double the amount of 
interest it is required to pay on its long-term debt securities outstanding and 
proposed to be issued.10 
In 223 electric utility rate cases settled during the three year period 1971-
1973, 212 or 95 percent of the utilities had indentures which specified that in-
terest payments must be covered at least 200 percent by earnings before interest 
and income taxes (see table 19). In the 202 cases where data were available, 
a greater proportion of the earlier cases reported high coverage ratios than did 
the more recent cases. In the period January 1, 1971-March 31, 1972 62 per-
cent of the utilities reported an interest coverage ratio of 2.5 or more. By 1973, 
only 44 percent were in that category (see table 20). 
TABLE 19.-MINIMUM INTEREST COVERAGE REQUIRED BY INDENTURE (IN ELECTRIC RATE CASES SmLED 
1971-73) 
Number of 
Required interest coverage cases 
Less than 2 _______________________________ ------- _----- -------------------- ----- 11 
2 ___ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 192 2.1 to 2.5 __ __________ _____________ _____________________ ---------- ____ ------- ---- 17 
2.5 to 3 _____________________ __ ___________ -- ___ -- __ -- _- ---------- -- -- -------- - -- 1 
3 and over ______ --- _______________________ ------------------------------------- 2 
Percent of 
total 
------------------TotaL ____________________________ _________ ---- __ ---- _____________ ------- 223 100 
1 Less than 1 percent. 
Source: Edison Electric Institute. 
TABLE 20.-INTEREST COVERAGE AT TIME OF APPLICATION FOR ELECTRIC RATE CHANGE (202 ELECTRIC UTILITY 
RATE CASES) 
Time period Under 2 2 to 2.5 2.5 to 3 3 and over Total 
Jan. 1, 1971 to Mar. 31, 1972 ____________ 5 22 14 31 72 
Apr. 1, 1972 to Dec. 31, 1972 ___________ 5 27 12 18 62 Jan. 1, 1973 to Dec. 31, 1973 ____________ 4 34 10 20 68 
TotaL _____ --- __________ -_-._-- 14 83 36 69 202 
Source: Edison Electric Institute. 
10 See Wllllam R. Brown, "Rates Cases and Utlllty Financing," PubZlo UtiUtieB Fort-
nightly, February 15, 1978, p. 89. 
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TABLE 21.-RELATIVE DEPENDENCE ON CAPITAL MARKETS IN 1972 
(In millions of dollars) 
Electric utilities All nonfinancial corporations 
Source of funds Amount Percent Amount Percent 
1 nternal sources: Depreciation and amortization _____ _______________ 2.9 20 21.6 15 Retained earnings _______________________________ 11.6 11 62.8 40 
SubtotaL ____________________________________ 4.5 31 84.4 55 
External sources: Stocks and bonds ____________________________ ___ 9.6 66 38.2 25 Loans and other short-term items _______________ __ 4 3 30.7 20 
SubtotaL ________________________________ ____ 10.0 69 68.9 45 
TotaL _______ _________ ------------------- -- -- 14.5 100 153.3 100 
t Includes reserves for deferred income taxes. 
Source: Federal Reserve System Flow of Funds; Edison Electric Institute. 
THE ROLE OF THE INDUSTRY IN CAPITAL MARKETS 
Greater Dependence on Capital Markets 
The above-average dependence of electric utilities on capital markets is 
illustrated in Table 21. Whereas all non-financial corporations, on the average, 
obtained 55 percent of their funds from internal sources in 1972, the far more 
capital-intensive electric utilities got only 31 percent of the funds they require 
in that fashion. It is pertinent to note that the bulk of the electric industry's 
relative modest internal funds are obtained via depreciation allowances. In strik-
ing contrast, the great bulk of the internal financing of other companies is 
through retained earnings; in fact, profits are their major single source of 
financing. 
When we turn to the subject of external financing, we find that other companies 
generally obtain a substantial portion of their funds via bank loans and other 
short-term indebtedness, unlike the electric utilities. 
Thus, the great and rather unique dependence of electric utilities on capital 
markets arises from a combination of factors: 
1. The highly capital-intensive character of the industry and hence its 
continual need for new capital. 
2. The modest availability of retained earnings and hence the industry's 
dependence on external sources for financing its large capital programs. 
3. The minor extent to which it uses, or could be expected to utilize, 
short-term financing for its long-term capital projects, and thus the great 
dependence on continually attracting new long-term capital into the industry. 
Despite its massive size, the industry does not have the internal financial 
reserves to weather periods of stress in capital markets generally or in the 
electric utility industry specifically (see Figure 5). As pointed out in the intro-
duction, an early period of lack of capital led to the entry of municipally-owned 
utilities. The current period of stress has resulted in ane case where the state 
government has taken over the ownership as well as financing of major new 
facilities. 
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Its Proportion of TotaZ OapitaZ Funds 
Its high degree of capital intensity plus its reliance on external financing 
for the major part of its capital expansion have led to the investor-owned 
electric utility industry becoming a significant factor in the nation's capital 
markets and in the overall process of capital formation. This significance can be 
measured in a number of ways. Over the past 25 years, electric utilities have 
annually taken the equivalent of from 5 percent to 16 percent of all personal 
savings to finance their construction programs. Over the past decade this per-
centage has displayed a persistent tendency to rise. Over the period 1947-1972 
the share of personal saving (measured on a national income basis) absorbed 
by investor-owned electric utility stock and bond sales averaged an unweighted 
9.9 percent annually. During the five years 196&-1972, however, the average was 
13.4 percent and the annual values have been rising steadily. Figure 6 illustrates 
the evolution af the electric utility industry's long term external financing as a 
percent of personal savings. 
NEW 
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. Another measure of the role of electric utilities in the nation's capital formation 
IS the ~hare of investor-o'Yned el~ctric utility expenditures in the total capital 
expenditures of all U.S. mdustnes. Over the past decade the investor-owned 
electric companies have doubled their proportion of the annual creation of new 
plant. and equipment in the United States, from 7.6 percent in 1964 to 15.0 per-
cent m 1973 (see Table 22). Undoubtedly, some of this increase has been due to 
the unusually pronounced impact of inflation on the cost of construction a 
factor. which weighs heavily in utility capital expenditures. Also, the growing 
commitments to nuclear power, a very capital-intensive form of power generation 
have accounted for some of this increase. Another factor was the desire t~ 
develop sufficient reserve capacity to reduce the likelihood of "brown-outs" and 
"black-mils" during periods of peak demand due to equipment failures. 
Year 
TABLE 22.-CAPITAL OUTLAYS IN ELECTRIC UTILITIES AND OTHER INDUSTRIES 
(Dollar amounts in billions) 
Investor-owned 
All U.S. electric 
industries utilities 1 
$47.0 $3.6 
54.4 4.0 
63.5 5. 0 
65.8 6.1 
67.8 7.2 
75.6 8. 3 
79.7 10.2 
81.2 11.9 
88.4 13.4 
99.7 15.0 
1 Electric utility plant only. 
Investor-owned 
utilities as 
percent of total 
U.S. industry 
7.6 
7.4 
7.8 
9.4 
10.6 
11.0 
12.8 
14.7 
15.2 
15.0 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, "1971 Business Statistics " October 1971 p. 9 • 
"Survey of Current Business," May 1974, p. S-2; Edison Electric Institute. ' ' ' 
CHAPTER 4. THE FUTURE CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY 
INDUSTRY 
SURVEY OF EXISTING FORECASTS THROUGH 1980 
Industry Souroes 
Forecasts of capital spending by investor-owned electric utilities are made 
regularly by the Edison Electric Institute and by trade publications such as 
Electrical World. In its periodic "National Power Surevys", the FPC also projects 
electric utility capital requirements. Normally, these estimates are on a constant 
dollar basis with possible rates of inflation suggested for developing current 
dollar figures. Projections beyond a 10-year horizon are highly speculative and 
of limited value. Estimates for the coming 5 to 10 year period are grounded in 
actual construction program data, however, and can thus be viewed with some 
degree of certainty. 
For the 5 years 1974-1978, the Edison Electric Institute has estimated that 
investor-owned electric plant construction will entail the expenditure of $73 bil-
lion, measured in 1973 dollars. Table 23 contains year-by-year figures from this 
forecast. 
Year: 
1974 
1975 
1976 
19-77 
1978 
TABLE 23 
PROJECTED PLANT CONSTRUCTION BY ELECTRIC UTILITIES 
[Constant 1973 Dollars] 
Minions 
$15,860 
13,800 
14,160 
14,460 
14,830 
Total------------------------------------------------------- $73,110 
Source : Edison Electric Institute. 
For the years 1979 and 1980, it is likely that constant dollar capital expendi· 
tures will stabilize at nearly $15 billion a year, making a 7-year dollar figure 
of $103 billion. 
In its most recent survey, Electrical World projected long-range investment 
requirements for the total electrical utility industry. For the period 1974-1980, 
these outlays are estimated at $179.3 billion, assuming an inflation rate of 
3.3 precent a year. Taking the investor-owned segment of the industry at a 
constant 78 percent of the total, current dollar needs of investor-owned utilities 
would thus equal $139.8 billion over the 7-year span. The corresponding constant 
1973 dollar figure would be about $122 billion (see Table 24). 
Year 
TABLE 24.-2 INDUSTRY PROJECTIONS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY CAPITAL NEEDS, 1974-80 
(In millions of constant 1973 dollars) 
Edison Electric 
Institute 
Electrical 
World 
1974 ____________ ----------------------------------------------------------- 15, 860 15, 900 
1975 •••• ---- --------------------------------------------------------------- 13, 800 15, 650 1976 _____________ ---------------------------------------------------------- 14, 160 16, 150 
1977----------------------------------------------------------------------- 14, 460 17, 300 
1978 _____ ----------------------------------------------------------------- - 14, 830 18, 300 
1979 •••••• ------ ••••••• _ -----------. -··· •••••••••••• __ •••••••••• _ ••••••••• _ I 15, 000 18, 950 
1980·---------------------------------------------------------------------- 115,000 19,550 
---------------------TotaL ________________ ----------- •• --------------------------------- - 103, 110 121, 800 
I Author's estimates. 
Source: "24th Annual Electrical Industry Forecast," Electrical World, Sept. 15, 1973; table 21; adjustments for inflation 
and investor-owned shares by the author. 
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. In addition to these capital outl'8.ys on electric plant and equipment. the 
u~.vestor-owned companies will also be making investments in other utility facili-
ties (gas, steam, and water) of perhaps $500 million a year (measured in con-
stant 1973 dollars). Thus, their caiptal needs in the 1974-80 time period will be 
rnised by an additional $3-4 billion. 
. Putting the above foreca·sts on a current dollar basis involves an arbitrary 
JUdgment of the average impact of in:flation over the remainder of this decade. 
Urufortunately, predicting the course of price rises has proven especially dif-
ficult in the recent past. Recent developments, however, tend to indicate the 
possibility of a higher average rate of in:flation during the next few years than 
the 3-5 percent range commonly used in long-term estimates. For the purposes of 
this study, an alternative set of estimates has been prepared, based on an aver-
age annual rate of in:flation of 7 percentt. 
Adjusting the constant doUar series of the forecasts to a current dollar series 
assuming a 7 percent in:flation rate produces the figures shown in Table 25. 
TABLE 25.-2 INDUSTRY PROJECTIONS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY CAPITAL NEEDS, ASSUMING 7-PERCENT INFLATION 
(In millions of current dollars) 
Year 
Total. ___ • ___ •• ____ _ •• • _ •• • ____ ___ __________________________________ _ 
Edison Electric 
Institute 
16,970 
15, 800 
17, 3!i0 
18,950 
20,800 
22,510 
24,090 
136,470 
Electrical 
World 
17,000 
17,900 
19,750 
22,650 
25,650 
28,400 
31,300 
162,650 
.~e two industry estimates,, when adjusted for a 7 percent in:flation rnte, ' fall 
Withm a range of ±9 percent around $150 billion. Adding the expected expendi-
tures on non-electric utility plant-$4.6 billion over the 197~1980 period-
'!O~d give ~ total capital requirement of about $155 billion. Perhaps the most 
sigmficant difference between the two -sets of forecasts is that EEl anticipates 
a lower level of capital spending by electric utilities in 1975 than in 1974. This 
would permit some ease in the industry's current severe financial pressures. 
In contrast, the trade publication sees little abatement in the upward trend at. 
electricity capital requirements. 
Estimates by Non-Industry Sources 
Numerous organizations outside the electric utility industry prepare forecasts 
of the industry's future capital expenditures. Most emanate from the :flnancia'l 
community and are generated by analysts particularly conversant with utilities. 
Other estimates are made from time to time by academic researeh(~rs and by 
experts in fuel supply and equipment manufacturing indutJtries for which elec-
trict utilities represent important customers. Comparisons of these various non-
utility industry forecasts is often difficult because allowances for in:flation may 
· not be indicated, time horioons vary, or year by year est imates are not given. 
However, where a common approach is used or where a \''ommon approach can 
be inferred, a com!pB.rative analysis of these forecasts can l,.."' useful. 
Table 26 presents some recent estima•tes of near term capital requiremE-nts by 
investor-owned electric utilities made by non-industry experts. '\\,.l:lile these esti-
mates are not strictly comparable because of uncertainty over in.rlfttion rates 
they all appear to imply constant dollar (1973) estimates of $60-65 billion ove~ 
the four years 197~1977. Over the same period the Electrical W r,rld forecast 
cited previously calls for $66 billion in 1973 dollars and the EEI projection $58 
billion. ' 
TABLE 26.-4 PRIVATE PROJECTIONS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY CAPITAL NEED, 1974-77 
(In millions of dollars) 
Kidder, Truslow 
Year Peabodyl Hyde2 Dean Witter a 
1974 ___ -- ------------------------------------------ 14,413 14,400 14,438 
1975 ____ ----- -------------------------------------- 14,588 15,000 16,759 
1976 _____ ------- ----------------------------------- 15,126 15,600 16,527 
1977---------------------------------- ------------- 16,925 16,200 17,441 
Total ____________ ._ ••• _. ___ •• _. __ • ___ ••• _____ 61,052 61,200 65,165 
First Boston' 
16,100 
16,700 
18,200 
21,200 
72,200 
1 E. W. Meyer, Kidder, Peabody & Co., testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Interior and Nuclear 
Affairs, Mar. 6, 1973 (apparently, a constant dollar forecast). 
ll W. Truslow Hyde, Jr., "Electrical World," Nov. 15, 1972, p. 31 (apparently, a constant dollar forecast), 
a K. Hollister, "The Electric Utility Industry: An Investment Approach to Overall Return," Dean Witter & Co., 
August 1973 (inflation at about 5 percent). 
4 S. A. Barnes and P. F. Naughton, "Investor Owned Electric Utility Outlook," First Boston Corp., May 21, 
1973 (no indication of inflation rate but apparently is a current dollar forecast). 
WORKING ESTIMATE OF OAPITAL EXPENDITURES 
For purposes of estimating the possible extent of external financing require-
ments of the investor-owned electrical utility industry in the period 197~1980, the 
construction expenditure forecast to be used in the following analysis is a basic 
constant-dollar total of $103 billion. This forecast uses the lower of the two 
industry estimates through 1978 and assumes a plateau in real terms !or the 
period 1978-1980 at about $15 billion a year. The moderrute projections for 1979 
and 1980 specifically reflect cutbacks in capital programs recently announced by 
several public utilities. An allowance is added to cover non-electric utility outlays 
by electric companies. When the figures are adjusted for a projected 7 percent 
annual rate of inflation, the result is a $140 billion total of 1974-80 in current 
dollars. On a year-by-year basis, current dollar capital .outlays by the investor-
owned electric utilities are projected to follow the pattern shown in Table 27. 
TABLE 27.- CAPITAL OUTLAYS BY ELECTRIC UTILITIES, 197~0 
(In millions of current dollars) 
Year 
1974 ____ ---------------------------------------- ---------------- -1975 ____ __ _________________ _______ ________ __ ___ _______ ___ __ _____ _ 
1976 ____ ___ ______ ---- ------------- ------- --- --- ------------------
1977---- -- ------- --------------- ---------- ----- -- ----------------
1978 ____ -- ---------------------- ----- ----------------------------
1979 ___ ---------- -------- --------- -- ------ -------------------- ---
1980 ____ _ ----------- ----- ------- --- ---- --------------------------
TotaL_------ __ -------------- -- •• -- -- ----- -----------------
Electric 
plant and 
equipment 
$16,970 
15, 800 
17,350 
18,950 
20,800 
22,510 
24,090 
136,470 
Other 
utility 
plant and 
equipment 
$535 
570 
610 
655 
700 
750 
830 
4,650 
Total 
$17, 505 
16,370 
17,960 
19,605 
21,500 
23,260 
24,920 
141,120 
These estimates would still prove to be too high if recently announced curtail-
ments in electric utility construction programs should become a generalized 
phenomenon in the industry. The use of a 7 percent in:flation rate may also be 
questioned as 'representing an overly pessimistic view of the longer term effects o'f 
anti-in:flation measures. However, for purposes of assessing the potential capa-
bility of the investor-owned electric utilities to meet their financing requirements 
and to evaluate possible government actions to assist them in this endeavor, it 
would seem appropriate to use a current dollar forecast re:flecting continued 
increases in both electricity demand and the general price level. 
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CAPABILITY OF THE INDUSTRY TO FINANCE ITB CAPITAL NEEDS 
Historica~ Trends 
The _internal generation of capital, as already noted, does not play as important 
a ~ole m the financing of electric utility expansion as it does in most other indus-
tries. Normally, about 40 percent of an electric company's capital needs will be 
covere~ from int~rnal sources, although this figure can vary from year to year. 
In periods of rapid expansion external sources may have to be relied upon for as 
~uch as 70 percent of the _investment, while in periods of more moderate growth 
mternal funds generation may be sufficient for more than half of the annual 
capital expenditure. 
. La~ge increases in construction budgets over the past several years of high 
m::tlation have been reflected in a reduction in the relative importance of in-
terually generated funds as a source of financing. This is evident from the data 
in Table 28, which show a decline from 48.4 percent in 1966 to 33.8 percent in 1973. 
Year 
TABLE 28.-TOTAL AND INTERNALLY GENERATED FUNDS OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES 
(Millions of dollars) 
Total funds Internally 
provided generated 
5, 565 2,694 
6, 726 2, 954 
8,058 2,962 
8, 728 3, 392 
11,306 3,472 
13,147 3,927 
14,530 4, 585 
15,400 5, 200 
Source: EEl Economics and Statistics Department. 
Percent 
internally 
generated 
48.4 
43.9 
36.8 
38.9 
30.7 
29.9 
31.6 
33.8 
Internally generated funds :flow from three principal sources : retained earn-
ings, depreciation and amortization, and provisions for deferred or future in-
com~ t.axes. Of the three, depreciation and amortization is the most important, 
proVIdmg more than 60 percent of the total internal funds :flow. Retained earn-
ings are the second most important source. Deferred income taxes are still a 
relatively minor contributor to the overall :flow but have increased rapidly since 
1966 as various tax measures designed to stimulate investment have begun to 
make their in::tluence felt. A fourth source of internal funding of construction 
which is tapped only sporadically is the reduction of working capital. The per-
centage breakdown of the internal funds stream for the period 1966-1973 is 
shown in Table 29. 
TABLE 29.-INTERNALLY GENERATED FUNDS OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES 
(Dollars in millions] 
Retained earnings 
Depreciation and 
amortization 
Net decrease in 
working capital 
Deferred or future and miscellaneous 
income tax sources 
Total internal 
funds 
Year Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent 
1966 ____ --------- $861 32.0 $1,782 66.1 $51 1. 9 ------------------ $2,694 100 
1967------------- 893 30.2 1, 902 64.4 58 2.0 $101 3.4 2,954 lOU 1968 ____ --------- 843 28.5 2,044 69.0 75 2. 5 ------------------ 2,692 100 1969 _____________ 943 27.8 2,206 65.0 95 2.8 148 4.4 3,392 100 
1970_ ----------- 950 27.4 2,411 69.4 111 3. 2 ------------------ 3,472 100 1971 _____________ 1,090 27.8 2,639 67.2 198 5. 0 ------------------ 3,927 100 1972 _____________ 1, 319 28.8 2,920 63.7 346 7. 5 ------------------ 4,585 100 1973__ ___________ 1,427 27.4 3,270 62.9 503 9. 7 ------------------ 5,200 100 
Source: EEl Economics and Statistics Department. 
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The importance of depreciation as a future source of funds can be inferred from 
the rapid growth in new plant to be added by utilities in tJhe remainder of the 
1970's. Normally, the V'alue of net additions to gross plant .represents an average 
of 90 percent of annual construction expenditures. With the current dollar total 
of such expenditures expected to exceed $140 ·billion over the period 1974-1980, 
additions to the gross pl'ant total will pr<Ybably surpass $125 billion. The total of 
electric utility ·facilities will almost double during this period, rising from about 
$140 billion at the end of 1973 to nearly $270 billion by the end of 1980. 
The contribution of depreciation charges to the flow of internal funds will 
depend on the trend in average annual depreciation rates. Over the past several 
years the percentage of pl'ant charged to depreciation expenses has shown a ·ten-
dency to decline, as indicated in Ta·ble 30. 
TABLE 30.-ELECTRIC UTILITY PLANT AND ANNUAL DEPRECIATION 
(In millions of dollars] 
Year 
1966 ••• ----------------------------------------------------------
1967-------------------------------------------------------------
1968 ••• ----------------------------------------------------------
1969.------------------------------------------------------------
1970 _____ --------------------------------------------------------L ••• __ --- _______ • ______________________________ • ____________ _ 
1972. ----------------------------------------------------------
1973.------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Edison Electric Institute Economics and Statistics Department. 
Total utility 
plant 
$69,260 
74,640 
81,040 
88,470 
97,690 
108,910 
121,480 
135,770 
Depreciation 
and 
amortization 
$1,782 
1,902 
2,044 
2,206 
2,411 
2,639 
2,920 
3,270 
Average 
depreciation 
rate (percent) 
2.57 
2.55 
2. 52 
2.49 
2.47 
2.42 
2.40 
2.40 
The steady decrease in the average effective depreciation rate is the result of 
several factors. Among these are regulatory influences, company depreciation 
policies, a rising proportion of pl'ant with a longer expected useful life, and in-
creased construction work in progress. 
The overall pattern of internal and external flows of funds of the investor-
owned electric utility for the years 1966-1972 can •be seen in Table 31. :Apparent 
in the figures is the uneven growth of retained earnings, the rapid growth of de-
ferred or future vaxes, and the pronounced swings in the annual changes in short 
term debt. 
Estimated Internal Funds Fliow 1914-1980 
!This section of the report is devoted to developing estimates of the availability 
of .internal financing for the electric utility industry through 1980. 
Deprectation.-As is evident from data in the preceding ta>bles, depreciation is 
the most important single source 'Of internally generated funds for electric utili-
ties. If the reduction in average depreciation vates is arrested 'and if construction 
e~penditures grow at a decreasing rate t!hrough 1980, as is generaHy expected, 
depreciation w'Ould represent an increasing share of these expenditures. This will 
tend to reduce the need for increased external capital. 
To ·forec'ast the flow of funds from this source through 1980, it is necessary to 
project toval plant v·alues for the period and make an assumption concerning the 
depreciation rate. Table 32 sets out the e~ted year 'by year net additions -to 
gross plant. These are based on an assumed ratio of net 'additi'Ons to construction 
expenditures of 0.90. 
Assuming that current depreciation rates in the neighborhood of 2.4 percent of 
total gross plant will be maintained for tihe balance of the decade, the internal 
funds flow represented by depreciation will rise from $3.6 billion in 1974 to $6.2 
billion in 1980 (see Table 33). 
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TABLE 31.-CASH FLOW STATEMENT FOR INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES 
Jln millions of dollars) 
1972 ' 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 
Increase in value of gross plant: 11,109 9,427 7,635 6,397 5,n~ 4,362 Electric.-------------------------- ------------- 12, 338 
Gas, steam, and other.---- ----- ------ ----------- 694 495 554 363 464 439 
TotaL.·----- __ --------_--------------------- 13, 032 11,604 9,981 7,998 6, 861 5,943 4, 801 
Sources of funds: 1, 319 1, 090 950 943 843 893 861 Retained earninas·-------------------------- ----Depreciation an amortization ____________________ 2,920 2,639 2,411 2,206 2,044 1,902 1, 782 
Deferred or future income taxes __________________ 346 198 111 95 75 58 51 
Increase in short-term debt. _____________________ 380 137 -------- 781 1}, 062 265 158 
Decrease in working capital (other than short-term 
debt) and other miscellaneous sources •••. ------------------------------- 148 -------- 101 --------
Total internally generated plus short-term borrowing _____ • __ ._. ____ • ____ •• ___ • ____ -_ 4,965 4,064 3,472 4,173 4,024 3, 219 2,852 
Increase in long-term debt. ______________ ________ 4, 902 4, 958 5,037 3, 542 3,136 2,636 2,160 
Increase in preferred stock ______________ _________ 2,119 1, 745 1,147 402 459 470 356 Increase in common stock ________________ ________ 2, 544 2,380 1, 650 611 439 401 197 
Net proceeds from sale of securities _____________ 9, 565 9,083 7, 834 4, 555 4,034 3,507 2,713 
Total funds provided·--------------- ---------- 14,530 13,147 11,306 8,728 8,058 6, 726 5, 565 
Funds applied to: 8 323 7 168 6 140 4 962 Construction expenditures-electric department.. ••. 13, 435 11, 938 10, 182 , • • • 481 Construction expenditures-all other departments.. 423 560 436 405 312 586 
Decrease in thort•term debt. ____________ ------------------------- 138 --------------------------------
Increase in working capital (other than short-term 649 550 -------- 578 -------- 122 debt) and other miscellaneous sources__________ 672 
Total funds applied __________________________ -1-4-, 5-30-1-3,-1-47_1_1,-30-6--8,-72-8_8_,-o5_8_6_,-:72:-:-6--::5-::, 5=65 
1 Since 1968, notes payable are included in short-term debt. 
Source: Edison Electric Institute. 
TABLE 32.-PROJECTIONS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY GROSS PLANT 
(In millions of dollars) 
Year 
1974 •••• --- •• ------------------------------------------------ ----
1975 ____________ -------------------------------------- -----------6 ____________________________________________________ _ 
1977-------------------------------------------------------------
1978 •••• ---------------------------------------------------------9____________________________________________________________ _ 
1980 •••• -------------------------------------------------------- -
Source: Table 27 and assumptions described in the text. 
Construction Net additions 
expenditures to gross plant 
$17,505 
16,370 
17,960 
19,605 
21,500 
23,260 
24,920 
$15,755 
14,735 
16,165 
17,645 
19,350 
20,935 
22,430 
TABLE 33.-PROJECTED DEPRECIATION CHARGES OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES 
[In millions of dollars] 
Year 
Average gross 
utility plant 
Yearend 
gross plant 
$158,155 
172,890 
189,055 
206,700 
226,050 
246,985 
269,415 
Depreciation at 
2.4 percent of 
gross utility 
plant 
1974 ••• --- ----------------------------------------------------------------- 150, 280 ~·. ~}~ 
1975 ••• ----------------------------------- --------------------------------- 165, 525 4, 345 
1976 ••••. ------------------------------------------------------------------ 180, 975 4, 750 
1977------------ --------------------------------------------------- ---- ---- 197, 880 5, 195 ~~~~:::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ~~~: ~~g 5, 675 
1980 ______________ ___________________________________ _________________________ 2_58_,_2o_o ____ 6_,_19-:5 
33,745 Total..--.------------------------------------------------···--·------·---·-----·-- --
Retained Earninga.-Earned surplus represents the second most important 
source of internal funding. The extent to which companies will be able to rely 
on retained earnings will depend on several factors, including rate relief and 
the trend of operating expenses. A conservative estimate would call for a 
growth in annual earnings retention of 7.2 percent a year, slightly below tlie 
average annual rate of increase realized over the period 1966-1973. Such an esti-
mate would project retained earnings rising from $1.5 billion in 1974 to about 
$2.3 billion in 1980. Total earnings retained for reinvestment would equal $13.3 
billion over the 1974-1980 time period (see Table 34). 
TABLE 34 
PROJECTED .RETAINED EARNINGS OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES 
Year: 
1974 ----------------------------------------------------------
1975 ----------------------------------------------------------
1976 ----------------------------------------------------------
1977 ----------------------------------------------------------
1978 ----------------------------------------------------------
1979 ----------------------------------------------------------
1980 ----------------------------------------------------------
MiZUonB 
$1,530 
1,640 
1,760 
1,885 
2,020 
2,165 
2,320 
Total ----------------------------~-------------------------- $13,320 
Provisions for Deterred or Future Income Tames.-Deferrals of income tax 
resulting from accelerated depreciation have become a significant source of the 
internal :flow of funds since 1970. While still a small percentage of total require-
ments (about 3 percent of construction expenditures in 1973), these annual 
deferrals have been growing rapidly. Use of liberalized depreciation (or ADR) 
has enabled many companies to increase the benefits of using accelerated de-
preciation. It should be recognized that deferred taxes are only a source of funds 
for companies who are allowed to "normalize" tax incentives. 
For purposes of this report, annual estimates of deferred taxes are assumed at 
1 percent of the cumulative net addition~ to gross utility plant since 1969. On that 
basis, the annual total of deferred taxes will rise from $645 million in 1974 
to almost $1.8 billion in 1980 (see Table 35). 
TABLE 35.-PROJECTED DEFERRED TAXES OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES 
(In millions of dollars) 
Year 
1974 _____ --------------------------------------------------------------
1975 •••• ---------------------------------------------- ------ -----------
1976 ••• ----------------------------------------------------------------
1977------------------------------------------------ -- -----------------
1978 ••.. ---------------------------------------------- -- ---- -----------
1979 •••. -- ---------------------------------------------- ---------------
1980 ••.• -------------------------------------------- -------- -----------
Cumulative net 
additions to gross 
utility plant since 
1969 
64,325 
79,060 
95,225 
112,870 
132,220 
153,155 
175,585 
TotaL. ___ •••. ------------------------------ ---- ------ -----------------------------
TABLE 36.-PROJECTED INTERNAL FINANCING OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Retained earnings 
Depreciation and 
amortization 
Deferred or future 
income tax 
Annual deferred 
taxes at 1 percent 
of cumulative net 
additions since 
1969 
Total 
645 
790 
950 
1,130 
1, 320 
1, 530 
1, 755 
8,120 
Year Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent 
1974 ••• -------------------- $1,530 26.5 $3,610 62.4 $645 11.1 $5,785 100 
1975 ____ ----------- -------- 1,650 25.7 3,975 62.0 790 12.3 6,405 100 
1976 ••• -------------------- 1, 760 25.0 4,345 61.5 950 13.5 7,055 lOO 
1977----------------------- 1, 885 24.3 4,750 61.2 1,130 14.5 7,765 100 
1978 •••• -- ----------------- 2,020 23.7 5,195 60.8 1,320 15.5 8,535 100 
1979 •••. ------------------- 2,165 23.2 5,675 60.6 1,530 16.3 9,370 100 
1980 _____ ------------------ 2,320 22.6 6,195 60.3 1,755 17.1 10,270 100 
TotaL ___ • __ • ________ 13,320 24.2 33,745 61.1 8,120 14.7 55,185 100 
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Total Internal Funds Flows, 1914-1980.-Table 36 summarizes the estimates 
of annual internal generation of investible funds from the three principal sources 
of depreciation, retained earnings, and deferred taxes. The total estimated avail-
ability of over $55 billion is an impressive sum, at least until compared to the 
anticipated capital requirements of the electric utility industry. 
For the period 1974-78, an alternative set of projections has been prepared by 
Donald Mishara of Smith, Barney and Company. His total of internal financing 
available to the utilities for the five year period, $36.2 billion,1 is very close to 
the $35.6 billion that can be computed from Table 36. The coincidence of ind~ 
pendent estimates, of course, is no guarantee of accuracy, but it may provide some 
assurance tha~t the figures used here are not extreme ones. 
Ea:tent ot Ea:ternal Funds Required 
For the 7-year period 1974-80, approximately 39 percent of estimated capital 
requirements of the electric utilities will be met by internal financing according 
to the estimates developed in this report, $55 billion out of over $140 billion (see 
Table 37). The remainder, nearly $86 biUion will have to be raised by attracting 
additional capital to the industry. Another way of looking at the situation is 
that, for a regulated utility, the internally generated sources of funds are a rela-
tively fixed percentage of existing plant. Depreciation is directly a function of 
the capital stock and income is based on rates geared to the "rate base," which 
is closely related. Hence, substantial increases in capita•! spending generally re-
quire added use of external financing via sales of stock and bonds. 
An external requirements figure exceeding $85 billion over the seven years 
1974-80 represents an extreme challenge to the capital markets by the investor-
owned electric utility industry. Al1though it is presented as a realistic projection, 
it could be viewed as a "high" estimate fo-r the fol'lowing reasons : 
(1) It ignores the potential contribution to internal funds flows of the 
investment tax credit.2 
(2) It "pessimistically" assumes continuation of inflation at an annual 
rate of 7 percent for the balance of this decade. 
(3) It forecasts retained earnings growth as a marginally lower rate than 
experienced over the preceding 7-year period, but assuming continued prog-
ress in rate relief. 
(4) It assumes no improvement in depreciation rates. 
(5) It anticipates only limiated curtailment in electricity demand growth 
as a result of the recent energy crisis. (However, new ·additions to capacity 
now cost two to three times as much as they did five or ten years ago). 
The pattern of future financing needs outlined in Table 37 does reveal that, 
over the period 1974-1977, some stabmty is likely to be attained in the absolute 
dollar amounts which the industry will be raising in capital markets. This 
"breathing space" could be available to industry, regulatory authorities and the 
Federal government to deal with the underlying problems ~that affect the capabil-
ity of utilities to finance their needs. 
TABLE 37.-PROJECTED EXTERNAL FINANCING OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES 
[Dollar amounts in millions) 
Construction expenditures Internally generated Externally financed 
Year Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent 
1974 ____ ------ --- ------ $17,505 100 $5,785 33.0 $11,720 67.0 
1975 ____ --------- --- --- 16,370 100 6, 405 39. 1 9, 9b5 60.9 1976 _____________ ___ --- 17,960 100 7,055 39.3 10,905 60.7 
1977------------- --- --- 19,605 100 7, 765 39.6 11, 840 60.4 1978 _______ - ------ --- -- 21,500 100 8, 535 39.7 12, 965 60.3 
1979 _____ -- ------ ---- -- 23,260 100 9, 370 40.3 13,890 59.7 1980 ________ - ----- --- -- 24,920 100 10, 270 41.2 14,650 58.8 
TotaL ______ ___ __ 141, 120 100 55, 185 39.1 85,935 60.9 
1 Electrical World, June 1, 1974, p. 285. 
• 
2 The tax credit as now applied is limited to 4 percent for electric utilities as compared 
to 7 percent for manufacturing firms. Moreover, limitations now imposed on the use of the 
credit mean that a change upward in the credit rate would not help a company which is 
already generating more investment credit than it can use. Many electric utilities are now 
near this limit of 50% of income. 
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The critical role of rate increases in attracting adequate capital to the electric 
utility industry has been noted by many experts. A vice president of the invest-
ment banking firm of Dean Witter and Co. described the relationship succinctly: 
The single most crucial item in being able to finance this magnitude 
growth will be the amount of rate relief that will be granted by the 
various regulatory agencies.8 
A utilities consultant described the situation as follows: 
Certainly, investors are becoming increasingly concerned with not only 
the universal and inevitable failure of utilities to earn the returns to 
which Commissions say they are entitled, but also with the declining 
return on the common equity of many individual companies. They will 
also become more selective in their investment decisions as they become 
more conscious of the ability, or inability, of individual companies to 
·obtain adequate and timely rate increases and to maintain a satisfactory 
return which is essential to permit financing at a reasonable cost.' 
A senior officer at a major New York bank presented his "t""iews: 
... many electric utility executives have expressed their serious, 
and quite natural, concern about the availability of capital to meet their 
burgeoning needs. 
Frankly, we at Citibank do not share this serious concern. In our view, 
the financial markets have the depth, efficiency, and flexibility to ac-
commodate these requirements. 
Therefore, the key to our confidence in capital adequacy for electric 
utilities is the premise that they will maintain sound financial structures, 
and that they will produce earnings sufficient to adequately cover fixed 
charges. If this premise is incorrect, we will all have problems !-for 
there will always be competition for funds.5 
A similar analysis was provided by a former president of the American .Stock 
Exchange, now chairman of the management committee of the First Boston 
Corporation : 
Rate relief is urgent for the utility industry to attract equity capital. 
Without rate relief, the investor-owned electric utility industry will have 
great difficulty in meeting projected external financing requirements.6 
It is ironic to contemplate that the alternative to adequate rate increases to 
attract sufficient capital is also rate increases, but of a less efficient type. That is, 
when utilities find it difficult to raise funds for expanding their facilities, they 
are encouraged to select the least capital-intensive alternative. But that is likely 
to result in higher operating costs and hence in higher rates to cover the costs of 
using the less efficient alternative. To the extent that these uneconomic choices 
result in curtailment of expansion of nuclear facilities, they also may be making 
more difficult the attainment of the national objective of reducing this nation's 
dependence on overseas sources of energy. 
PROSPECTS FOB. A LOWER GROWTH RATE IN ELECTRICITY USAGE 
During the past two decades, the consumption of electricity in the United States 
has risen at an annual rate of 7.4 percent, from 443 billion kilowatt-hours in 1953 
to 1,849 billion kilowatt-hours in 1973. For most periods, except during the boom 
of the 1960's, electricity usage has grown more than twice as fast as the economy 
as a whole, reflecting in part the fact that the price of electricity was declining 
sharply relative to all prices. The record of more recent months, however, shows 
the possibility of a shift in the historical trend. 
3 Kenneth Hollister, CFA, "Regulatory Ratings," Public Utilities Fortnightly, Septem-
ber 27, 1973, p. 19. 
'W. Truslow Hyde, Jr., "Regulatory Ratings," Public Utilities Fortnightly, Septem-
ber 27, 1973, p. 21. 
5 William A. Lockwood, Senior Vice President of the First National City Bank, OapitaZ 
Resources for a Oapital Intensive Industry, a speech before the General Electric Sixth 
Electric Utility Executives Conference, Hot Spring, Virginia, September 17, 1973, pp. 1-2. 
11 Ralph S. Saul, "Energy and tbe Capital Markets," PubZic Utilities Fortnightly, Janu-
ary 31, 1974, p. 38. 
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Relationship Between RateB and UBage 
·Consumption of electricity began running below the level of the previous year 
almost immediately upon the imposition of the oil embargo in the Fall of 1973. 
This decline in usage, to some extent, reflected the public reaction to the gov-
ernment's efforts to foster voluntary conservation. It subsequently was reen-
forced by the sharp rise in utility rates, . although we cannot measure the precise 
impact. However, by March 1974, even before the embargo was lifted, usage of 
electricity ·began exceeding year-ago levels. The trend since then has been erratic. 
June power consumption declined from the level of June 1973, but that may reflect 
both an unusually strong month last year and unusually cool weather this year 
with an attendant dampening effect on air conditioning usage.7 
This fluctuating pattern may suggest that voluntary measures are difficult to 
sustain beyond periods of immediate crisis. Also, the impact of price on demand 
patterns may take considerable time to unfold. In the short run, some economists 
report that the elasticity of demand for residential users if electricity is quite 
low, between -0.1 and -0.2. This means that a 10 percent increase in utility 
rates will reduce usage by enly 1-2 percent. ., 
Over the long-run, however, demand may be quite elastic. Professor Dale J or-
genson of Harvard University has estimated a long-run "elasticity" of demand for 
electricity at -0.62; that is, a 6.2 percent decline in kilowatt hours consumed for 
every 10 percent rise in prices.8 The economic staff if the Federal Reserve Bank 
of San Francisco reports that some studies indicate a long-run elasticity of 
demand of -1.0 for residential users of electricity, as does a study by Profes-
sor Hendrik Houthakker of Harvard University and several associates. A recent 
report by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory found elasticities for commercial 
and industrial users in the -1.5 range.9 
However, a paper by Roger Carlsmith, Associate Director of the ORNL-NSF 
Environmental Program at Oak Ridge adds the following "word of caution": 
We also find that there is a time delay of 6-10 years in the response to 
price changes. Thus one cannot expect electricity price rises to be a near-
term solution to the problem of supply shortages.10 
If measures of price elasticity for electricity are uncertain, even less work 
has been done in quantifying measures of cross-elasticity with other fuels, such 
as oil and natural gas. It may well be that price elasticity for all enetgy is rather 
low while cross elasticities, over the longer run, are rather high. If this is the 
case, then to properly predict demand for electricity one would also need to pre-
dict the price and subsequ~nt demand for other energy sources as well. 
As a general proposition, economists see electrical energy as a commodity sub-
ject to the influences of supply and demand, which means a sensitivity to price. 
Many long-term projections by financial institutions and industry sources now in 
use were prepared prior to the recent large increases in rates. It could well be 
that these forecasts overstate future electricity usage. 
Energy growth expanded rapidly in the past two decades, in part because real 
energy prices were declining (that is, rates were going up more slowly than the 
general p~ level). Between 1951 and 1971, real electricity prices were reduced 
by 43 percent, encouraging users to substitute energy for labor and material, which 
were rising faster in price. Now that energy prices are rising faster than labor 
and materials, some reverse substitution may dampen energy demand. 
As a result of the substantial rise in energy prices as well as concern over the 
availability of adequate supplies, a new "energy ethic" is reported to be de-
veloping in some quarters of business and other parts of society. A recent 
issue of U.S. NewB and WorZa Report cited numerous examples of companies 
learning to economize on this now expensive resource, ranging from reducing 
hot water in hotels to shutting down escalators in off hours.u 
A homeowner may put in more insulation (substituting capital for energy), 
a manufacturer may change from plastic to wood (substituting material for 
energy), and a company may use more hand assembly rather than automation 
(substituting labor for energy and capital). 
'1 "Conservation Even Affected Peaks,t EEI Finds," Electrical Week, May 20, 1974, p. 2. 
a Stephen B. Shepard, "How much energy does the U.S. Need?," Business Week, ;June 1, 
1974. p. 70. 
9 W111lam Burke, "After Con Ed," Business and Financial Letter, Federal Reserve Bank 
of San Francisco, May 24, 1974, p. 3; "Electric Utlllties face a price dilemma," Business 
Week, February 2, 1974, p. 34. 
10 Roger S. Carlsmith, "Energy Conservation Programs," in National Science Founda-
tion, Energy, Environment, Productivity, Washington, 1974, P.· 9. 
u "How Soaring Cost of Energy Spurs New Ways to Save,' U.S. News and World Report, 
May 27, 1974, p. 49. 
The Federal Energy Administration has embarked on a comprehensive cam-
paign ·to dampen down the demand for energy which, to the extent it succeeds, 
should slow down the growth rate of electricity usage. 'l~he effort to foster. an 
"energy conservation ethic" in the United States consists of the followmg 
activities: . . 
1. An advertising campaign, in cooperation wi:th the Advertismg Council, to 
expose citizens "to how they can conserve energy and why it. is important." 
2. A joint program with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
to distribute energy conservation school kits (teacher aids, charts, course. study 
material, etc.) to one-third of the elementary and secondary schools m the 
United States. 
3. Individual campaigns using media and educational literature aimed at 
home improvements, driving, appliance use and purchasing, heating and cooling 
equipment maintenance and lighting. 
4. A specific program to achieve 50 percent conformance with FEA lighting 
standards of 50 footcandles over office work stations, 30 footcandles in general 
office space, and 10 footcandles in halls and corridors. 
5. The Department of Commerce program to label on a voluntary basis major 
energy consuming appliances, to help the public determine the relative efficiency 
of different units. 
6. Developing a program to stimulate adding storm doors and improved insula-
tion to homes, and to get localities to adopt revised building codes for the 
same purpose. 
7. The Federal Energy Management Program, which claims to have reduced 
the government's own demand for electricity by 1,213,000 megawatt hours during 
January-March 1974.12 
Effect on OapitaZ RequirementB 
To some extent, the changing pattern of electricity demand is affecting capital 
expansion programs in the industry, although the problem of raising capital is 
clearly another important factor. 
Perhaps a straw in the wind was the May 22, 1974 announcement of the 
Detroit Edison Company that it was reducing its :five-year capital spending pl'ans 
from $3.6 billion to $2.95 billion, an 18 percent cutback. The utility announced 
that it simultaneously was reducing its forecast of the annual growth rate for 
electricity consumption from 6.8 percent to 5.8 percent. The previous month, 
however, Standard and Poor's had reduced the rating of the company's bonds 
from AA to A.18 
Consumers Power Company of Michigan has said that it will delay for about 
a year the planned openings of two major electric plans originally scheduled 
for the late 1970's and early 1980's because its internal projections suggest "a 
reduction in the rate of growth in electric demand over the next 5 to 10 years." u 
The company conceded that the delay would result in higher costs for these 
projects, but stated that, in the light of the current high costs of capital, it is 
not considered to be prudent to build facilities before they are necessary. Con-
struction work has not started at any of the proposed facilities. 
Commonwealth Edison Company of Chicago in July cancelled plans to build 
two 500,000 kilowatt coal-fired generating plants because of "reduced estimates 
of peak loads." 15 A group of 10 electric companies reported to the Delaware River 
Basin Commission that the area needs three fewer new nuclear power plants 
during the next 15 years than the ten originally proposed in 1972.18 
Some observers disagree with the notion that the combination of rising prices 
and relatively elastic demand will dampen down the future growth rate of 
electricity usage. With dwindling supplies of liquid fossil fuels, some analysts 
12 Testimony of John 0. SawhtZZ, Administrator, Federal Energy Ofllce, before the Senate 
Commerce Committee on S. 258!, Electrical Energy Conservation Act, Washington, June 17, 
1974, pp. 2, 4; FEA Release 74-276, July 2, 1974, p. 2. 
18 
"Detroit Edison Cuts Its Spending Plans 18% Due. to Finance Woes," The Wall Street 
JournaZ, May 22, 1974, p. 27. 
u "Consumer Power To Delay Opening Two Electric Plants," Wall Street Journal, 
May 3, 1974, p. 4. Additional cutbacks by the company were announced In late June. See 
"Construction Plans for Nuclear Plants Canceled by Utllity," The New York Times, 
June 29, 1971, p. 1. 
J 15 "Blg Chicago Utility Drops Plans To Build 2 Coal-Fired Units," Wall Street Journal, 
uly 5, 1974. 
18 New York Times May 6·, 1974. See also Sanford L. Jacobs, "Money-Raising Problems jause Utlllties To Cut Spending for New Electric Plants," The Wall Street Journal, 
uly 19, 1974, p. 26. 
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predict that electric power, which can be generated from a variety of sources 
such as coal and uranium, will continue its past rapid growth rate.17 They view 
the recent softening of electrical use as a temporary response to a crisis-induced 
"conservation ethic," which is not expected to be a lasting phenomenon. Some 
a~celeration in the demand for electricity could occur as users switch from scarce 
oil ~nd natural gas, especially for heating. Certainly, the more successful that 
ProJect Independence turns out to be-with its emphasis on coal and nuclear 
energy rather than oil and natural gas-the greater is likely to be the use of 
electricity. 
COMPETING REQUIREMENTS FOB CAPITAL FUNDS 
. ~lectric u~ilities are not the only energy industries facing large increases in 
capital reqwrements for the balance of this decade and beyond. The need to find 
and develop additional fuel supplies on American territory in conjunction with 
"Project Independence" will entail capital expenditures on an unprecedented 
scale b~ the Prin;tary energy industries. To supple-ment natural gas resources, large 
expenditures will 'be needed to construct synthetic gas plants using coal or 
~etr_?leum as raw materials and to build facilities to store and regasify imported 
hqwfied natural gas. In addition to their investment in American reserves and 
product~on facilities, many of the ''international" energy companies will be seek-
mg cap1tal for expansion of foreign operations including maritime transport 
systems to handle fuel imports into the U.S. Much of the capital for these latter 
developments will be raised in foreign money markets but some will also 'be taken 
from American sources and these capital de-mands will compete with those of 
the purely domestic energy industries. 
In.1972 total capital expenditures by the petroleum industry in the U.S. ap-
p:o;x:Im1~ted half the same year's t?t~l of the investor-owned electric utilities, $14 
bllhon. About ~0 perc~nt of the oil mdustry was generated internally. The rapid 
future growth m capital outlays will likely force the oil industry to rely on 
external financing for a larger percentage of its total requirements. Recent 
dramatic rises in profits may have only a transitory effect on the petroleum in-
dustry's cash :flow and will not obviate the ue-ed to increase debt/equity ratios. 
Th:e most comprehensive forecast of energy industry capital requirements was 
pubhshed by the National Petroleum Council in 1972.19 This forecast considered 
four different supply scenerios. The scenerio calling for the highest level of 
domestic fuel production-more in line with current national priorities-would 
necessitate the investment of $311 billion (in 1970 dollars) over the period 1971-
1985. (These totals exclude outlays by utilities). Assuming that one-third of this 
amount would be programmed between 1974 and 1980 and that 60 percent of it 
would be funded internally, external requirements over this same period would 
total more than $40 billion in 1970 dollars. A comparable 1973 dollar figure 
would >be in the neighborhood of $50 billion, roughly two-thirds of the probable 
external financing requirement of investor-owned electric utilities measured 
likewise in 1973 dollars . 
. Th~ fi';lancin~. ~equirements of non-inv~stor-owned electric utlities, and gas 
~Istnb~tl~n utlhtles must also ~e taken mto account in estimating the energy 
mdustr1es total demand on capital markets. Construction expenditures for the 
government and cooperatively owned power suppliers might run as high as $30 
billion, in 1973 dollars, for the 1974-1980 time span. About half of these funds are 
likely to be raised in the capital markets. 
Gas distribution utilities are forecast to spend some $9 bHlion over the 3 years 
1974-76 for an average of $3 billion a year.20 Some of this total is accounted for 
by combination companies which supply both gas and electricity and is already 
included in our investor-owned electric utility forecast. For the balance of the 
decade gas utility expenditures should prove to be reasonably stable near the 
levels projected for 1974--1976. They may u1timately total up to $20 billion in 
1~73 dollars, half of which might require market financing. 
In summary, a rough estimate of market financing requirements by the energy 
industries could total, in 1973 dollars, nearly $140 billion (see Table 38). 
17 D!lvid Myhra. "·The Elasticity Argument in Electricity Demand," Public Utilities 
Fortn~ghtly, June 6. 1974, pp. 41-46. 
18 Based on expenditure data for 30 large petroleum companies surveyed by Chase Man-
hattnn Bank. 
19 National Petroleum Council, U.S. Energy Outlook, 1972, page 296. 
20 American Gas Association. Gas Facts, 1972. 
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TABLE 38.-ESTIMATED INVESTMENTS BY ENERGY INDUSTRIES 1974-80 
(Dollar amounts in billions) 
Capital 
requirements 
~~i~~t~i~~~~-~~~~~~~i~~~==== = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = $1~~ Non-investor-owned electric utilities_________________________________ 30 
Investor-owned electric utilities _____________ -------_________________ 107 
External 
financed 
$48 
10 
15 
65 
Percent 
externally 
financed 
40 
50 
50 
61 
183 50 Tota'----------------------------------------------------------2-77---------
A variety of projections by responsible public and private sources indicate that 
very substantial demands will ·be made on the nation's capital market in the near 
future to finance long-term investment projects. The economics department of the 
General Electric Company, for example, has estimated U.S. industrial capital 
needs at $2.7 trillion in the period 1974-1985. Table 39 contains a breakdown of 
that substantial figure by major sector. Professors Barry Bosworth and James 
Duesenberry have estimated that the anticipated heavy capital requirements 
for such purposes as developing new energy sources, converting manufacturingl 
plant and equipment to types of machinery that use less energy, and meeting 
pollution restrictions will result in raising the ratio of private investment to 
GNP from 10.6 percent in 1973 to an estimated 11.3 percent in 1980.n 
Another way of looking at the question of rising capital needs is to look at the 
annual totals. The Economics Department of the McGraw-Hill Publishing Com-
. pany has estimated that capital expenditures by American industry, other than 
electric utilities, will rise from $89.0 billion in 1973 to $191.9 billion in 1985.2:1 
A variety of estimates have been made for specific areas of public sector capital 
spending. The Institute for Rapid Transit has estimated that 11 mass transporta-
tion authorities will spend over $5.8 billion for new rapid transit facilities in the 
year 1975-79, in addition to $1.4 billion for modernizing existing plant.23 The U.S. 
Council on Environmental Quality has projected public sector capital investment 
for pollution control during the decade 1972-81 at $52.4 billion.2l In effect, avail-
able forecasts of future capital needs seems to present a constant variation of 
the standard economic principle that human wants are insatiable. Thus, these 
figures cannot ·be viewed in isolation, but in reference to the likely supply of in-
vestment funds. 
(In billions of dollars) 
Amount 
772 
838 
170 
188 
729 
TotaL _·-·-- __________ _ .• _____ __ • ____ ____ ______ •• •. _____ . ___ _____________ • __ ---- --- _______ ___ __ 2, 697 
Sourc~: Gener~l Electric Co., Capital Requirements of Business, 1974-1985, statement of R. H. Jones before the Joint 
Economrc Commrttee, May 8, 1974. 
The prospects on the saving side are not very favorable. In absolute terms, of 
course, there will be large increases in the dollar amount of funds that will be 
available for investment. Several important factom, however, are dampening 
down the growth rate of saving. Even with the inv~stment credit back on and 
the liberalized depreciation (ADR) provisions, our tax system does less to en-
courage private saving and investment than those of most other industrialized 
nations. · 
21 Barry M. Blechman et al, Setting National Priorities: The 1915 Budget, Washington 
Brookings Institution, 1974, p. 268. ' 
22 
,:'How U.S. industry's cash needs soar," Business Week, September 22. 1973, p. 50. 
23 Transit Capital Needs, 1970-79," National Journal, October 3, 1970, p. 2157. 
2
' U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality, Fourth Annual Re-
port, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1973, p. 93. 
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For example, compared to the capital gains tax in the United rstates-which 
can be as much as 35 percent on assets held for six months or more--Japan does 
not gain tax gains from occasional transfers of shares, but only if trades in a 
single year exceed 50 transactions or 200,000 shares. In France, the Netherland, 
and West Geremany capital gains generally are not subject to tax, while in Italy 
they are taxed at the municipal level at 9-15 percent. 
In Canada, 50 percent of capital gains are included in taxable income, but 
there is no holding period requirement. The United Kingdom provisions similar 
treatment on the first 5,000 pounds of annual gains only, or an alternative rate 
of 30 percent.26 The very progressive nature of the federal personal income tax 
will also exert a downward effect on the savings ration. As prices-and hence 
nominal incomes--continue to rise, taxpayers are pushed into ever-higher 
brackets. Thus, they pay a rising proportion of their income in taxes (unless 
rates are reduced) and have a declining portion of their income available for 
consumption or saving. 
Consumers-who are the basic source of saving in the economy-will be experi-
encing some fundamental but adverse demographic factors in this decade. The 
changing age distribution of our population suggests that, if past savings patterns 
are maintained, the personal saving rate (although not the absolute amount) 
could decline over the next decade. Table 40 shows the unfavorable prospects 
as projected by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
TABLE 40.-PROJECTED AGE DISTRIBUTION IN UNITED STATES, 1972-82 
[In millions) 
Age category (years) 1972 1982 Change 
Under 5-------------- - ----------- --- ----------------------------- 17.2 19.6 +2. 4 
5 to 9--------------------------- ---- ----------------------------- 18.7 17.0 -1. 1 
10 to 14---------------------- --- --- ------------------------------ 20.8 17.6 -3.2 
15 to 19·------------- - ------- --- ---- ----------------------------- 20.1 19.0 -1. 1 
20 to 24--------------- ------ ---- ---- ----------------------------- 18.2 21.1 +2. 9 
25 to 29.-------- - --------- - ----- ---- ----------------------------- 15.0 20.4 +S. 4 
30 to 34.-------------- - --------- ---- ----------------------------- 12.3 18.5 +6. 2 
35 to 39·------------------- -- --- ---- ----------------------------- 11.1 15.2 +4. 1 
40 to 44·-------------------- - ---- --- --------·-------------------- 11.6 12.3 +O. 1 
45 to 49·-------------------------- ---- ----- --- ------·---- -------- 12.0 10.9 -1. 1 
SO to 54------·---- ---------------- ------ - ------- ----------- - ----- 11.6 11.1 -0.5 
55 to 59.·---- - ---------- ---- ------ --- ------- --- - --------- - -- ----- 10.2 11.1 +O. 9 
60 to 64·-- ----- -- --- ------- ------- --- ----------- -·- -------- - ----- 8. 9 10.2 +1. 3 
65 to 69.·--- - - -- --- - -------------- ------ -- --- -- --- -- ------- ------ 7. 2 8. 4 +I. 2 
70 to 74·----- -- -- -- ------ --------- --- - -- -- ----- -- --- -- -- - --- ----- 5. 6 6. 7 +1.1 75 and over_. ___ ___ __ • __ ____ ________ _ . _______ ___ •• . . __ ._------ __ . 8. 1 9. 7 +1. 6 
---------------------------Total,___ ___ _______ _________ ___ _____ ____ ______ ____ ___ ______ 208.8 228.7 +20. 2 
Note: Details may not add to totals shown due to rounding. 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Current Population Reports," series P-25, No. 493, Washington, 1972, series E. 
The number of Americans in the high-spending, low-saving age brackets (20-
34) is expected to rise substantially, from almost 46 million in 1972 to 60 million 
in 1982. These are the young people who in the main borrow heavily, particularly 
to finance and furnish new homes. In striking contrast, the higher saving and 
investment age bracket (40-54) is forecast to show a decline in absolute numbers, 
from 35 million in 1972 to 34 million in 1982. The projections should be fairly 
accurate, because they deal entirely with people who are already born and are 
based on expected life frequency patterns. 
A study by the staff of the Feder.11l Home Loan Bank Board tends to reenforce 
these conclusions. The FHLB staff concluded that the most dramatic shifts 
from renter to homeowner status occur among younger families, especially 
between the ages of 25 and 34 : 
. . . almost two-thirds of the families shifting from renting to home-
ownership between 197 4 and 1980 will be headed by persons under 
35 ... most of these families will be in the 25- to 34-year. age bracket.28 
~Gary ~- Gillum, "Capital Gains," Business Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Phdadelphta, September 1973, p. 5. 
25 Josephine M. McElhone and Henry J. Cassidy, "Mortgage Lending: Its Changing 
Economic and Demographic Environment," Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal. 
July 1974, p. 11. ' 
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.Another factor dampening down the private saving rate is the repeated 
liberalization of social security and other government inco.me-maintenance pro-
grms. This relationship has been noted by several authorities. Recent studies 
bY Professor Martin Feldstein of Harvard University show that the provision 
of public pensions for the aged substantially depresses the rate of private 
saving. "If this is not offset by other government policies," Feldstein says that 
"the result is a decline in the rate of capital accumulation ... " !!7 
Professor Robert Eisner of Northwestern University has reached a similar 
conclusion : 
Our increasingly comprehensive Social Security system tends, desirable 
as it may be--and I do not want to be interpreted as opposing Social 
Security-to obviate some of the need for private saving. It is not nec-
essary to put aside income now to provide for the future if retirement 
expenses will be taken care of by the government.28 
On balance, all of this indicates that large sums of money will be saved and 
equally large sums will be invested in the United States, but not all require-
ments for capital funds are likely to be met. There will be vigorous competition 
for available investment funds. From the viewpoint of any individual industry 
attempting to obtain capital, the situation that will confront it has been 
described tersely by John F. Childs, senior vice president of the Irving Trust 
Company: 
I don't think there is a problem of getting adequate capital. It's a 
question of getting adequate earnings to attract capital.211 
The deterioration in the relative position of the electric utility industry in 
the competition for available investment funds is not something that occurred 
suddenly in the Spring of 1974. This situation has been noted by many observers. 
James G. Stark of the investment house of Lehman Brothers stated to an 
industry meeting in the Fall of 1973 : 
In recent years, as you know, the utility industry has been losing 
ground in the competition-both in respect to attracting debt capital 
~nd, ev~n more so, in respect to equity investment- as evidenced by your 
mcreasmgly higher costs, relative to competing security offerings.30 
In the two and a half year period from January 1, 1971 to June 30, 1973, 
Standard and Poor's reduced the bond ratings of 32 utilities and raised only one 
The rate. ditf~rent~al be~ween notches can be as much as 25 or 35 basis poin~ 
(100 basis yomts Is. eq~Iva!ent to one percentage point in the interest rate). At 
the same time, the msbtutwnal market for these debt securities shrinks consid-
erabl~. as ratings decline, due to legal restrictions applying to lower-rated 
securities. 
Mr. Stark also noted that "It is very disturbing, indeed, to see the stocks of 
40 of the 90 largest electric utilities selling today at or below book value--
~here there ":ere ~n~~ 7 in t~is category just over two years ago.31 The evalua-
tion o~ electric ~tihbes by mvestors has declined .further since Mr. Stark's 
analysis, a~ noted man earlier section of this report. 
_The subJe~t of adequate earnings by electric utilities is inextricable linked 
w1th the ~UbJect of rates allowed by regulatory commissions. Hence, the following 
ch~pter IS devoted to a detailed examination of the role and importance of 
utility rates. 
f 27Ei'Iartin Feldstein, Social Security and Private Savings, Cambridge, Harvard Institute Retiirce0mRn~~ica!r1~~~~ua\~7~aBit:Z·J;;u!t~?at~~~~ttaa!:;13~~inH~~;!~~ ~~~r:~~~ ~~d~cceod 
nom c esearch. 1973. ' -
l\I:;.~o~~7~.E~~~~~- "Business Investment Preferences," George Washington Law Review, 
:"Is U.S. Running Out of Money?," U.S. News and World Report May 27 1974 23 FraJc,~~~ c~·11~tr~i~ ~~v~~b~~~~bl~9~3d a~dress to the Atomic Industrial 'Forum,P·san 
31 1bid.' pp. 4- 5. ' ' ' p. . 
41-160 0 , 75 - 31 
CHAPTER 5. THE RoLE AND IMPORTANCE OF UTILITY RATES 
THE NATURE OF UTILITY REGULATION 
For many years, the electric utility industry has been subject to close and 
continuing governmental regulation in respect to accounting, financing, rates 
charged for service, and many other aspects of operations. Rate regulation seeks 
two key objectives: 
1. To protect consumers against exorbitant charges that might otherwise re-
sult from the monopoly aspect of public utility franchises. 
2. To set rates for service at a level which will afford the companies an op-
portunity to earn a fair and reasonable rate of return. 
Altllough differences on specifics may emerge, there is virtually universal 
agreement on the general functions of rate regulation. The following statement 
on the subject is taken from a report by Ralph Nader's Study Group on Regu-
lation and Competition: 
In simplest terms, regulators perform two tasks. The first is to deter-
mine the company's "overall revenue requirements." These must be suffi-
cient to cover all costs (which include operating expenses, deprecia-
tion, interest, and taxes) and to yield a fair profit, or "rate of return," 
which enables the company to attract the necessary capital for mainte-
nance and expansion of its services. The second task is to devise the 
appropriate rate structure, consisting of a schedule of charges which, 
when applied to the various services that the company provides, will 
satisfy the overall revenue requirements. For both of these steps it is 
necessary to determine the value of the "rate base"-the company's cap-
ital investment in plant and equipment used in providing each regu-
lated service--because the amount of profit that the company is allowed 
to earn is expressed as a percentage of the rate base.1 
The courts have consistently held that the profits or returns earned by utilities 
should generally be comparable to those of other business undertakings of cor-
responding risk, and should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial 
soundness of the utility, to maintain its credit and enable it to raise the capital 
that it requires. 
In the celebrated Hope case, the U.S. Supreme Court laid down guidelines for 
utility regulation: 
... it is important that there be enough revenues not only for oper-
ating expenses but also for the capital costs of the business. These in-
clude service on the debt and dividends on the stock ... By that stand-
ard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with risks 
on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That 
return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the finan-
cial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract 
capital/~ 
The basic standards of the Hope case can be paraphrased as follows : 3 
1. There should be enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also 
for the capital costs of the business, which include service on the debt and 
dividends. 
2. The return to the equity owner should be commensurate with the terms on 
investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. 
3. The return should be sufficient to ensure confidence in the financial integ· 
rity of the enterprise so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital. 
1 The Monopoly Makers. Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on Regulation and Com-
petition, New York, Grossman Publishers. 1973. p. 5. 
ll F.P.O. vs. Hope Natural Gas Oo., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944). 
a Alfred Copeland, "Time for Another Hope Case?", Public Utilities Fortnightly, March 1 
1973, p. ll.9. 
(479) 
This sounds as though a substantial measure of financial protection is as· 
sured by law. However, public utilities are not in any sense guaranteed any rate 
of profit or level of earnings. This has been clearly stated by the Supreme Court 
in the N aturaZ Gas Pipeline case ( 1942), when the Court said: 
... the utility gets it return ... by rates sufficient, having in view 
the character of the business, to secure a fair return upon the rate base, 
provided the business is capable of earning it. But regulation does not 
insure that the business shall produce net revenues, nor does the Con-
stitution require that the losses of the business in one year shall be 
restored from future earnings . . . the hazard that the property will not 
earn a profit remains on the company in the case of a regulated, as 
well as an unregulated business.4 
In this connection, the following statement by the Committee on Corporate 
Finance, contained in its 1952 report to the National Association of Railroad 
and Utility Commissioners, is quite pertinent: 
·Good credit, if once lost by a corporation, is seldom regained. At 
best, loss of prime credit standing results in increases 'in total capital 
costs. At worst, it will impair the quality of service and lead to a pub-
lic reaction much more serious than the utilities' financial position. 
. . . Over the long term, obtaining and retaining prime credit rating 
for the utilities is far more important to the public than the contin-
uance of utility rates which are depressed in relation to present wages, 
incomes and general prices. For prime credit ratings are essential if 
utilities are to continue to secure at advantageous terms the new cap-
ital continuously required to maintain their existing service and to 
extend and improve service in the future}; 
It is important, moreover, to understand that the allowable rate of return 
for a public utility is not comparable to interest on a savings bank account or 
earnings on shares of stock. The typical utility takes substantially less than 
100 percent of its return into earnings. The rate of return applied to a utility's 
rate base equates to net operating income, or the results of a company's op-
erations after federal income tax, but before interest and other capital costs. 
Rising interest rates alone could •quire a substantial increase in the rate of 
return achieved a given company, without any change, or even a decline, in its 
return of common equity. 
Table 41 contains the results of a special survey conducted by the Edison 
Electric Institute covering 219 electric rate cases which were settled during 
the three-year period 1971-1973. The very considerable variation in the overall 
rates of return which are allowed to individual companies is apparent, ranging 
from less than 6 percent to over 9 percent. 
Table 42 contains corresponding information for 181 of the cases where in-
formation was available on the return on common equity which was granted 
by the regulatory commissions. Here, even more substantial variations are visi-
ble, ranging from less than 6 percent to over 12 percent. In theory, we would 
expect that another factor was present, differences in capital structure. That is, 
utilities that are highly leveraged (with a low percentage of common equity 
to total capitalization) would show above-average returns; this would reflect 
the relatively high risk to shareholders who would not receive their dividends 
until the prior claims of a large number of bond holders had been satisfied. Con-
versely, lightly-leverage utilities would be expected to provide below-average 
returns to their shareholders, in view of the lesser risk to which they are 
exposed. 
Yet available data do not bear this out. Appendix Table C contains the infor-
mation on the common equity as percent of capitalization for the utilities sur-
veyed. Figure 7 graphically presents the data that would show the relationship 
if any between degree of leverage and rates of return to common stockholders. 
No distinct relationship emerges from the data in the table. One explanation is 
that the expected relationship is "swamped" or more than offset by another 
factor-the great extent to which utilities are subject to the vagaries of individ-
ual regulatory commissions. As will be shown to be the case in many other 
aspects, no standards emerge from analyzing the results of a national sample 
of recent electric rate cases. 
'Cited in Charles Tatham, Measures of Public Utility Bond Quality, New York, Bache 
and Co., September 1970, p. 19. 
6 Cited ln Ibid .• p. 20. 
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TABLE 41.- VARIATIONS IN ALLOWABLE RATES OF RETURN (IN ELECTRIC RATE CASES SETILED DURING PERIOD) 
(In percent) 
Time period Less than 6 6 to 7 7to8 8 to 9 9 and over Tota 
Jan. 1,1971 to Mar. 31,1972 ____ _____ 1 17 48 14 0 80 
Apr. 1, 1972 to June 30, 1972 ___ ______ 1 3 13 6 0 23 
July 1, 1972 to Sept. 30, 1972 _______ . _ 1 2 8 8 0 19 
Oct. 1, 1972 to Dec. 31, 1972. ----- -·· 2 2 10 9 1 24 
Jan. 1,1973 to Mar. 31, 1973 ...... ... 5 0 11 5 1 22 
Apr. 1, 1973 to June 30, 1973. ________ 1 3 8 4 0 16 
July 1, 1973 to Sept. 30, 1973__ _______ 0 3 9 5 0 17 
Oct. 1, 1973 to Dec. 31, 1973.-------- 1 4 5 8 0 18 
Total._------ -------- ________ 12 34 112 59 219 
Source: Edison Electric Institute. 
TABLE 42.-RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY GRANTED (IN ELECTRIC RATE CASES SETTLED DURING PERIOD) 
(In percent) 
Time period Less than 6 6 to 8 8 to 10 10 to 12 12 and over Total 
Jan.1,1971 to Mar. 31,1972 _________ 0 1 2 25 43 71 
Apr. 1, 1972 to June 30, 1972 _________ 0 0 1 10 9 20 July 1, 1972 to Sept. 30, 1972 _________ 0 0 0 5 8 13 Oct. 1, 1972 to Dec. 31, 1972__ ________ 0 1 2 7 8 18 Jan. 1, 1973 to Mar. 31, 1973 _________ 1 0 3 4 8 16 
Apr. 1, 1973 to June 30, 1973 _________ 0 1 1 5 5 12 July 1, 1973 to Sept. 30, 1973 _________ 0 1 2 7 6 16 Oct. 1, 1973 to Dec. 31, 1973 __________ 1 0 0 3 11 15 
Total 
----- ... -- ... --------- ... ---- ... 
2 4 11 66 98 181 
Source: Edison Electric Institute. 
Without prejudging the decisions of any specific commission, it is clear that 
they vary very substantially in the pattern of their decisionmaking as well as in t~e manner in which they apply rates of return. Some commissions' tend to grant 
higher returns to their electric utilities than do other commissions, and the dif-
ferences cannot be explained by variations in capital structure. On reflection that 
is likely to be the result of decentralized regulation responding to a V'ari~ty of 
economic, political, geographic, and social circumstanC('S. 
It s significant to note that ·a recent survey by the Edison Electric Institute 
found no relationship between the regulatory rate of return and the cost of capital 
use~ by 69 .. companies for their own internal economic evaluations of proposed 
capital proJects. It was observed that the average regulatory rate of return in 
early 1974 (8.2 percent )is lower than the cost of capital used for economic evalua-
tions ( 9.8 percent) ,11 
In spite of the multiplicity of regulatory bodies, rate-of-return regulation does 
appear to be the essential feature of the regulation of the electric utility in-
dustry." This is essentially due to the influence of the U.S. Supreme Oourt. The 
hist~ric ~a.se of Munn v. Illinois (94 U.S. 113- 1877) suggested the concept of a 
public utihty. Smyth v. Ames (169 U.S. 466-1898) introduced the concept of fair 
value in the regulation of rates. FPO v. Hope NaturaZ Gas (referred to earlier) 
further developed the notion of an adequate rate of return. 
REGULATORY LAG 
The aspect of regulation which appears to have provoked the greatest amount 
of interest during the recent period of rapidly rising utility costs has·been the de-
lay of "lag" involved in regulatory commissions acting on requested changes in 
electricity rates. 
The recoql shows that state regulatory commissions have been approving sub-
stantial numbers of rate increase requests. During the first quarter of 1974, 40 
11 Edison Electric Institute, Investor Relations Committee, Cost of Capital Used For 
Economic Evaluations By Privately-Owned Electric Utilities, June 1974, pp. 6-7. 
7 Leon Courville, "Regulation and efficiency in the electric utility industry " BeZZ 
Journal o! Economics and Management Science, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring '74, p. 57. ' 
increases were ·granted, totaling over $526 million, compared to 2:1 increases 
totalling $146 in the first quarter of 1973. For the entire year 1973, increases of 
almost $1.1 billion were granted.8 Despite the large number of rate increases, 
electric utilities as a whole have not been able to earn the rates of return allowed 
by the commissions. 
In an informal survey of electric utilities undertaken in May 197 4, the Federal 
Reserve System reported that "the regulatory process had not been accelerated-
despite the severity of the financial problems which these firms face." 9 Of the 
nearly 100 utilities that the System contacted, over 80 ha·d sought rate relief 
within the previous year. Just under one-half of the requests were granted in 
full. Another one-seventh were granted either in part or on an interim basis, and 
two-fifths were still pending. 
The Fed survey reported that, "The time typically required for the resolution 
of a request for a rate adjustment apparently has not been shorted significantly-
if at all ... If lags are not too long, the rate adjustments are often too small." 10 
In reporting the results of the survey, Federal Reserve Board member Andrew 
Brimmer stated that, since most rates are based on past costs, earnings sufler in 
an inflationary environment, even if the pace of the regulatory procedure is 
accelerated. However, he discounted the need for state emergency assistance: 
I am personally convinced that a more sympathetic-and timely-re-
sponse of regulators to requests for rate adjustments will enable the 
vast majority of firms to cope with their problems.11 
The Federal Reserve survey noted considerable variation in regulatory lag 
in the different regions. According to Dr. Brimmer, "In the Middle West ... the 
regula~ory climate appears to be rather unfavorable to prompt rate action." 12 
In OhiO, for example, delays of three years are not uncommon. Michigan cur-
rently bases its decisions on 1972 data. In contrast, the Federal Reserve Banks 
of Dallas and Minneapolis reported rather speedy approval. 
The state of Virginia has an annual earnings review. If a firm is found not 
to be earning the rate of return the State Corporation Commission approved a 
year before, it can increase its rates within 30 days, subject to a commission veto. 
The survey by the Federal Reserve System also reported that three utilities in 
th~ Atlan~a District can pass on local taxes, as can some companies in the 
Mmneapohs Bank survey. Nebraska permits operating and maintenance costs to 
be passed on as wel1.13 
Until recen~ly, the process by which the regulatory commissions approved 
changes in rates received comparatively limited attention from the public. 
Th~ough the late 1_960's, electricity prices tended to decline as technological inno-
vatiOn offset cost mcreases. But with the more rapid rate of inflation of recent 
years, delays in acting on requested rate changes have become more serious. 
~he resultant problem of regulatory lag has become one of the major focal 
p_omts of .c?ncern in financing electric utility expansion. This lag between the 
time a utlhty files a request for a change in rates and the time a change is 
granted has been aggravated not only by the number of increases being filed but 
by the increasingly extensive hearings associated with each case. This latter 
complexity has increased in turn because of the growing number of interventions 
by environmentalists, consumer advocates, and others. 
One _measure of the increasing dimensions of the "backlog" problem can be 
found m the data on the number and dollar value of increases pending at the 
end of ~ach quarter for the period 1970 through the second quarter of 1974. As 
shown m Table 43, there bas been a fairly steady and substantial increase in the 
backlog of pending rate cases, measured both in terms of number of cases and total 
amount of rate changes requested. 
Another measure of the increasing backlog problem can be gleaned from the 
figures ~m new filings for rate increases made by investor-owned companies. As 
shown m Table 44 an extremely rapid increase has been occurring during the 
last few years, in the period 1970 through the second quarter of 1974. 
8 Statement o! Alvin W. Vogtle, Chairman EEl, at a Press Conference New York City 
June 8, 1971, , Edison Electric Instistute p. 1. ' ' 
e Brimmer, op. cit., p. 4. ' 
10 Ibid. 
u Ibid. 
12 Ibid., p . 17. 
13 Ibid., p . 18. 
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TABLE 43.-BACKLOG OF ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE CASES 
Total dollar Total dollar 
value of value of 
increases increases Number of pending Number of pending 
Quarter ending cases pending (in millions) Quarter ending cases pending (in millions) 
Mar. 31, 1970 ____________ 45 512 June 30, 1972 ____________ 
46 615 Sept. 30, 1972 ____________ June 30, 1970 ____________ Sept. 30, 1970 ____________ 47 435 Dec. 31, 1972 _____________ 
59 679 Mar. 31, 1973 ____________ Dec. 31, 1970 _____________ 
71 939 June 30, 1973 ____________ Mar. 31, 1971 ____________ 
86 986 Sept. 30, 1973 ____________ June 30,1971 ____________ 
105 1,237 Dec. 31, 1973 _____________ Sept. 30, 1971 ____________ 
99 1,157 Mar. 31,1974 ____________ Dec. 31, 1971 _____________ Mar. 31, 1972 ____________ 96 938 June 30, 1974 ____________ 
Source: Edison Electric Institute. 
Quarter ending 
Mar. 31, 197D__ __________ _ 
June 30, 197Q ___ ________ _ 
Sept. 30, 1970 _____ ______ _ 
Dec. 31, 197D__ ___ _______ _ 
Mar. 31,1971 ____ _______ _ 
June 30, 1971 ___ ________ _ 
Sept. 30, 1971 ____ _______ _ 
Dec. 31, 1971 _____ _______ _ 
Mar. 31, 1972 ____ ________ _ 
TABLE 44.-NEW FILINGS FOR ELECTRIC RATE INCREASES 
Total dollar 
value of 
requests for 
mcreases 
filed in 
Number of quarter Quarter ending cases filed (in millions) 
12 
21 
16 
31 
31 
36 
29 
17 
22 
89 June 30, 1972 ______ _____ _ 
209 Sept. 30, 1972 __ ___ ___ ___ _ 
61 Dec. 31, 1972 ___________ _ _ 
437 Mar. 31, 1973 ___________ _ 
451 June 30, 1973 __ · - - - - - ----325 Sept. 30, 1973 _____ __ __ __ _ 
361 Dec. 31, 1973 ___ _________ _ 
231 Mar. 31, 1974 _____ ____ __ _ 
171 June 30, 1974__ __________ _ 
Source: Edison Electric Institute. 
104 
102 
99 
96 
123 
112 
137 
144 
169 
1,067 
1, 317 
1,123 
1,059 
1,572 
1, 283 
1,656 
2,052 
2,678 
Total dollar 
value of 
requests for 
mcreases 
filed in 
Number of quarter 
cases filed (in millions) 
35 
26 
27 
22 
45 
24 
47 
45 
55 
412 
442 
180 
114 
703 
280 
762 
638 
1,188 
Rising backlogs mean increasing delays in getting the average case complet~d. 
Data on 211 final rate case decisions made by state and local regulatory bodies 
during the three years 1971-1973 show that less than 30 percent of the cases 
were concluded within 6 months of the initial filing. About 47 per~ent were 
completed between 6 months and one year. Nearly one-fourth reqmred more 
than one year. One third of those cases involving lags of more than one year 
required more than 18 months before a final d~cision was rea~hed (see Table 45) · 
The length of the lag appears to be incre~smg. An. analysis _of final rate case 
decisions made in the year 1973 alone indicate an mcrease m the percenta~e 
of cases requiring more than one year for settlement with nearly 30 percent m 
this category. More than half of the latter involved lags ~reater than 18 
months. Perhaps a more fundamental finding from the data IS. the very sub-
stantial variation in the length of the regulato~ proces~ that exists from state 
to state, from utility to utility and from one time periOd to another. 
Interim IncreaBes 
One method of compensating for lengthening delays b~tween initial filings and 
final decisions is the granting of interim _or tempo:ary .mc:eases. In the 211 de-
cisions covered by the albove analy~is, 51 mvolved u:~tenm mcreases. The survey 
data revealed a growing use of this procedure. While only 13 of the rat_e cases 
settled in 1971 had involved interim increases, 18 of those completed m 1~72 
has such increases, as did 20 of those in 1973. Thr_oughout the three year perwd 
for those cases where interim increases were permitted, the average ~~l~y be~ore 
an interim increase was granted was just under 5 months from the Initial fihng. 
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TABLE 45.-VARIATIONS IN REGULATORY LAG IN ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE INCREASES, 1971-73 (TIME FROM 
FILING OF APPLICATION TO FINAL ORDER FROM CQMMISSION) 
[Number of cases and percent distribution) 
Months 
0 to 6 6 to 12 12 to 18 18 to 24 24 to 30 Over 30 Total 
Date of final 
Num- Num- Per- Num- Per- Num- Per- Num- Per- Num- Per- Num- Per-order Per· 
ber cent ber cent ber cent ber cent ber cent ber cent ber cent 
197L------ ---- 13 24 27 50 13 24 1 2 -------------------------- 54 100 
1912---- --- --- - - 26 31 41 49 12 15 3 4 ------------- 1 1 83 100 
1973..--- - ------ 21 28 31 42 10 14 8 11 4 5 ------------- 74 100 
Average lag __________ 28 ---- --- 47 ------- 17 ----- -- 6 ------- 2 -------------------- 100 
Source: Appendix Table A. 
Automatic Adjustment OZauses 
Certain costs of electric utility operation, subject to frequent changes, are 
essentially out of the utility's power to control, at least in the short run. Some 
of these costs represent significant portions ·of utility expense. To handle this prob-
lem, many regulatory bodies permit utilities under their jurisdiction to use auto-
matic adjustment mechanisms which refiect, with relative short delays, the in-
crease (or decrease) in the particular expense in question. The use of these 
automatic adjustment clauses in effect thus reduces regulatory lag with regard 
to the uncontrollable costs which are covered by these clauses. 
Among the types of adjustment clauses in use are those taxes, the cost of power 
purchased from other utilities, and fuel costs. The latter two have become in-
creasingly important in recent years as fuel costs have escalated rapidly and 
the need to exchange power among utilities has increased because of delays 
incurred in the scheduled addition of new capacity. The fuel adjustment clause 
is the most important one for many utilities and is most frequently alluded 
to in public discussions of automatic provisions. 
Currently, about three-fourths of all investor-owned utility kilowatt-hour sales 
to ultimate customers are covered by fuel adjustment clauses. The extent of 
their use varies from state to state, however. In 43 States and the District of 
Columbia at least some of the rates of investor-owned companies are accompanied 
by such riders. In some instances, their use is restricted to industrial and com· 
mercial rates while in other cases all rates are covered. Differences also exist 
with regard to the method of calculating the adjustment charge. Some utilities 
base .the adjustment on fuel costs incurred the previous month, others on the 
average cost of the two previous months, and still others use even longer period~·. 
The actual lag between determination of the adjustment factor and its ap-
plicat ion to customers bills can also vary among states. Differences likewise exist 
as to whether a cents/million BTU or centsjkwhr calculation is employed to 
determine the adjustment factor. Also the treatment of nuclear fuel expense is 
not uniform among the states having nuclear power plants. Finally, the extent 
to which total costs are accounted for by the adjustment mechanism can differ 
between utilities. A portion of the fuel cost is included in the base wi,th the ad-
justment factor retlecting changes in the price of fuel above or below that amount. 
However, in many cases the full differential may not ,be recovered with the 
resulting shortfall impacting negatively on the utility's earnings. 
The purpose of the fuel clause, like any automatic adjustment mechanism, is 
to bring revenue and expense as nearly into phase as possible. Its importance to 
the utility is paramount when costs are increasing rapidly at unpredictable rates, 
although this mechanism also permits a speedy reduction of the fuel cost com-
ponent of a customer's hill should the price of fuel decline. The large increases 
in fuel costs experienced during the winter of 1973-1974 would have been beyond 
the capability of many utilities to absorb had they not been able to adjust their 
rates automatically. In many cases the increases in fuel costs equaled or exceeded 
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the net income of the companies. Even when rapid adjustments were effective, 
the normal lags between billing and collection added to the strains on working 
capital which had already been crea,ted by ,the need to finance much more 
expensive fuel inventories. 
RELATIONSHIP OF CURRENT RATE INCREASES TO FUTURE COSTS 
It is important to recognize that the so-called regulatory lag as it relates 
to the adjustment of permissible earning rates for utilities is not an accident 
of history. The regulatory lag which receives so much attention these days 
has served a useful function over the years in accommodating a range of earnings 
opportunity within which utility managment is challenged and motivated to 
perform efficiently. The fact that a company may have to wait for an extended 
period of time before rates are adjusted upward to reflect circumstances also 
provides a strong incentive to management to eliminate inefficient operations. 
By the same token, during periods in which technological innovations are 
reducing costs, management may enjoy an extended period of above average 
profitability before regulatory authorities require downward rate adjustments. 
The present problem lies in the fact th.at existing regulatory arrangements 
were established during periods of relative economic stability. During periods 
of extreme price deflation or inflation the regulatory lag becomes a dangerous 
burden rather than a constructive motivating influence. For example, the quality 
of an electric utility's bonds is a function, among other things, of the earnings 
available for the payment of interest on the company's bonds. This relationship 
is variously referred to as times charges earned, fimed charge coverage, or 
simply earnings to flmed charges. 
Bond Ratings and Utility Rates 
It may be difficult for individual users of electricity to see the relationship 
'Jetween utility rates and something so technical as bond ratings. After all, 
why should they really care what happens to the bondholders? Analysis shows 
that there are very good reasons. The basic answer is that interest on those 
bonds is one of the rising costs that are forcing utilitiea to apply for rate 
increases. 
When a utility's bond rating drops, the amount of interest it has to pay on 
its new bonds rises. For example, when Union Electric sold $70 million of bonds 
on February 5, 1974, it had to pay an interest charge of 8.29 percent (its bond 
rating was a moderate one, single-A by Standard and Poor's and double-A by 
Moody's). On the day before, a company with a stronger bond rating (AA), 
Public Service of Indiana, sold its bonds at a cost of 8.03 percent. Spread out 
over the 30-year mortgage period, Union Electric's higher interest will cost 
the utility-and ultimately its customers-an additional $5,250,000.u 
Although many institutional investors establish their own quantitative stand-
ards for specified qualities of bonds, most investors rely on the major rating 
services for this purpose. One of the principal bond rating services is that of 
Standard and Poor's Corporation. As reflected in Figure 7 until 1968, when 
the rate of inflation began rising sharply, upgrading of the quality of electric 
bonds was not unusual. It is also obvious that from 1968 to the present time there 
have been few quality upgradings. With respect to downgrading, on the other 
hand, a striking increase has occurred in recent years. · 
The ra,ting organizations (Standard and Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch's) typically 
reappraise utility bond quality at the time companies issue additional debt 
securities. By so doing the rating agencies have the benefit of recent registration 
ma.terials prepared for the Securities and Exchange Commission and other 
information made available in connection with the sale of new issues of securities. 
These rating organizations place much emphasis on such quantitative ratios 
as the earnings to fixed charge relationship described above, the capital structure 
of the firm, margin of safety tests, and others. The rating organizations also 
have begun to place great stress upon the a·ttitudes and actions of the regulatory 
authorities of the companies whose bonds are being rated. It is fair to say 
that the rating organizations are not anxious to engage in precipitate changes 
in bond ratings. Indeed, they seem quite restrained given the nature of changes 
taking place within the utility industry. This patience is in part self-serving 
since it would not be :flattering to engage in frequent changes in bond ratings. 
14 Harry Wtlensky. "High Credit Costs Add To Utntty Problems," St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, June 25, 1974, p. 3B. 
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The result is that a company with low quantitative measures of quality may 
be all-owed to retain its oond rating if tecent and significant rate relief bas 
been permitted by the regulatory authorities. On the other hand, a firm with 
stronger quantitative coverages may experience a downgrading of its rating if 
it is located in a jurisdiction where regulatory authorities show less sympathy 
for or comprehension -of the importance of the earnings of the companies they 
regulate. 
Within recent months there has 1been an increasing trend toward a reappraisal 
of bond ra_tings at times other tban when new bonds are issued. This is un-
doubtedly accounted for by what the rating organizations consider to be a 
rapid deterioration of the financial position of many companies and an apparent 
lack of interest Ol! the part of s-ome regulatory authorities. Also, the manage-
ments or-some companies may not have ·been considered aggressive enough in 
pursuing needed rate relief with skill and vigor. 
The significance of reduced ratings for a company is quite clear. Table 46 
reflects the cost differential among new issues of electric utility 'bonds of the 
AAA, AA, A, and Baa categories. The reduction in the J.'lating of the bo~ds 
of a company is quickly reflected in the interest cost structure of the firm, w1th 
the effect tbat earnings to fixed charge ratios are reduced further. This, of 
course simply hastens the day when additional requests for rate relief must 
be maile. It seems clear, therefore, that prompt and judicious rate relief pre-
vents companies' interest cost pressures from feeding upon themselves. 
TABLE 46.-COST DIFFERENTIALS AMONG NEW ISSUES OF PUBLIC UTILITY BONOS, 1964-73 
(FOR THE MONTH OF JANUARY OF EACH YEAR SHOWN) 1 
[In percent) 
Average of yield on new issued bonds 
Rating category 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 Average 
f~~ ~ = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =: = = =: :: ~~ 4. 55 5.29 6. 38 6. 81 7.45 9. 63 8.12 8.10 7. 62 --- -----4. 50 5.00 5. 90 6. 62 7.17 8.96 7.90 7.36 7. 54 --------DifferentiaL ••• ___ • ______________ 
.26 • 05 • 29 .48 .19 . 28 • 67 . 22 . 74 .08 • 33 
AA·----------------------------------- 4. 45 4. 43 4.90 5. 36 6. 43 7. 06 8. 66 7.49 7.11 7.46 ------- -
Differential ••• __ ••• __ ._ •••••••• _. - .36 .12 .39 1. 02 .38 • 39 .97 • 63 .99 .16 . 54 
AAA •• --·················--·---··--·-- 4. 53 4. 37 4. 83 5. 35 6. 28 6. 97 8. 64 7. 29 7.09 7. 36 --------
DifferentiaL __ • __ • ______ •••••• --- • 28 .18 . 46 1.03 .53 .48 . 99 '83 1. 01 • 26 • 60 
1 Or nearest month, if none issued that month. 
Source: Moody's Public Utility Manual and Bond Survey, weekly issues. 
The differences in annual interest charges can be substantial. Taking the 
54/100 of 1 percent average differential experienced in the past decade between 
an AA bond and a Baa bond is $54,000 a year in interest charges for a $10 mil-
lion issue. To compound the problem, many traditional utility investors may not 
legally buy bonds that do not qualify for some minimum rating. When Stand-
ard and Poor's Corporation, a major private rating agency, reduced its rating 
of the bonds of the Consolidated Edison Company from BBB to BB, this action 
made the bonds ineligible as legal investments for fiduciary financial institu-
tions in New York State. 
THE BASIC ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF ELECTRICITY PRICES 
Prices serve a basic economic purpose, even though it may not always be a 
popular one. During the pa.st year characterized by rising public concern over 
the availability of energy sources, attention has been drawn to the allocative 
or "rationing" role that prices play. Thus, rising prices for gasoline have served 
as a means for bringing supply and demand of energy into better balance. 
In our economic system, we "economize" on scarce resources by making 
them more expensive, thus making users more conscious of the need to restrain 
their demand. Simultaneously, the increase in price encourages producers to 
expand their supply, some portion of which may not have been worth produc-
ing at earlier, lower prices. 
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In the case of utilities, regulatory commissions closely control the income 
of the companies so as to avoid "windfall" profits. Certainly, the current pre-
carious financial condition of many electric utilities dramatically demonstrates 
the absence of "excessive" or "windfall" profits, however defined. 
During this period, some observers have expressed concern over the hard-
ships imposed by rising energy prices on low-income groups. One instinctive 
response-which unfortunately has no justification in economic analysis-is 
to subsidize the price for these groups. On reflection, such an action would run 
counter to· the basic need to dampen down demand for scarce resources. More-
over, it would not help attract additional supplies. Dr. Andrew Brimmer 
concludes that "we should all accept the fact that this growing scarcity will 
mean higher prices for energy relative to most other items on which consumers 
can spend their income" and that "it is better to permit the~e increases in real 
costs to be passed on to final users-rather than pretend that we can-some-
how-escape the lmrden. Only in this way will consmner welfare be truly served 
in the years ahead." 1G 
The answer that present public policy provides is not a hard-hearted one at 
all, but a fairly sensible approach. It is to provide an adequate income to enable 
various groups of the population to buy the goods and services that they require, 
but without exempting them from the price pressures to conserve relatively 
scarce and hence relatively expensive resources. We can see the generosity of 
existing policy in the very substantial increase in welfare, social security, and 
similar "income maintenance" expenditures by the federal government. From 
a relatively high level of $95.9 billion in the fiscal year 1973, such expenditures 
are budgeted to rise to $129.8 billion in 1975.18 These payments are often supple-
mented by substantial state and local government programs. 
The public and political pressures exerted on many state regulatory bodies are 
very real and need to be acknowledged. A recent issue of U.S. News and World 
Report reported some of the more colorful reaction to recent electric rate 
increases: 
"In some places, t.he increase has been so staggering that customers 
can't believe it. "My electric bill has gone up from $20 a month to $43 
a month since last fall, even though I haven't used my electric dryer in 
a coon's age", complains a housewife in the Southwest. "I don't know 
what to say. "It's outlandish." 17 
It indeed is likely to be extremely difficult to fully mollify the outraged South· 
west housewife. Yet, she must be told the hard facts of equally or even more rapid 
rise in the costs of producing electric power. Otherwise, the utilities will simply 
become convenient "whipping boys" for the general public distaste for inflation . 
One outspoken chairman of a state regulatory commission has described the 
following "necessary" action: "Elimination of partisan politics from utility rate-
making, coupled with a determination by state commissions to grant cost-jm~tified 
rate increases promptly, regardless of the political consequences." 18 
Leon Keyserling, a former chairman of the President's Council of ~conoiQ.,ic 
Advisers in the Truman Administration has provided some useful perspective 
in assessing the relationship between utility rate increases and the concern for 
the consumer : 
The ultimate interest is always the consumer. But the policy, far too 
prevalent at least until very recently, of pointing toward the lowest price 
for the consumer in the short run, has ignored the interest of the con-
sumer in investment and plant and growth and technological progress. 
In view of the natural and popular pressures for the lowest feasible 
prices in the short run, I believe that utility regulators, among others, 
must join in the educational process, in order to avoid killing the goose 
that lays the golden egg.18 
The Michigan State Special Commission on Energy, chaired by Professor Pa"Ql 
McCracken, a former Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advise],'~ 
1& Brimmer, op. cit., p. 23. 
1e Special Analyses. Budget o! the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1975, Washington, 
Government PrintinA' Office, .1974, p. 161. 
17 
''Electric. Gas. Phone Bills Jump--Some Double or More," U.S. News ana Worltl 
Revort. 1\Ia:v 1ll. 1974. n. nO. 
18 William G. RosenherA'. Crisis in Utility Finance: Where Do We Go From Heret, pres-
entation to Fe!'leral Energy Administration Utility Rate Reform Conference, Washington, 
D.C .. June 19. 1974. o. 6. 
19 Leon H. Keyserling. ''Critical Issues in Utility Regulation," Proceedings o! the Eighty-
Second Annual Convention o! the National Association o! Regulatory Utility Commi88ion-
'ers, 1970, p. 515. 
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in the Nixon Administration, provided a very useful statement of the need to 
achieve balance in utility regulation. The following is an excerpt from the 
Commission's report, with specific references to Michigan deleted: 
A proper balance must be found between protection of consumers and 
the approval of rates that are substantial enough to maintain the finan-
cial integrity of the companies. Without the latter, earnings of these 
companies would be inadequate to raise the capital needed to assure 
meeting future energy needs of . . . consumers and businesses, and pre-
serve job opportunities ... The citizens ... have a stake in the 
maintenance of that healthy financial condition for their public utilities 
without which future service will not be assured.20 
Clerily, there is a primary economic role for rate changes, and they are likely 
more frequently to be increases rather than decreases in the current environment. 
Nevertheless, other changes in regulatory and ·utility practices may be required, 
and they are examined in the following section. 
VARIATIONS IN REGULATORY AND UTILITY PB.A.CTIGES 
As shown in earlier sections of this report, there are very substantial varia-
tions in the pattern of decision-making by utility regulatory commissions in 
different parts of the country. An examination of these variations provides useful 
insights into possible changes in regulatory or company practices which may 
help to meet the financing requirements of the utilities through means other than 
general rate increases. 
UtiZity BiZZing Practices 
One area of substantial variation among utilities is in the way customers are 
billed for services, particularly in the case of late payments. An April1974 survey 
of billing practices of 90 electric utilities obtained a variety of responses. While 
40 of them do not have any charge for late payments, the other 50 follow many 
different ways of adding a penalty or interest to the bill or offering a discount 
for prompt payment.21 As shown in Table 47, the interest charges range from a 
low of 6 percent to a high of 18 percent, where such charges are made. 
TABLE 47.-LATE PAYMENT CHARGES BY 90 UTILITIES, APRIL 1974 
Penalty for late payment (add-on to base rate).--------------------·------------------------------------- 35
8 Discount for prompt payment (deduction from base rate)_---------- · --·----------------------------------
Interest charge: 
6 percent. ••• _. __ ---· ••••• _ •• _. __ ••• -- ••• -.-·_----.--.-.------- ••• -.- •• ---------------.-·--------- 3 
12 percent.. __________ •• -•• --.-------------.----------------------------------------------------- ~ 
No lit~ ~~~~~~t ciiarge-_-::: ::::::::::::::::: :·:: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ~ 
TotaL •• _._._._. ___ ._ •••• _______ ._ •••.•••.••• __ ••.• _--.-----. ____ -•• ----.------------------------- 90 
Source: Survey by the Rate Research Committee of the Edison Electric Institute. 
Only 17 of the utilities reported t~at all classes of customers were charged 
for late payment. Seventeen other utility companies said that government agen-
cies were not charged, and five others excluded both residential and governmental 
users. Two utilities only levied late charges on large commercial and industrial 
users, while the late charges of two other utilities covered all customers except 
large general service and industrial users.~~ There is also an important equity 
aspect to this relatively mundane question of billing. 
The reluctance of some regulatory commissions to pPrmit utilities to charge 
penalties for late payment means that customers who pay their bills promptly 
are unfairly bearing a portion of the cost of the added working capital to be 
raised by the utility to compensate for the lack of revenue from late-paying 
customers. This process of differential treatment through the regulatory process 
which arbitrarily shifts costs from one category of users to another is now re-
ferred to in the literature as a type of "regulatory subsidy." 
Automatic Oost Pass-Throughs 
To deal expPditiously with the frequent increases in the cost of fuel purchased 
by electric utilities, many regulatory commissions have authori~ed companies 
to add an automatic adjustment to utility bills to cover such mcreased and 
20 Paul W. McCracken et al., Report to Governor William G. MllZiken by the Special 
Oommission on Energy, Lanstn~. State of Michhran. 1!l74, pp. 31-32. 
n Questionnaire Oovering Electric Utility BiZZing Practices tor use in EEI Rate Research 
Oommittee Meeting, April U-!S, 1974, p. 2. 
21 Ibid., p. 4. 
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relatively uncontrollable costs. Table 48 shows the rapid growth in the use 
of these automatic clauses. Whereas less than two-thirds of settled rate cases 
contained fuel cost pass-through clauses covering 90 percent or more of the 
kilowatt hours sold during 1971 and early 1972, these provisions had become 
almost universal by late 1973. 
The use of these automatic devices tends to reduce regulatory lag, but not 
to eliminate it. Some commissions require utilities to u~e the FIFO method 
(first-in, first-out) to measure changes in fuel inventories. With a 60 day or 
greater stockpile, a utility may thu~ have to wait two months or more before 
its added fuel costs become fuel eligible for inclusion in the pass-through. 
There is another lag-often 1-2 months-between the time that increased fuel 
costs are allowable and the time that they actually show up in added billings. 
Thus, a 3-4 month lag is customary even with the use of supposedly automatic 
pass-through mechanisms. 
Although automatic pass-throughs of fuel and other cost increases can be 
useful to utilities, it should be realized that they do not provide a panacea. 
These rate adjustments are one-for-one pass throughs, with no increase in net 
income. If customers adapt to the resultant higher rates without cutting back 
on electric power usage, then the utilities merely break even on the higher 
rates. But when customers respond by using less electricity, revenues fall more 
rapidly than costs, which comprise an element of fixed charges which must be 
covered regardless of the precise rate of operations. 
Rate Bases 
The base on which utility rates is determined is of course one of the key fac-
tors in the regulatory process. Traditionally, most state commissions have used 
the original cost of the applicable company investments to estimate the rate 
base. 
As shown in Table 49. however, in a modPst number of cases, the commissions 
have used a replacement or "fair value" basis. In a period of rapid inflation, 
the latter approach is likely to yield a higher base for rate-making. Although 
this report is not the place for a detailed analysis of the two alternatives 
it should be noted that replacement cost may come closer to the economic notio~ 
of "opportunity costs." 
TABLE 48.-COVERAGE OF FUEL CLAUSES-PERCENT OF KILOWATT HOURS (IN ELECTRIC RATE CASES SETTLED 
DURING PERIOD) 
Time period 
0 to 25 
percent 
Jan. 1, 1971 to Mar. 31, 1972_________ 6 
Apr. 1, 1972 to June 30, 1972_________ 1 
July 1, 1972 to Sept. 30, 1972_________ 0 
{let. 1, 1972 to Dec. 31, 1972__________ 0 
Jan. 1, 1973 to Mar. 31, 1973_________ 0 
Apr. 1, 1973 to June 30, 1973_________ 2 
July 1, 1973 to Sept. 30, 1973_________ 3 
Oct. 1, 1973 to Dec. 31, 1973__________ 0 
Total. _____ __ ____ __ _________ _ 12 
Source: Edison Electric Institute. 
26 to 50 
percent 
10 
50 to 75 76 to 90 90 to 100 
percent percent percent 
11 3 46 
1 0 18 
1 0 15 
3 2 19 
4 0 16 
2 4 13 
1 0 17 
1 0 18 
24 162 
TABLE 49.-TYPES OF RATE BASES USED IN ELECTRIC RATE DECISIONS 
Time period Original cost • Fair value 1 Both 
66 25 
17 8 
13 6 
22 4 
18 5 
15 5 
13 5 
12 3 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
Jan. 1, 1971 to Mar. 31, 1972 ___ ·---- -- -------- -- - - --- -Apr. 1, 1972 to June 30, 1972 ____________________ ___ . __ 
July 1, 1972 to Sept. 30, 1972 ________________________ _ 
Oct.1, 1972 to Dec. 31, 1972 __ _______________________ _ 
Jan. 1, 1973 to Mar. 31, 1973· -- ------------------·---Apr. 11973 to June 30, 1973 _____________ ____________ _ 
July 1, 1973 to Sept. 30, 1973__ ______________________ _ 
Oct.1, 1973 to Dec. 31, 1973 _________________________ _ 
Total 
72 
21 
16 
26 
20 
21 
21 
20 
217 
Total 
92 
25 
19 
27 
23 
20 
18 
16 
-----------------------------------Total ______ ______ __________________________ _ _ 
I Includes "reproduction" basis. 
Source: Edison Electric institute. 
176 61 240 
Interim Rates 
In some states, interim rate increases may be granted while a rate increase 
is being considered by the regulatory commission; typically, the interim rate is 
lower than the request being considered. This clearly is an effort to reduce the 
length of regulatory lag. In 18 percent of the cases surveyed, interim increases 
were granted (see Table 50). 
A related approach is for the commission to grant a temporary approval of the 
requested increases, with the proceeds held under bond. Thus, if the commission 
ultimately rejects the increase or approves a lesser amount, all or a portion of 
the proceeds must be refunded to the customers. As shown in Table 51, this 
procedure was followed in 11 percent of the cases surveyed. 
1.'reatment of Ta.m Incentives 
The benefits of federal tax incentives are often offset, in the case of public 
utilities, by the actions of state regulatory authorities. For example, many utili-
ties are in effect required to ignore the rapid write-offs of capital outlays per-
mitted for federal income tax purposes and to "fiow through" the tax savings. 
This results in higher reported earnings and in lower cash fiow to finance new 
outlays. 
In recent years, many commissions have permitted utilities to switch from ":flow 
through" to "normalization," that is to follow the procedures used in industry 
generally. But as shown in Table 52, in over half of the cases, utilities are still 
required to use the ":flow through" method for all or at least part of the federal 
tax incentives. 
TABLE 50.-INTERIM RATES IN EFFECT WHILE CASE IS IN PROGRESS (IN ELECTRIC RATE CASES SETILED DURING 
PERIOD) 
Time period In effect 
Not in 
effect Total 
Jan.1, 1971 to Mar. 31, 197L---------- -------------------------- -- 17 82 99 
Apr.1, 1972 to June 30, 1972 ••• -------------------------------- --- - 4 21 25 
July 1,1972 to Sept. 30, 1912------- ---- ----------------------- ---- - 6 14 20 
Oct. 1, 1972 to Dec. 31, 1972.------- - - - ----------------------- -- --- 2 29 31 
Jan. 1, 1973 to Mar. 31, 1973.- - ----- ---- ----------------------- --- - 4 20 24 
Apr. 1,1973 to June 30, 1973·------ ----- ----------------------- --- - 2 19 21 
July 1, 1973 to Sept. 30, 1973·----------- -- - - ----------------------- 6 16 22 
Oct.1, 1973 to Dec. 31,1973.----------- ---- ----------------------- 7 14 21 
---------------------------
Total.------ ________ ------ ____ -- --- -----------------_______ 48 215 263 
Source: Edison Electric Institute. 
TABLE 51.-RATES IN EFFECT UNDER BOND WHILE CASE IS PENDING (IN ELECTRIC RATE 
CASES SETILED DURING PERIOD) 
Time period In effect Not in effect 
9 90 
5 • 20 
4 16 
2 29 
2 21 
4 19 
3 19 
1 20 
30 234 
Source : Edison ElEctric Institute. 
Total 
TABLE 52.- TREATMENT OF TAX INCENTIVES (IN ELECTRIC RATE CASES SETILED DURING PERIOD) 
Time period Normalization Flowthrough Both Total 
Jan. 1,1971, to Mar. 31, 1972·------------------------ 36 42 12 90 
Apr. 1, 1972, to June 30, 1912------------------------ 8 12 4 24 
July 1, 1972, to Sept. 30, 1912 •• ----------------------- 9 10 0 19 
Oct. 1, 1972, to Dec. 31, 1972·------------------------- 17 8 3 28 
Jan. 1, 1973, to Mar. 31, 1973·------------------------ 12 6 5 23 Apr. 1, 1973, to June 30, 1973_ ____ _______ __ ___ _____ __ 11 10 2 23 
July 1, 1973, to Sept. 30, 1973 •• ----------------------- 10 4 6 20 
Oct. 1, 1973, to Dec. 31, 1973 ••• ---------------------- 10 6 3 19 
Total. ________ -- _____ -------.---.------------ 113 98 35 246 
Source: Edison Electric Institute. 
Forward, Looking Test Periods 
Regulatory commissions generally set utility rates on the basis of costs in-
cul'lred during some recent past period of •time, which is referred to as the "test 
period." Some commissions have been experimenting with the use of estimated 
future costs as a basis for fixing rates. In July 1973, the Federal Power Com-
mission issued order No. 487 providing for a twelve-month test period beginning 
as late as the date when the increased rates are proposed to go into effect. 
The order covers wholesale •rates where the proposed increase is in excess of 
$1 million ; for smaller increases, the use of a future test period is optional. 
Historical data for the preceding 12-month period will also be considered, but 
·primarily to check the reasonableness of the projected figures. 
Although there is always some reluctance to base decisions on forecasts of 
future events, it should be noted that the future test period used by some com-
missions is quite short when compared to the planning period for electric 
utilities. The companies are expected to invest very substantial sums in equip-
ment which is to be used to meet demands which are anticipated to arise over 
a period of several d~ades. 
Okanges in Utility Rate Structures 
The energy crisis of last fall and winter has caused many observers to review 
the basic principles of energy pricing. It seems unlikely that economies of scale 
and technical improvements in the near future will be sufficient to offset in:fla-
tion and high debt costs. In the words of Dr. Brimmer, ''INo one doubts any longer 
that energy is now both an increasing cost industry and in increasingly com-
petitive one, when substitutions among energy sources are considered." 28 Despite 
recent rate increases, the average price for a residential kilowatt-hour of elec-
tricity was 2.38 cents at the end of 1973, the same as it was ten years earlier.:u 
He went on to state: 
... the presumption among most observers is that rates will have 
to rise. This will be necessary not only in order to attract funds for 
the necessary increases in capacity and environmental quality, but also 
in order to perform an allocative function as well." 25 
The allocative function that Brimmer has in mind is rthe one pointed out ear-
lier, that price increases help to dampen down demand and to guide the use of 
scarce resources to the activities that produce the highest returns. However, he 
goes on to point out that. if energy is indeed a scarce commodity that should be 
conserved ,"rewards could be given to the small user and penalties extracted 
from the large users ... This ... is the reverse of the present pricing system." 26 
system." ?II 
»Brimmer, op. cit., p. 21. 
:u News from Edison EZectrio Institute, June 11, 1974, p. 1. 
: f6jtfmer, op. cit. 
41-160 0 - 75 - 32 
He does acknowledge the physical efficiencies that are involved in delivering 
energy to large users, citing the savings achieved by using. high: voltage lines. to 
deliver electric service to large customers. In contrast, residential users reqmre 
expensive and complex distribution networks. Nevertheless, Dr. Brimmer main-
tains that the current pricing pattern tends to encourage industry to develop 
in the direction of energy-intensive production technologies.~'7 
Several authorities have begun to advocate replacing the present system of 
declining block rates with a structure which more nearly approximates mar-
ginal cost pricing. In other ~vords, the .u~er is charge~ acco:ding to. how ~uch 
it costs to deliver the last umt of electricitY consumed m a given perwd of time. 
Such a structure would include peak load ra•te differentials for both time of day 
and season of the year. 
In the past year considerable interest has developed in the possibility of 
discouraging the use of electricity through revising the current "declining-
block" rate schedule whereby larger users of power typically pay lower rates 
for each "block" they use. 'l'he current practice is defended on the basis of the 
underlying economics-the total cost per kilowatt hour tends to decline with 
volume, as many items of fixed cost are spread over larger number of units ; 
thus price is related to cost of service. To some extent, however, a considerable 
flattening of electric rates is occurring with the growing importance of pro-
portional "fuel-adjustment" charges whereby utilities pass on the added cost 
of the fuel they purchase. Further flattening of block rates for large industrial 
and commercial customers may result from the sharp rises in generation and 
transmission costs. 
There is precedence in other parts of the economy for discouraging usage in 
peak periods, when production is more costly, and to encourage off-peak use 
when the cost of production is very low. ~Iovie houses, parking lots, and other 
kinds of businesses set their prices according to the time of day in order to spread 
the use .of their facilities in the most efficient pattern. 
Telephone companies do this by charging higher rates for long distance calls 
in the daytime and thereby encouraging night-time, off-peak use of their facili-
ties. Similarly, many airlines offer lower "night owl" rates. Electric utilities 
have taken limited steps in this direction. The Union Electric Company charges 
lower rates for dusk-to-dawn lighting. It seeks to promote electric heating by 
bargain rates in an effort to offset the summer air-conditioning peaks (ironically, 
summer air conditioning was originally encouraged by the utilities when their 
peaks resulted from winter heating demands) . 
Union Electric's Taum Sauk storage plant pumps water up a mountain during 
the slack hours and lets it flow back down to generate additional current when 
needed to meet peak demands. Since 1959, the company has bet>n charging resi-
dential customers a higher summer rate, about 25 percent more, when their 
use of electricity, usually stimulated by air conditioning, exceeds 600 kilowatt 
hours a month. 
Higher summer rates may also be viewed as an attempt to deal with the 
problem that, under current rate schedules, the higher usage represented by air 
conditioning is charged a lower than average rate, while the cost of installing 
the added capacity to provide the extra power is higher than the cost of pro-
viding basic electric power. 
Time-of-day pricing of electricity, as suggested by some economists, would 
be a more drastic change in the basic utility rate structure. According to Pro-
fessor William Vickery of Columbia University, "The time of consumption is 
by far the most crucial element to be taken into account in any rate structure." 28 
He believes that if consumers were charged the true cost of service--more when 
a utility is operating at full capacity and less when it is not-they would shift 
a considerable amount of their electric usage from peak hours to periods when 
total demand is less. 
According to Dr. Alfred E. Kahn, now chairman of the New York State Public 
Service Commission, Great Britain and France sell electricity at time-of-day rates 
that are based roughly on rising short-run marginal cost. He also points out 
that power pools draw power automatically from alternative sources on the 
same basis. 29 
:rr Ibid., n. 20. 
28 Onoted in Harry Wilensky, "Searching for A Short in UE's Rate System," St. Louis 
Post-DisTJatrh . . Tnne 2::!. 1974. n. 1D. 
29 Alfren E. Kahn. "Economic Theorv as a Guideline for Government Intervention and 
Control: Comment." Journal of Economic Issues, June 1974. pp. 305-306. For an analysis 
of the nra~tical difficulties of introflucing marginal cost pricing in utility reg'Ulation. see 
Harry M. Trebing, "Realism and Relevance in Public Uttuty Regulation," Journal o! 
Economic Issues, June 197'4, pp. 215-216. 
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Many governmental and industry experts are dubious about the effectiveness 
of such an innovation. According to William Lindsay, head of the rate division of 
the Federal Power Commission, '"It's an undemonstrated and radical departure. 
I doubt that it would hurt much. I'm not persuaded that it would do much good, 
either." 30 Industry reaction is even more negative. Charles J. Dougherty, presi-
dent of Union Electric, believes that electricity has become such a necessity that, 
"I'm not sure that even a 50 percent increase in cost of current used by the 
housewife would change consumption patterns." 31 
The New York State Public Service Commission recently ruled that Niagara 
Mohawk Power Corporation will have to investigate the feasibility of time-of-
day pricing before making another application for a rate increase. 
Another suggestion for change in the structure of utility charges is to "invert" 
the rates, eliminating the discounts now given to large users and, in order to 
foster conservation, increasing a user's unit charges as usage rises. Such a change, 
it is frequently argued, would constitute a fundamental departure from the 
time-honored principle that prices should reflect costs. It is obvious that it costs 
a utility more to bring power to small separate residences or retail stores than 
to one large industrial plant, but it is not inevitable that existing rate differen-
tials exactly match these cost differences. 
Some of the suggestions to invert the utility price structure have been based 
on the argument that increasing consumption leads to higher costs and, therefore, 
the price per unit should rise with increased consumption. This type of argu-
ment confuses short-run marginal costs with long-run marginal costs. 
In terms of rate structures, that is a confusion between rate forms and rate 
levels. Rate forms are a function of the short run marginal cost of existing 
facilities. Rate levels are a function of the long run marginal cost of additional 
facilities. 
It does appear that long run marginal costs are now rising-the cost of produc-
ing power from new units is greater than the cost of producing power from exist-
ing units. But there are good reasons not to respond to a sharp change in long run 
marginal cost by abandoning rate levels based on average costs and suddenly 
adopting levels based entirely on the new incremental cost. Utilities on the 
average would reap windfall returns (economic rents) on their present invest-
ment. Existing customers would be required to pay more than the actual costs 
of service. 
There is a theoretical solution, of course, to the problem: charging higher rates 
based on long run incremental costs for the loads of new customers and for 
the new additional loads of existing customers. Such a proposal, however, is 
likely to encounter great public and political resistance because of the apparent 
discrimination among individuals. Moreover, application of such a policy to the 
new loads of existing residential customers would require demand metering. This 
is something which regulatory commissions have been hesitant to authorize for 
numerous reasons, including the high cost of installing and maintaining demand 
meters. 
We need to understand that the cost of serving any electric utility customer 
contains both fixed and variable components. ]'ixed costs are those incurred 
by the utility in order to be in a position to serve the customer. no matter what 
his or her level of usage may be. Variable costs are those which depend directly 
on the amount of electricity actually used. Because the fixed charges-in the 
short run-are independent of the number of kilowatt-hours actually consumed. 
the greater the consumption, the lower will be the average amount of fixed 
charge per kilowatt-hour (kwhr). 
Variable cost in contrast, is the same for each kwhr used. Hence, short-run 
average cost must decline for a given customer as the usage rises. This situa-
tion can be described in simple mathematical terms: 
Average cost/kwhi=Fixed cost+ Variable cost/kwhr 
Number of kwhrs 
It is also aparent that the larger the variable cost relative to the fixed cost 
at an:r given level of consumption, the flatter will be the average col"lt curYe. This 
explains why increases in fuel costs tend to have the greatest flattening effect 
30 wnensky. op. cit. 
31 lbid., p. 3D. 
on the average cost curve of a large consumer. The rapid increase in fuel prices 
as transmitted through automatic fuel adjustment clauses is a good example 
of this effect. The cost of service with a greater variable cost component is 
typical in the case of large customers who take their energy at higher voltages 
and do not require as much distribution investment per kilowatt of load. 
Thus when fuel costs are rising rapidly, the average price per kilowatt hour 
paid by the large industrial customer tends to rise at a higher percentage rate 
than does the average price paid by a a smaller consumer whose average cost 
of service includes a proportionally larger fixed cost component. 
The Missouri Public Service Commission has required Union Electric to 
undertake a cost-of-service study to help the commission to see more clearly 
the relationships between costs and charges for each major class of service. 
In announcing the study, the commission chairman, James F. Mauze stated: 
We hope to find a rate structure that will enable the utilities to use 
their plant more efficiently- not an inverted rate structure but a more 
sophisticated structure that would induce more consumption during 
o1f-peak periods thereby bringing down the average cost per kilowatt 
hour.82 -
Such a change might require significant modifications in living and working 
habits. We can only speculate as to the extent that price incentives will en-
courage housewives to put off electricity-consuming chores during the daytime 
and wait until the evening to use washing machines and dryers, or to get them 
to turn off the air conditioning when they go shopping. 
Q Ibid., p. 3D. 
CHAPTER 6. PROPOSED CHANGES IN PUBLIC POLICY : GOVERNMENT CREDIT 
GUARANTEES 
The traditional response to prospective difficulties in financing the capital pro-
grams of electric utilities is in terms of increasing the general rate structure. As 
shown in an earlier chapter, that is currently the preferred solution on the part of 
many authorities. 
Yet, recent rate increases have been so substantial and at times public opposi-
tion to further rate increases so vehement, that a number of people have urged 
new approaches. It should be realized that these suggested innovations are not 
generally described as complete substitutes for rate changes. Rather, they are 
often presented as a means of slowing down the rising price of electricity. 
This chapter is devoted to an examina-tion of one group of those proposals-
suggestions to lighten the financing burdens of electric utilities through govern-
ment credit guarantees. '£he following chapter presents and analyzes other pro-
posals for easing the financial pressures on electric utilities. 
The notion of federal guarantees of electric utility bonds has obtained some 
support within the industry itself. Charles F. Luce, Chairman of the board of the 
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, has been quoted as being sympathetic 
to the approach as a means of dealing with the pressing financial problems facing 
companies such as Con Ed.1 A specific plan for such guarantees has been ad-
vanced by William G. Rosenberg, chairman of the Michigan Public Service Com-
mission. Because of the national attention received by Mr. Rosenberg's proposal 
and the detail that he has made available, the following analysis of federal guar-
antees of utility bonds is based on his approach. 
DESCRIPTION AND RATIONALE OF THE ROSENBERG PLAN 
Chairman Rosenberg presented his views in a -speech of the Eighty-Fifth Annual 
Convention of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners on 
September 18, 1973, Rates, Consumer Pressure and Finance: The Need tor In-
novation in the EZectrio Utiilties.~ The 14-page speech was accompanied by a 32-
page paper with the same title which provided additional detail.8 In its essence, 
the Rosenberg approach is to have the fede .. ·al government guarantee the interest 
of the bonds issued by electric utilities. The federal support is also seen as per-
mitting the utilities to more highly leverage their financial structures, to issue a 
larger proportion of bonds to stock than is currently the case. His expectation is 
that the lower interest rates which the utilities could pay on these bonds would 
reduce the very sub~tantial pressures for rate increases that are now being felt by 
the Michigan Public Service Commission and by its counterparts throughout the 
nation. ·~ . 
The program is expected .to operate in the following manner for a typical 
electric utility: 
1. The utility would petition the state reguiatory agencies for authority to 
issue debt securities to finance new cons-truction and associated facilities or to 
refinance debt. 
2. After feasibility analysis, the commission would certify that the proposal 
was in the public interest. 
3. The utility would then apply to the appropriate federal agency for fed~ral 
insurance and guarantee of the proposed debt issue. 
1. "Con Edison Says a Resumption of Payout Is Uncertain; Meeting Is Tumultuous," 
ThP. WtJ.lZ Street Journal, May 21, 1974. p. 6. 
2 Wllllnm G. Rosen"~>erJr. Rates, Consumer Pressure· and Finance: The Need for Innova-
tion in the Electric Utilities, a speech delivered at the Eighty-Fifth Annual Convention 
of thP N~ttfonal Asf;oclatlon of Regulatory Utntty Commissioners, Seattle, Washington, 
Seotemher 18. 1973 (hereafter referred to as Rosenberg Plan). 
3 WUUnm G. RosenberJr. Rates. Consumer Pressure and Finance: The Need tor Innova-
tion in. the Electric Utilities (hPreafter referred to as Rosenberg Paper). This paper 
contains the following note: "The substance of this paper wns prPsented In a 11peech 
nt the Efghty-Ffth Annunl Convention of the National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners, Seattle, Washington, Tuesday, September 18, 1973." 
(497) 
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4. The federal agency, relying on certifications by the state ~O?Jlmissi?n, would 
guarantee the debt service payments. It would charge the ubhty an msurance 
fee sufficient to fund the risk of default. 
5. The utility \vould then make its usual public offering or priv~te placement 
of its bonds. The new facilities would be constructed under surveillance of the 
state commission. . . 
6. Debt service payments and the insurance fee would be made by the ubhty 
in accord with the terms of the bond indenture. 
7. In the event of default, debt service could be paid from the insurance p~ol. 
If the pool were insufficient, payments would be made by the U.S. Treasury. 
Chairman Rosenberg contends that such a system of federal guarantees would 
reduce the cost of capital by enabling electric utilities both to issue bonds at lower 
rates of interest and to use more debt and less equity in their capital struc-
tures. Thus, savings would result from two ~ources: (1) lower inter~st pa;v~ents 
and (2) a substitution of tax-deductible mterest for non-deductible dividend 
payments. . . . 
The direct interest savings are estimated at 150 basis pomts (a 11h percentage 
point reduction in the interest rate). The higher leverage resulting from a greater 
percentage of debt in the capital structure is estim~ted to yiel~ su~stantial sav-
ings because "common equity, even under conventiOnal financmg, IS over three 
times more e~pensive than debt." 5 • • 
Chairman Rosenberg advocates the use of government guarantees m view of 
the cost pressures on the electric utilities. "There c~n be no doubt," he states, 
"that when the financial facts are considered objectively, financial stress upon 
the companies is serious." 8 The problem is also viewed as a continued ~ne: "It 
is abundantly clear that the combination of growing demand for service and 
decline in the attractiveness of utility securities will continue to result in severe 
financial pressures." 7 He also cites various precedents for federal guarantee of 
private credit. . _ 
It should be noted that Chairman Rosenberg does not view the proposal for 
federal guarantee of electric utility bonds as a panacea. In his paper, he empha-
sizes the important role of utility rates: 
It is clear that short-term benefits of less than fair rates are out-
weighed by the negative long-term consequence~ .t~ the society of ~ailure 
to provide adequate utility service ... The utilities cannot service the 
public's energy needs at a reasonable co~t and in an enviro"?mentan;v 
acceptable manner unless they can attract needed ~xterna! capital. Capi-
tal will be forthcoming at the lowest costs only If earnmgs levels are 
sufficient to assure a reasonable return on bond :md equity investments.8 
Chairman Rosenberg's paper also acknowledg:es some of the techniral difficul-
ties that would have to he faced in making effective any general program of 
fed€'-ral guarantees of utility bonds. As he points out, most ontstanding uti1itY 
bond indentures include a restriction on the issuance of additionql deht hy the 
rompany. New deht may he issued unlPss coverage (tlw. rnto nf earnin~s he-
forf' taxes and interest to interest charges) is above a stmnlated level, usually 
2.00. Since many utilities are already very close. to minimum ~overage. lev~ls, 
they could not significantly increase the proportion of deht without viol::~h~g 
the indenture restrictions.9 Chairmnn Rosf'nherg urges amenrlmf'nt of thf' Pnhhc 
Utility Holding Company Act and elimination of any other legislative obstacles 
that may he identified. He concludes: 
If Congress decides to apply the full faith an? cr~n.it. of thf' U.S. 
Treasnrv to the financing requirements of electrtr nbhhes. f'ongr~ss 
should have no furthE>r problem in amenrline- other statutes a~ertmg 
nublic utilitv financing which coulrl cut across the indenturE> restr1ctwns 
to assumE> that the fPCleral guarantee and insurance proposal has broad 
applicability to all of the nation's electric utilities.10 
4 Ro.~enbem Plan, pn. 10- 11. 
s n1ir7., n. ·11. Chairman Rosenbf'rg's paper rpfers to a potential 25 percent savings in 
thP l'ost of capital (p. 17). 
n T11ir1., p. 3. 
• 111i(l., n. 4. 
R Ro.qenbem Pane1·, p. 7. 
D J11ff1., pp, 13- 14. 
1o Ibid., p 21. 
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Before undertaking a more detailed analysis of this proposal for federal guar-
antees of utility bonds, it may be useful to array the major "pro" and "con" 
arguments that can and have been made for the plan. 
1li ajor Arguments 
Pro 
1. It provides a new source of capital to the electric utility industry. 
2. It lowers the industry's cost of financing. 
3. It reduces the industry's tax bill. 
4. It a voids federal controls. 
5. It protects existing debt holders. 
6. It does not change the status of equity investors. 
7. It relies on numerous precedents for federal guarantees of private credits. 
Con 
1. It does not provide a new source of capital to the economy as a whole, but 
uses the political process to give one industry a larger share of available capital 
funds. 
2. It could increase financing costs to the extent that delays resulting from 
federal reviews force utilities to miss periods when interest rates are low. 
3. It violates binding commitments to existing bondholders. 
4. It increases taxes to be raised from the rest of society. 
5. It subsidizes the use of energy when public policy is fostering conservation. 
6. It opens the way for federal controls, which often accompany government 
~ubsidies. 
'i. It overestimates interest savings and ignores increased costs to other bor-
rowers. 
It is apparent that many of the disagreements between the proponents and 
OPI~onents of federal credit guarantees are based on different interpretations of 
ihe impact of such federal programs;. Hence, a detailed analysis of federal credit 
J{Uarantees in general and of guarantees of utility bonds specifically would seem 
very much in order. 
UIPACTS ON TOTAL SAVING AND INVESTMENT 
The aYailable literature on the impacts of federal credit programs on the total 
flow of saving and ilwestment in the American economy is clear. All authorities 
l:ltate that these programs do not increase the total flow of saving or im·estment. 
At the most, they merely change the share of investment funds going to a given 
industry or sector of the economy and, in the process of doing so, exert upward 
pressures on interest rates as investment funds are bid away from other sectors. 
In commenting on existing programs of federally-assisted credit to the private 
sector, Dr. Henry Kaufman, the distinguished economist with the investment 
house of Salomon Brothers, has written: 
FE>deral agency financing does not do anything directly to enlarge the 
supply of savings ... in contrast, as agency financing bids for the limited 
supply of savings with other credit demanders, it helps to bid up the 
price of money.11 
In referring to borrowing by the Federal Government and its agencies, Dr. 
Albert 'Vojnilower has made a similar observation: 
Because these governmental borrowers need have few if any worries 
about creditworthiness or meeting interest payments, they can preempt 
as much of the credit markets as they choose. As a result, the Federal 
sector has become one of the most relentless sources of upward pressures 
on interest rates.:. ~ 
In a comprehensive study of federal credit programs for the prestigious Com-
mission on l\I01wy and Credit, 'Varren Law of Harvard University concluded 
that they have created inflationary pressures in every year since World War 11.13 
11 Hrnry Kaufman. "Federal Deht 1\InnngPment: An Economist'R View from thf' 1\Iar-
kf'tpln<'P.'. in Ff'deral Resf'rve Bank of Boston, Issues in Fede1·al Debt Jllauagement, Bos-
ton.l!l73. p. 171. 
_t 2 Alhert l\I. Wojnilower, "Can Capital-Market Controls be Avoided in the 1970's," in 
:'lhchael E. Levy. editor. Containing Inflation in the Envi1·onmcnt of the 1970's, New 
York. Conference Boarrl. 1971. n. 42. 
• 
13 
·warren A. Law. "The Ai!greg::t!.£:: Impact of Federal Credit Programs on thf' Economy," 
m Commission on l\Ioney and Credit, Federal Credit Programs, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-
Hall, 1963, p. 310. 
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Professor Patricia Bowers has noted what she terms "costs" of federal credit 
programs: 
One cost arises from the fact that when the budget constraint is 
loosened for housing, it must be tightened for other sectors. The other 
two borrowing groups most adversely affected by tight credit are state 
and local governments and small businesses. 
A further cost ... is that the operations of the federal credit agencies 
tend to increase the level of interest rates above the level that would 
have prevailed if they had not entered the credit markets.1' 
This phenomenon occurs for a variety of reasons. The total supply of funds is 
determined by household and business saving and the ability of banks to increase 
the money supply. This is the budget constraint, as described above by Professor 
Bowers, for new finance for all borrowers, public or private. The normal response 
of financial markets to an increase in the demand for funds by a borrower, such 
as is represented by a federal credit program, is an increase in interest rates so as 
to balance out the demand for funds with the available supply. But the federal 
government's demand for funds are "interest-inelastic" (the Treasury will gen-
erally raise the money that it requires regardless of the interest rate). Thus, 
weak and marginal borrowers will be "ratiom~d" out of financial markets in the 
process, while the Treasury and other borrowers pay higher rates of interest.:u; 
Important insight into the effects of federal credit programs on capital markets 
has been provided by Bruce MacLaury, the President of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis and a former deputy Undersecretary of the Treasury : 
The more or less unfettered expansion of Federal credit programs 
and the accompanying deluge of agency direct and guaranteed securities 
to be financed in the credit markets has undoubtedly permitted Congress 
and the Administration to claim that wonder of wonders-something for 
nothing, or almost nothing. But as with all such sleight-of-hand feats, the 
truth is somewhat different.16 
Dr. MacLaury goes on to point out that there are extra costs associated with 
introducing new government credit agencies to the capital markets, selling issues 
that are smaller than some minimum efficiently tradeable size, and selling securi-
ties that only in varying degree approximate the characteristics of direct govern-
ment debt in terms of perfection of guarantee, flexibility of timing and maturities, 
"cleanness" of instrument, etc. He points out that, as a result of such considera-
tions, the market normally charges a premium over the interest cost on direct 
government debt of comparable maturity. That premium ranges from 1,4 of one 
percent on the well-known federally-sponsored agencies such as FNMA to more 
than lh percent on such exotics as SBIC debentures and New Community Bonds. 
He points out: 
In general, if cost of financing were the only consideration, it would 
be most efficient to have the Treasury itself provide the financing for 
direct loans by issuing government debt in the market.17 
MacLaury also describes the reduced efficiency that occurs in the economy by 
providing a federal "umbrella" over many credit activities without distinguishing 
their relative credit risks: 
One function that credit markets are supposed to perform is that of 
distinguishing different credit risks and assigning appropriate risk pre-
mia ... this is the essence of the ultimate resource-allocation function 
of credit markets. 
As an increasing proportion of issues coming to the credit markets 
bears the guarantee of Uncle Sam, the scope for the market to differenti-
ate credit risks inevitably diminishes ... Theoretically, the Federal agen-
cies issuing or guaranteeing debt would perform this role, charging as 
costs of the programs differing rates of insurance premia. In practice, all 
of the pressures are against such differential pricing of risks.18 
u Patricia F. Bowers, Private Choice and Public Welfare, Hinsdale, Dryden Press, 1974, 
pn. 4CI4--496. 
16 Ibid., p. 496. 
16 Bruce K. MacLaury, "Federal Credit Pro~rams-:the Issues They Raise," in Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston, Issues in Federal Debt Management, Boston, 1973, p. 214. 
11 Ibid., p. 215. 
ta Ibirl., p. 217. 
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IMPACTS ON OTHER SECTORS OF THE SOCIETY 
In an article in the Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal which was bas~ on .work done in th~ U.S. Treasury Department, the present ~riter pointed 
?ut, ... It must be recogmzed that the very nature of [Federal] credit assistance 
IS to create advantages for some groups of borrowers and disadvantages for 
others." 19 To the questions "Who will be rationed out? Who will be the new dis-
advantaged in the credit market?", the literature provides clear answers. To 
quote Dr. Kaufman again: 
It is unlik~ly ~o be the large well-known corporations or the U.S. Gov-
e!nment. It IS hkely. to be some State and local government, medium.: 
Sized and smaller busmesses, some private mortgage borrowers not under 
the Federal umbrella, and some consumer sectors. . . . This is bound to 
contribute to additional economic and financial concentration in the 
United States.20 
J.ames Mc~e~? also notes that the continued expansion of government-
assi.sted credit wo~ld result in corporate issuers [not receiving federal aid] 
havmg to reach a wider market with resultant consequences for rates. It would 
also probably bar even more lower-rated issuers from the bond market in the 
years to come." 21 
Kaufman .also co~tend~ th~t the substanti·al volume of new -offerings by the 
federal credit agencies will widen sharply the yield spread between these issues 
and t~ose of the U.S. Government, while the yield spread between the agencies 
and high-grade corporate bonds will tend to be very narrow.211 
H.e also st~tes that investors may become reluctant to buy revenue bonds not 
havmg the direct guarantee of state and local governments.23 Pollution control 
bonds having typically yielded moderately more than alternative long-term tax-
exempt issues and substantially more than the after-corporate tax yield of new 
corporate bonds. This relatively high interest cost is ascribed to their rather 
small size, and limited distribution and marketability,lK characteristics which 
woul~ also apply to federally-guarantees of individual utility bonds. 
It IS clear t~a~ the propose~ ~rogram of federal guarantees of utility bonds 
would P.osses s.Imilar charactenstlcs as existing federal credit programs. It would 
do noth~ng to mc~ease the total amount of saving in the economy which provides 
the basic pool of mvestment funds. Moreover, to the extent that the government 
guarantees eD;abled utilities to obtain larger share of available capital funds 
the results would be two-fold : ' 
. (1) to elbow out of credit markets weaker and "unprotected" borrowers such 
a.s co~s.umers, homeow~ers, small businesses, school districts, and smaller coun-
ties, Cities, and other umts of local government. 
(2) The diversion of investment funds from these other sectors to utilities 
~o~ld require an increas~ in interest rates. Thus, some of the anticipated saving 
m.mterest costs t~ the utilities from the government guarantee would not materi-
ahze, and borrowmg costs to other borrowers would tend to rise. 
IMPACTS ON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND ON FEDERAL TAXPAYERS 
One impact of the Rosenberg plan is clear and negative: to the extent that the 
guara!ltees were successful in permitting utilities to shift from stock issues to 
bend Issues, the resultant increase in tax-deductible interest payments would re-
duce the payments of income taxes by utilities to the Treasury. Nothing in the 
proposal would generate any offsetting savings in federal spending. Rather the 
plan calls for the Treasury meeting utility interest payments if the comp~nies 
are unable to do so and the guarant{'e fund is exhausted. 
Thus, the Rosenberg plan would either result in a larger oudget deficit- which 
wou~d accerbate the inflationary pressures which are the source of so much of 
the mdustry's present financial difficulties--or it would require adding to the 
tax burdens of all other taxpayers. . 
10 Murray L. Weidenbaum, "Financing and Controlling Federal Credit Programs" Fed-er~l Home Loan Bank Board Journal, September 1971, p. 15. ' 
Kaufman, op. cit., pp. 171. 173. 
21 
.TameR .T. McKeon. "Ae-ency Debt Growth Shouldering Others From Market" Money 
Mnnaqer, DPcemher 10, 1973. p. 3. ' 
M 22 Henry Kaufman. "Continued Inflation Portends Vast Changes in Markets" Money ~:gied.' June 17, 1974, p. 5. ' 
:u Salomon Brothers, Comments on Values, June 5, 1974, p. 3. 
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Another aspect of the proposed credit guarantee is the risk that it would im-
pose on the United States Treasury. As the plan is now formulated, there is a 
lack of incentive for individual companies or state regulatory commissions to 
minimize high-risk undertakings. That is so because the plan calls for losses to 
be covered by all utilities and, if necessary, by the Treasury. There is no pro-
vision for "merit rating." Thus, conservatively-managed institutions would pay 
the same percentage fee as companies that engage in riskier ventures. 
IMPACTS OF CREDIT PROGRAMS 
In considering proposals for new loan guarantees by the Federal Government, 
some attention needs to be given to the existing burden of liabilities and contin-
gent liabilities already borne by the U.S. Treasury. Table 53 summarizes the 
major commitments of such a nature. On June 30, 1973, they totalled in excess of 
$1.7 trillion, of which direct liabilities were over $520 billion and go-vernment 
credit programs accounted for over $160 billion. By way of comparison, total 
federal revenues for the fiscal year 1975 are estimated at about $300 billion. 
Detailed information on the individual federal credit programs is contained 
in Table 54. An examination of the array of programs is noteworthy. In the 
typical case, the area being aided is one subject to close federal regulation (rail-
roads, merchant marine, defense production, and agriculture) or has become, 
at least in part, a federal responsibility (housing, economic development, medi-
cal care, education, veterans assistance, and disaster relief). 
The largest federal program of loan guarantees is in the housing area. The 
purpose of the loan guarantees is different than that envisioned in the Rosen-
berg plan. It is to open up the mortgage market to borrowers who otherwise 
might be denied credit due to imperfections in credit markets. As explained by 
one authority, 
One of the factors discouraging the purchase of mortgages by the broad 
spectrum of financial investors is the illiquidity of mortgage instru-
ments due to the limited secondary market for mortgage instruments, 
in contrast to the broad secondary markets for business and government 
securities. 25 
TABLE 53.-LIABILITIES AND OTHER FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, AS OF JUNE 30, 1973 
(In millions of dollars) 
Applicable 
to other 
Government Applicable 
Category funds to the public 
liabilities: 
Public debL. ... . . . ... ... .................. . ................. 124,210 
Agency securities. ..... ............... .. . ..................... 1, 996 
Deposit fund liability accounts •... •• •••• • . • •• - ---··-·-·····------------------· Checks and other instruments outstanding ____ ________________________________ _ 
Accrued interest on the public debt. ____ __ ___________________________________ _ 
Other Treasury liabilities _______ • _______ • ___ • __ ___ • _______ • _____ • ______ ._. ___ • 
Accounts payable on the books of government agencies____________ 6, 377 
333,932 
9,113 
3, 653 
7, 075 
2, 874 
418 
31, 049 
Total 
458, 142 
11, 109 
3, 653 
7, 075 
2, 874 
418 
37, 426 
--------------------------------Subtotal, liabilities. __ ____ • ___ • ___ ._ . ___ • ___ ._. _____ • ___ • __ ._ 388, 114 520,697 132,=58=3===~===== 
160,713 160,713 
1, 021,915 1, 021,915 
Contingent liabilities: 
Government guarantees insuring private lenders against losses __________________ _ 
Insurance commitments _____________ • __ _ •• __ • ••••• ___ ._._. ___ ._. ___ ••• ____ • __ 
5, 762 5, 762 
17, 502 17, 502 
Unadjudicated claims ••. ____ _________ __ • • ___ •• ______ • ___ • _____ • ____ • _______ ._ 
International commitments _____________ ••• _ • • ____ •• _______ • ______ • ___ • _____ --
----------------------------Subtotal, contingent liabilities •• _. _______ • _____ •• _____ • ______ • _____ ._. ____ ._ 1, 205, 892 1, 205,892 
====================== Grand totaL •••• __ -··- · ._ •• ________ ••• _._ • • __ •• ____________ _ 132, 583 1, 594, 006 1, 726,589 
Note: Excludes actuarial deficiency in social security and other "social insurance" programs, and other contingencies 
shown in source note. 
Source: Department of the Treasurv. Bureau of Accounts, statement of liabilities and other finzncial commitments of 
the U.S. Government as of June 30, 1973, January 1974. 
25 Bowers, op. cit., p. 483. 
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TABLE 54.-GOVERNMENT LOAN CREDIT GUARANTEES AS OF JUNE 30, 1973 
(In millions of dollars) 
Agency and program 
Funds appropriated to the Presi-
dent: 
Agency for International De-
velopment: Housing guar-
anty fund. 
Foreign military sales funds __ 
Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation. 
Dep· rtment of Agriculture, 
Agricultural credit insuranc3 
Farmers Home Administration: 
fund. 
Rural development insurance 
fund. 
Rural housing insurance fund. 
Department of Commerce, Eco-
nomic Development Adminis-
tration: Economic development 
revolving fund. 
Maritime Administration: Federal 
f~~~. financing fund, revolving 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration: Federal ship 
financing fund, fishing vessels. 
Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare: 
Medical facilities guar11ntee 
and loan fund. 
Student loan insurance fund •• 
Department of Housing and Urban 
Development: 
Low-rent public housing 
program. 
New communities guarantee 
fund. 
Federal Housing Administra-
tion. 
Urban renewal fund ________ _ 
Amount of contingency 
For 
guarantees 
and insurance 
For 
commitments 
to guarantee 
Total in force or insure Explanatory notes 
277 
244 
218 
2, 874 
1, 509 
6, 180 
48 
2, 579 
12 
455 
2, 099 
11, 783 
294 
93,432 
3, 651 
277 -------------- Includes extended risk gurantee 
contracts for housing. 
244 ·······------- Represents guarantees of credit for 
sales of defense articles and 
services. 
191 27 This Corporation offers U.S. lenders 
protection against commercial and 
political risks by guaranteeing 
payment of principal and interest 
on loans made to eligible private 
enterprises in foreign countries. 
2, 735 139 This fund is used to insure farm 
ownership lo3ns and soil and water 
conservation loans. 
838 671 This fund is used to make, sell, or 
insure water facility loans, rural 
electrification and telephone loans, 
industrial development loans, and 
community facility loan~. 
5, 869 311 This fund is used to insure rural 
housing loans, farm labor housing 
loans, and lo3ns for rural rental 
and cooperative housing. Loans are 
made to persons of low income and 
others in rural areas. 
48 __ • ____ ••• _. _. Outstanding guaranteed loans dis-
bursed by financial institutions to 
private borrowers for working 
capital in connection with projects 
in redevelopment areas. 
1, 260 1, 319 Government insurance of loans and 
mortgages which were financed by 
the sale of bonds to the public 
prior to the completion of con-
struction of ships under mortgage 
commitments. 
12 -····--------- Represents insurance of loans for 
construction or purchase of fishing 
vessels. 
47 408 Guarantees in force represent medical 
facilities guaranteed loans. 
2, 099 •• _ ... __ ••• _ •• Gu3ranteed loans-reinsured. Esti-
mate of expected losses is $130,· 
000,000. Funds are requested and 
appropriated by Congress to cover 
losses recognized during year in 
which claims are received. 
11, 783 _ .•••• __ •• _. __ Represents guarantees of bonds and 
notes issued by local housing 
autho;ities to private investors. 
198 96 Guarantees of loans issued by private 
developers to finance land acquisi-
tions and development costs of new 
communities. 
86, 877 6. 555 Insurance of loans for financing the 
production, purchase, repair, and 
improvement of residential proper-
ties. The FHA is indemnified against 
loss by trust agreements, perform-
ance bonds, and personal demand 
notes to the extent of $1,000,000. 
3, 651 --- ----·------ Guarantee of non-Federal loans. 
Agency and program 
Department of Transportation: 
Federal Aviation Administra-
tion: Aircraft loan guaran-
tees. 
Federal Railroad Administra-
tion: Railroad loan guaran-
tees. 
Urban Mass Transportation Ad-
ministration: Washington Metro-
politan Area Transit Authority 
bonds. 
General Services Administration: 
Defense production gurantees. 
Expenses, disposal of surplus anp 
related personal property. 
Real property activities ••• ______ _ 
Veterans' Administration : loan 
guaranty revolving fund. 
Other Independent agencies: 
Emergency loan Guarantee 
Board: Emergency loan 
guarantee fund. 
Export-Import Bank of the 
United States. 
Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. 
National Credit Union Admin· 
istration: National credit 
union share insurance fund. 
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Amount of contingency 
For 
guarantees 
and insurance 
For 
commitments 
to guarantee 
Total in force or insure Explanatory notes 
11 
275 
445 
49 
633 
25,372 
250 
4, 576 
42 
4 
11 ------ ·- --- --- Represents guarantee of 1 aircraft 
loan. 
171 104 Represents a guarantee of $68,000,(.00 
on a loan made to the National Rail 
Passenger Corp. and guarantees 
of $103,000,000 on trustee certifi-
cates of railroad companies under-
going reorganization. 
445 -------------- Principal and interest on bonds and 
other evidences of indebtedness of 
the WMATA may be guaranteed 
by the Secretary of Transportation. 
Periodic payment of ~ of the net 
interest cost to the authority is 
provided. 
44 Guarantees are given on loans made 
by public and private financing 
institutions to facilitate per-
formance of defense production 
contracts. 
2 - --------··--- Mortgage sold with full recourse to 
the U.S. Government secured by 
real property. 
633 ---------- ---- The GSA building construction pro-
gram includes projects financed by 
purchase contracts under the 
Public Buildings Amendments of 
1972. 
24, 420 952 Represents the guaranteed portion 
only of total loans of $47,165,000,-
000 made to veterans for purchase 
of homes, farms, and business 
property: the remainder of $22,-
745,000,000 is non guaranteed; 
cumulative gross claims of $1,698,-
000,000 were paid through fiscal 
year 1973 out of $50,841,000,000 
guarantees issued. Salvage opera-
tions (acquisition and resale of 
security properties) have resulted 
in recovery of all but $94, 800, 000 
of total claim payments. 
150 100 loan guarantee program for the lock-
heed Aircraft Corp. 
1, 784 2, 792 Represents loans sold with recourse 
and medium term guarantees. 
42 •. __ ____ ___ •• _ loan guarantees to railroads. This 
guarantee program ended as to re-
ceipt of new applications, on June 
30, 1963. The appraised value of 
collateral pledged is $66,100,000. 
4 ------ -- --·--- The fund has guaranteed the loans 
purchased by successful credit 
unions from liquidating credit 
unions at a price to permit payoff 
to members at par. 
Small Business Administra- 3, 393 2, 673 720 Represents guaranteed portion of 
tlon: Business loan and in- loans held by private lenders. The 
vestment fund. non11uaranteed portion of loans, or 
participants' share is $426,100,000. 
Disaster loan fund___________ 6 The nonguaranteed oortion or partici-
--------------- pants' share is $671,000. 
TotaL__________________ 160,713 146,474 14,239 
Note: Excludes Government-sponsored enterprises, such as Federal National Mortgage Association, Federal land Banks, 
Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, and Federal Home loan Banks. 
Source: Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Accounts, "Statement of liabilities and Other Financial Commitments 
of the U.S. Government os of JUne 30, 1973." January 1974. 
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That is, the $20,000 mortgage of John Smith ln Indianapolis is hardly the 
market equivalent of a $20 million bond issue by Public Service of Indiana. In 
the words of Professor Bowers, the residential mortgage" ... is IIlOt issued by an 
entity about which the public has some general knowledge and about which it is 
possible to gain additional specific information without too much difficulty and 
expense." l!6 Utility bonds do not seem to fit into that category. 
Impacts on Government Bond Issues 
As federal guaraiiltees are extended to more aud more private borrowers, an 
ever larger proportion of the nation's debt consists of federal credit. In order to 
entice a rising share of available savings, some increase would be expected in 
the interest rates paid on such debt. That is, if-in the absence of the Rosenberg 
Plan-total Treasury and government guaranteed borrowing in a given year 
were $50 billion then, with the Rosenberg Plan, total Federally-assisted borrow-
ing would rise to $70 billion. 
It is reasonable to anticipate that a higher rate of interest would have to be 
paid to attract $70 billion of saving to government credit ·activities than $50 
billion. liildeed, that is generally the conclusion of the scholars who have studied 
the matter. However, no precise estimates have ever been made. 
If the federal government were to guarantee all public utility debt, the re-
sultant quick and massive expansion of the size of the government debt market 
is likely to result in sharp increases in the interest rates necessary to attract 
a new body of illlvestors to government securities. Even if the new rates are 
below those now paid by utilities, they likely will be above those now paid by 
the Treasury. Hence, the advantages that would accrue to the utilities and their 
customers would be offset by the higher interest costs paid by the Treasury 
and thus financed by all taxpayers and the general public. 
For purposes of illustration, let us assume that the very substantial increase 
in total government-assisted credit that would result from extending guar-
antees to all electric utilities would require raising the average interest rate 
paid on such debt by one-quarter of 1 percent. In 1975, $28.4 billion of federal 
interest-bearing marketable debt is scheduled to mature and about $8 million of 
short-term Treasury bills are expected to roll over.27 Making an additional 
allowaiilce for the $21.6 billion of net new debt estimated to be issued,28 the total 
added cost to the federal taxpayers would be about $145 million a year (.0025 X 
$58,000,000,000). 
As a general proposition, it would be expected that Government-guaranteed 
debt would have a lower interest rate than ordinary utility bonds. But, as stated 
by one authority, "There is some reason to doubt, however, that this would 
actually be very substantial in effect." :e Herman G. Roseman, vice president of 
National Economic Research As~ociates, points out that the yields on Treasury 
bonds seem to have declined relative to utility bonds at least in part because of 
the decline in the outstanding volume of Treasury bonds. "There is no reason 
to think that a Government-guaranteed utility bond would be regarded as a 
substitute for a Treasury bond-which has a very high degree of marketabil-
ity-allld that it bear the same rate as a Treasury bond." 80 
Support for this position is obtained by examining existing programs of federal 
guarantees of the credit of private corporations. In the case of the railroads 
whose loans were guaranteed by the Federal Government during the period 
1959-63, the interest rates that they paid were substantially higher than the 
rates paid by the Federal Government as well as those of public utilities, who 
were operating without the benefit of a federal guarantee (see Table 55). This 
indicates the low investor evaluation of railroad investments, regardless of the 
government guarantee. 
A more recent program of federal guarantees covers the financing of American-
built ships. At the time of the offering of the 'bonds-which were clearly la'beled 
"United States Government Guaranteed Ship Financing Bonds"-they were 
li8Jbid. 
ll1 Trens11r11 Bulletin, Aorl11974. pp. 22. 30. 
l!8 Official orojections for calendar year 1975 are not available for new public debt to be 
issuefl : the fiscal :vear figure is useit in the calculation. 
!19 Herman G. Roseman. Remarks on the Adequacy of Oapital Supply !or the Electric 
Utility IndtJ.Btru in the Ooming Decade, New York, National Economic Research Associates, 
Inc ... Tanuary 29, 1974, p. 50. 
80 Ibid., p. 50. 
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priced to yield 7.9 percent at a time when Treasury bonds were yielding about 
7 percent and utility 'bond yields averaged about 8 percent.:n 
As Roseman puts it, "These two examples illustrate the principle that a Govern-
ment guarantee of a loan does not make the loan equiva~ent to a Government 
borrowing." 32 Hence, it is difficult to assume that electric utility bonds, if guar-
anteed as to interest and principal by the Federal Government, would thereby 
bear interest rates similar to those on government bonds. It does. however, seem 
reasonable to assume that the interest rate on guaranteed utility bonds might, 
for some companies and under certain market conditions, be lower than they 
otherwise would be. 
TABLE 55.-INTEREST RATES ON RAILROAD GUARANTY LOANS AND YIELDS ON GOVERNMENT SECURITIES AND 
PUBLIC UTILITY BONDS, 1959-63 
[In percent) 
Year 
1959 ••••• ------- - --------------- - ------- - -- - ---- -1960 _____________________________________ _________ _ 
1961 _________________________ ___________________ __ _ 
1962 ________________ ____________________________ __ _ 
1963 ________ ___________________________________ __ _ _ 
Range of 
interest rates 
on railroad 
guaranty loans 
5 -5H 
5 -5H 
4%-6% 
5 -5P 
4%-5% 
U.S. Govern-
ment securities U.S. Govern-
Public utility 3- to 5- ment long-term 
bonds year issues bonds 
4. 70 
4. 69 
4. 57 
4. 51 
4. 41 
4. 33 
3. 99 
3. 60 
3. 57 
3. 72 
4. 07 
4. 01 
3.90 
3. 95 
4. 00 
Source: Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Accounts, Section of Financial Analysis, Statistic~! Summary for 
Loan Guarantees to Railroads Under Part V of the Interstate Commerce Act, As amended, June 30, 1973; Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, December 1961 and December 1964. 
IMPACTS ON GOVERNMENT CONTROLS 
An examination of existing programs of federal guarantee of private credit 
also reveals how the credit assistance is often accompanied by various forms of 
governmental controls or influence over the recipients of the credit. For exam-
ple, federal credit guarantees for shipbuilders are part of a broader program 
whereby the federal government requires the builders to incorporate various 
"national defense" features into the vessels. 
It is instructive to examine the largest federal program for guaranteeing pri-
vate credit, that administered by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), 
to observe the extent to which controls accompany the credit assistance. The 
FHA conducts an inspection of each residence to determine whether the builder 
has abided by all of the agency's rules and regulations governing the construc-
tion of the homes that it insures. There are four separate "veto" points facing a 
builder applying for FHA insurance of mortgages for a new project: (1) affirma-
tive marketing to minority groups, (2) environmental impact, (3) architectural 
review, and ( 4) underwriting. 
Because of the division of responsibilities among the various federal housing 
offices, considerable confusion and delay often arise. For example, after the 
underwriting has been approved, which gives an appraised value high enough 
to cover the builder's costs, aJditional requirements may be imposed by the 
environmental impact office or by the architectural review which substantially 
raise the cost of the project. Then the builder must return to the first office and 
attempt to obtain a revised underwriting. 
Miles Colean, the distinguished analyst of the housing industry, has com-
mented on the deleterious effects on the housing industry of the increasing array 
of government controls that has been imposed via the FHA program: 
The complications of FHA operations by introducing numerous re-
quirements that, being irrelevant to the extension of mortgage credit, 
:n Ihid., p. 51. An offering- circular by the First Boston Corporation,. dated December 27. 
1973, bore the followin!! lanl!llRI!e on thp fnct of thP dornment: 'The issuance of th!' 
Bonos is subject to the execution hy the Secretary of Commerce of an ag-rePment. 011rsuant 
to which thP navment of principal and interest will be I!Uaranteed by the United States of 
America 1mder Title XI of the Merchant l\Iarine Act. 1936. as amended. which expressly 
provides that: 'The full faith and credit of the Unitecl StatPs is pledJ?ecl to the navment of 
all guarantees made under this title with respect to both princinal and interPst, inclnfling-
intei-est. as may be nroviiled for in the g-uarantee. accruing- between the date of default 
under a g-uaranteed obligation and the payment in full of the guarantee.' " 
3!! Roseman, op. cit., p. 51. 
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placed the market oriented activity of FHA at a competitive disad-
vantage.33 
In addition, Colean has called attention to the "Uncertainty and frequent 
interruption of FHA activity" caused by settling terminal dates requiring Con-
gressional action to review insurance authority, and the limitation placed an-
nually on FHA's ability to spend the funds for administration that it obtains 
from insurance fees and premi urns.~ 
In October 1972, the National Center for Housing Management contracted 
with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to study HUD's 
housing programs. The Center drew on a distinguished group of experts in the 
area of housing.35 In analyzing the requirements which have been added in recent 
years to the FHA processing format- "such matters as affirmative marketing, 
environmental protection, and project selection"-the center's report stated: 
... the Task force feels that HUD has not proceeded in the most logical 
fashion in dealing with these new requirements. It has tended to add 
them on to the process without even analyzing the effect that they would 
have on that process ... The end result has been that the constant im-
position of new socially useful requirements for FHA processing has 
produced a substantial loss of competitive status for FHA's single-family 
prograiil8. 38 
In a later part of the report, the Center stated that, "FHA has suffered 
from ... overly comp'i<'ated l)r ou'"dated requirements for builders, mortgagees, 
and mortgagors. This has discouraged many from applying, besides causing 
frustration for those who do." 37 
Perhaps the most fundamental problem that has arisen is the fact that FHA 
guaranteed loans have always been subject to an officially determined mortgage 
interest rate ceiling. In states with low usury ceilings, this has at times either 
prevented otherwise elivib'" p?ople from using the FHA insurance program 
of has required the use of "points" and other complicating subterfuges. 
Once an industry has become dependent on the federal assistance, that situa-
tion can be used to impose additional controls, which may be unrelated to 
protecting the government's investment or contingent liability. An example is 
the recent report of the Congressional Joint Economic Committee which deals 
with energy policy. Among its various proposals, it recommended that the Con-
gress enact authority to require minimum standards for thermal efficiency in 
new buildings as a prerequisite for approval under any federal subsidy or 
mortgage insurance program.38 
In the case of electric utilities, one of the potential federal controls could 
have fairly adverse effect<> on its <'!lnital financing situation- the Davis-Bacon 
Act regulating wages on construction projects. Hence, some attention to this 
control device is warranted. Contrary to the general laws and regulations that 
require the awarding of government business to the lowest bidders, the Federal 
Government tends to increase the costs of the construction projects that it 
finances or subsidizes. The reason is the DaYis-Bacon Act, which directs the 
Department of Labor to set "minimum" rates for construction workers on these 
projects. Although the law stipulates that the minimums be set at the level 
prevailing in "the city, town. village or other civil subdivision of the state in 
which the work is performed," in practice these rates are rarely the average of 
thoRe paid all construction workers in the area. 
The Davis-Bacon Act is not limited to the construction projects financed by 
federal agencies. It typically is appended to various programs of federal aid to 
state and local governments, ranging from airports to highways to libraries. 
Even in the case of the general revenue sharing legislation- whose basic purpose 
was to shift decision-making from Washington to the grassroots- the law re-
quires all of the state and local governments to abide by Davis-Bacon in the 
case of construction projects where the revenue sharing money covers one 
: j~~!f.s L. Colean, ':Quarterly. Economic Report," Mortgage Banker, March 1974, p. 63. 
35 
'l'hP AflviRory Council for th!' study consist!'cl of a variety of housing experts. includ-
inC" William G. RoRPnherl!. Chairman of the Michirran Public Service Commission and 
formPrly ExPcutiY!' DirPctor of the 1\fichl::ran State Housing Development Authority. 
36 ReTJort of tl1e Tn.~k Force on lmnro1"i11f1 tlle Operation of Federally lnsu.rerl o1· Financed 
HotuJin.Q Programs, Washington. National Center for Housing 1\Ianagement, Inc. (undated). 
pp. fl!l - 70. 
37 Jl>id .. n. !U4. 
38 Joint Economic Committee, A Reappraisal of U.S. Energy Policy, Washington, Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1974, pp. 2-3. 
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quarter or more of the cost. Although the original version of the bill did not 
contain such a clause, a rider was adopted prior to passage. 
"Minimum" wage rates set under. the Davis-Bacon provision are almost alwav~ 
at least as high as the local union rates and, in some instances, higher. Con-· 
tractors who want to bid on these projects must agree to pay at least thesl! 
rates. Professor Yale Brozen of the University of Chicago reports that in many 
cases the Labor Department has set minimum rates above even the uni?n scalE! 
found in the area in which the work is performed. Higher union rates m som4! 
other area, 50 or 75 miles from where the work is to be done, are frequently 
used instead of local rates, despite the instruction in the law to the ~ontrary . 
More than 50 percent of the time the Labor Department has used umon rate.•1 
from a country other than that in which the work was done.39 
Davis-Bacon minimum wage rates in Western Pensylvani.a, for example, are· 
based on the Pittsburgh construction union scale. The common .labo~ rate for 
building construction in Pittsburgh is $6.75 an hou.r plus 80 cents m frm~e ?en~ 
fits while the prevailing wage for common labor m depressed Appalachia IS $•· 
an hour. As a consequence, local cOntractors did not bid for water, sewage, and 
school projects. The "minimums" forced on them for these projects would havf• 
raised their wage scales so high that they would have been una·ble to competf' 
for nongovernmental projects. 40 
The case of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation is frequently cited as an example 
of the willingness of the Federal Government to provide capital to private cor-
porations which are hard-pressed :financially. Some attention is thus warra~ted 
to this precedent. First of all, it needs to be understood that what was provided 
was not federal money, but merely a guarantee of private borrowing.41 
Furthermore the guarantee did not cover long-term capital, but only relatively 
short-term bor'rowing-through December 31, 1975. Moreover, a substantial 
interest fee was charged the company by the Treasury so that Lockheed's total 
cost of •borrowing the additional funds was no lower than that available to other 
large :firms. 
Specifically, Lockheed pays the Treasury the difference between the interest 
it pays the banks on the guaranteed loans and the going rate for loans to air-
lines. Lockheed pays the banks an interest rate which is three-eighths of one 
percent higher than the average yield on nine-month Treasury bills, to avoid 
any windfall gains to the banks resulting from the federal aid. 
The loans guaranteed by the Federal Government take precedent over all 
other borrowings for purposes of repayment (literally, a policy of "last in, 
:first out"). A number of control powers over Lockheed's activities were given 
to a newly-constituted Emergency Loan Guarantee Board, such as approving 
the payment of dividends As a major military contractor, the company is sub-
ject to a wide variety of other governmental controls, notably via the extensive 
Armed Services Procurement Regulation. 
It should be noted that the Congress passed the le~slation authorizing the 
loan guarantee only after protracted debate. The bill passed the Senate by one 
vote. 
Chairman Rosenberg states that his proposal is not a vehicle for federal 
control of electric utilities : "Federal insurance and guarantee would not replace 
private ownership and control." 42 Yet, an examination of the draft legoi~lation 
which has been prepared to carry out the plan shows that a wide variety of 
federal controls and restrictions would ibe jmposed on both the electric utilities 
and the state commissions that regulate them!3 
The Rosenberg Plan and the White Bill 
The bill drafted by Lee White is based on William Rosen:her~'s fedf'ral credit 
plan and was prepared at the chairman's request. Althoug-h Chairman Rosenbf'rg 
assures the utilities that his plan is one of nrovidin~ ff'deral credit rather than 
federal control!'!, the bill c>ontains a varietv of new federal controls OYf'r activities 
of electric utilities which historically have f'ither been subject only to state 
control or to the discretion of company management. 
:l9 Yale Brozen. "The Law That Boomeranl!ed." N"tion's Bu11iness . .Anrl1 1!l71l nn . 71 - 72 ~eP Rl!'ln .Tohn P. Ooul<l . Davis-Bacon Act, Washington, American Enterprise Institute f•"' 
Puhlico PoliC'v RP!'lParcoh 1971. 
co RrozPn . oo. cit .. n. 72. 
41 S~>e nenRrtm~>nt of the Treasury, Special Report of the Emergency Loan Guarantee Bonrif . . TunP 2~. 1 07R. 
42 Rosenhera P1an, n. lR. 
43 Proposed "Electric Utility Guarantee Act of 1974." 
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In a description of the loan guarantee plan, Rosenberg provides for a relatively 
small role for the federal government, which he describes as follows! 
The federal agency, relying on state commission certification, would 
guarantee the debt service payments and would charge the utility an 
insurance fee sufficient to fund the risk of default.~ 
This is in striking contrast to the draft bill. The proposed "Electric Utility 
Guarantee Act of 1974" would give the federal government a variety of new 
regulatory powers over private utilities and stall commissions who want to 
qualify under the bill. The major controls are as follows, with citations to the 
draft bill: 
1. Before a utility can apply for the federal guarantee, its public utility com-
mission must submit for the approval of the Federal Power Commission a 
"Statement of Need," containing a variety of information which may not be 
available now or in the future on any but the most speculative basis. Each State-
ment of Need is required to provide the following material (Section 403(a).) 
a. A projection of the electric energy needs of the state, by service classifi-
cations, for the next ten years. 
b. A tabulation of peak demand and expected reserves to meet it. 
c. A description of emergency load reduction measures in force. 
d. A description of current efforts by the state to reduce the demand fol 
additional electric energy. 
e. A projection of the anticipated capital requirements to provide the 
electric generating capacity required by the projection of energy needs. 
f. An indication of the portion of the capital requirements which are esti-
mated to be beyond the capacity of electric utilities to :finance "at a cost 
consistent with the responsibility of delivering electric energy to consumers 
at a reasonable cost." 
g. A statement of the procedures and standards applied in authorizing the· 
construction of a facility, including environmental and siting considerations. 
h. A statement of the procedures and standards which are applied in ap-
proving new issues of stocks, bonds, and other indebtedness. 
i. "Such other information" as the FPC may reasonably require, all in 
accord with prescribed "form and content." 
2. The FPC is given the power to reject the state utility commission's State-
ment of Need on either of two grounds (Section 404(b)): 
a. The state commission has failed to meet the requirements listed in (1), 
above. 
b. The Statement of Need is not consistent with "national standards ... 
for the conservation, use, and production of electric energy" to be developed 
by the FPC itself. 
3. Each public utility applying for a federal guarantee must provide the fol-
lowing information to the FPC, in addition to a description of the bond issue 
itself (Section 405(b)): 
a. A "detailed" description of the proposed use of the proceeds. In the 
case of facilities; the description shall include the proposed construction or 
installation schedule and the environmental consequences. 
b. A "demonstration to the satisfaction of the commission" that no other 
reasonable means of :financing is available on "reasonable" credit terms. 
c. Assurance that the public utility commission has approved the pro-
posed :financing and considers it to be consistent with the approved State-
ment of Need. · 
4. Each utility bond issue guaranteed by the FPC must meet the following 
requirements (Sections .<106 (b), (e) 407) ) : 
a. The net interest cost to the utility must not exceed what the chairman 
of the FPC deems to be reasonable, taking into account the range of in-
terest rates prevailing in the private market for similar obligations. 
b. The interest is not exempt from federal incoone taxes. 
c. The bonds must be paid off in 30 years. 
d. The amount of bonds shall not exceed 85 percent of the value of the 
facility being :financed (the ratio may go to 95 percent if the utility is willing 
for the FPC to publish in the Federal Register a statement that the utility 
"mould not otherwise be able, in its present :financial condition, to com-
mence or complete construction of the Facility . . ." 
u WillJam G. RosenberJ!'. "Rates, Consumer Pressure, and Finane~," Public Utilities 
Fortnightly, January 31, 1974, p. 7. 
41-160 0 - 75 - 33 
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5. The FPC is required to make the following official findings before it gua.r-
antees the indebtedness of a utility (Section 407) : 
a. That the historic and prospective earning 'POWer of the utility pro-
vides reasonable assurance that it will be able to repay the indebtedness. 
. b. That the management of the utility is "efficient" and is actively pursu-
mg programs designed to improve the economic use and efficiency of its 
existing facilities. 
c. "Such other requirements" as the FPC may prescribe. 
. Viewed in its totali.ty, the proposed Electric Utility Guarantee Act of 1974 
Is J?Ore than ~ proposal to P-xtend federal guarantees to eJectric utili.ty bonds. 
I~ IS a sweepmg proposal to extend t.he power of the Federal Power Commis-
Sion over state ,regulatory commissions and individual electric utilities on mat-
ters which historically have been reserved for state and local governments or 
for private sector decisionmaking. 
There seem to be l:l number of technical defects in the White bill. It is limited 
t? .mortgage. ~o.nds. and thus excludes ordinary debentures. It makes no pro· 
VISIOn for utilities m states such as Minnesota, South Dakota and Texas which 
lack statewide utility regulatory commissions. '.rhe draft biil would appear to 
exclude those companies from its benefits. 
. The projected role o~ the Federal Power Commission also seems to be am-
biguous, and may even mvolve some potential conflicts of interest. For example 
under the proposal the commi~sion would be passing on the wholesale powe; 
rat~s of a given .utility and also on its requested bond guarantees. Thn8, the temp-
ta~wn could ar~se for the co~mission to reject or cut back rate increases and 
shift the financm? b.urden to t11e guarantee fund and ultimately to the Treasury. 
Also,. the c?mmiss~on would be setting standards for intrastate rates and at the 
same time Will contmue to be passing on interstate rates. Again, the pos8ibility 
could develop whereby the FPC's decision-making shifts costs from one cate-
gory of user to another. 
Perh~ps, a more fundamental objection to the White Bill is that in order 
to get mto. a position ?f eligibility for the federal guarantees, a utllity must 
~ake th~ kmd~, of ac~wns that would repel private investors. The required 
paupers oath· ( Sectwn 405 (b) ) w:ould thus force the utility to become not 
only dependent on but beholden to the FPC. Having taken the actions that 
reli!~ve It from ~he possibility of private financing, it would have put itself into a 
positlO~ where It had no recourse but to agree to every FPU demand in order 
to obtam the capital that it needs. 
I~ is also difficult ~o see how electric utilities could attract atlditlonal equity 
capital under these c1rcumstances. 
IMPACTS OF FEDERAL GUARANTEES ON THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 
The propo~ed f~~era~ guarantees of their bonds would have a variety of impacts 
on t~e ~lectriC uhht:v. mdustry, not all of which are obvious and direct. Some of 
the mdirect effects might be quite serious. For example, even if federal guaran-
tees wo11;ld reduce the .borrowmg costs of public utilities, such action would not 
necessarily reduc~ their tota~ costs: Othe~ factors would not necessarily remain 
the same. Operatmg costs m1ght likely rise more rapidly than otherwise. This 
could occur ~ecause t~e g~vernment guarantees would lessen whatever market 
fo!ces are still operatmg I~ .the government-regulated utility industry. There 
might be less pressure on utility managements for efficiency and cost reduction 
The result mig~~ be the "cost-plus" mentality that often characterizes govern~ 
ment markets. Ihus, the program could tend to Le not only self-perpetuating 
and could lead to demands for large federal subsidies. 
ThWe also need to remember that households are not the only users of electricity 
e gua~antees would be a form of differential subsidy among industrial a~d 
commercial user~. They ":ould tend to subsidize industries that are heavy con-
sumers of electnc power m contrast to companies that are more dependent on 
other energy sources or less energy-intensive means of production. Thus alumi-
nu!ll would. be benefitted over steel and within the steel industr co~ · 
usmg electnc furnaces over those with fuel-fired processes. Y, pames 
Because the Federal G.overnment does not guarantee the bonds issued hv the ~e~;es~e Valley Authonty (they are backed only by the revenues of the TVA) 
~· ~ . e~sury .only guaranteed privately-owned utilities that would tend t~ t~scridmmat e agamst the largest of the public power agencies, or at least reduce 
e a van ages that they currently possess. 
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The most serious problems that utilities would encounter are likely to be in 
the legal area-the commitments to existing bondholders that limit the amount 
of additional bonds that a utility can issue, regardless of whether they are 
backed by the federal government. 
Legat Problems in Increasing Leverage 
Among the legal and regulatory constraints placed on electric utilities is that 
of the earnings coverage test as inc01·porated in bond indentures. This test is 
analogous to the earnings to fixed charge ratio discussed earlier but with a 
somewhat different definition of terms. In general, indenture coverage tests 
require that earnings availa-ble for interest payments on bonds outstanding and 
interest on the new bonds to be sold must not be less than 2.0 times for twelve 
of the fifteen months prior to the month in which new bonds are to be issued. All 
indentures carry such a provision, although in a few cases the coverage require-
ment may be set somewhat lower or higher than 2.0. For those companies that 
are subject to the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, this indenture 
provision is a matter of policy by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
With the impact of higher interest rates and lagging rate adjustments the _in-
terest coverage has fallen sharply for all electric utilities. Less than ten years 
ago electric utilities in general had indenture-defined interest coverages of ap-
proximately five times. These coverages are now approaching minimum levels. 
For some companies, including a few large and prominent ones, financial plans 
have had to be altered because of the deterioration of this interest coverage to 
a point where additional bonds could not be issued. With the prevailing level of 
interest coverages, the increase in the mortgage debt component to the 80 per-
cent level envisioned in the Rosenberg proposal (or even 60 percent level) is 
clearly not possible without modifying the indenture provision. Modification of 
indentures has proven to be difficult under conditions favorable to bondholders. 
'Vith the proposed government guarantee of new bonds, the holders of outstand-
ing bonds would certainly be expected to reject the opportunity to enhance 
the financing activities of the companies whose bond they hold- at their own 
expense. 
The basic purpose of the Securities and Exchange Commission in requiring 
an indenture coverage at certain minimum levels is to protect the investors. 
The protection of new bond holders through government guarantees with a 
concomitant decrease in overall interest coverage would place a great and per-
haps intolerable burden on the existing bondholders. This problem could be 
solved by extending the government guarantee to outstanding bonds as well as to 
new bonds, all $55 billion of them. The premium required to establish support 
for such a level of liability would be enormous. Moreover, the holders of the 
old bonds would receive an undeserved windfall gain as the price of their bonds 
increased in the market in response to their reduced risk. 
For electric utilities with no debenture bonds outstanding, the indenture in-
terest coverage test extends only to the .mortgage bonds of the company. 
Under these circumstances government guaranteed debentures could be sold. 
It is also possible that for companies with both mortgage and debenture bonds 
outstanding, subordinated bonds could be sold to circumvent the protective intent 
of the interest coverage covenants of the senior obligations. It should be 
recognized, however, that the rating services as well as the Securities and Ex-
change Commission include interest on all of a company's bonds- secured, 
unsecured, and subordinated-in computing the earnings-to-fixed-charge ratio. 
And not only are indenture provisions a limitation. One must look to pro-
visions in a typical utility company's charter normally appearing as protection 
to senior equity or preferred stock. It is not unusual to find a requirement 
whereby, if the ratio of common equity to total capitalization should fall below 
a specified percentage, then the earnings which can be paid out as cash dividends 
are seYerely restricted. To change such charter would require a vote of stock-
holders. It would not be reasonable to assume that preferred stockholders would 
willingly or eYen possibly consent to a modification of a charter to reduce their 
protection. 
In addition to causing problems under indenture convenants, issuance of 
government-guaranteed debt by a public utility over the 60 percent leYel might 
cause prospective investors to avoid outstanding issues in the secondary market. 
It might also result in institutional investors holding outstanding issues of 
utility debt divesting themselves of those outstanding securities. 
While the arrangements discussed above might circumvent the problem of 
indenture constraints, certain other legal limitations of an indirect nature are 
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brought into play in terms of the market requirements for a company's securities. 
The laws of the State of New York as they apply to the eligibility of securities 
for New York savings banks are of far broader significance than might appear 
on the surface. These eligibility provisions have long served as a model for other 
States as well as for institutional investors in the establishment of their in-
vestment standards. Among other things, to be eligible for New York savings 
bank investments, a corporation issuing bonds must show net earnings for five 
fiscal years preceding the new issue to have averaged not less than two times the 
average annual interest charges on its total funded debt applicable to that 
period. For the l·ast fiscal year preceding such bond issue, the net earnings of 
the corporation must not be less than twice the interest charges for a full year 
on its total funded debt outstanding at the time of such investment. With 
interest coverage relationships now having reached minimal levels for most 
electric utilities, an expansion of the debt component of the capital structure 
of companies would clearly render the outstanding bonds of most companies 
ineligible for investment by New York State savings banks. Further, the laws 
of the State of New York also provide that savings banks may not purchase 
corporate preferred stocks unless the net earnings for either of the last two 
years cover the total of a company's interest charges plus its annual preferred 
dividend requirements by one and one-half ti:mes. Not only would the expansion 
of the long-term debt as a proportion of the capital structure render outstanding 
bonds ineligible for New York savings banks but preferred stock as well. 
California provides that its savings banks may not invest in public utility bonds 
if the funded debt of the issuer exceeds two-thirds -of the value of its physical 
property, less reserves for depreciation. Connecticut limits its savings banks' 
investments in the funded debt of public utility companies to debt of any issuer 
whose funded debt does not exceed sixty percent of tonal capital. Fiduciaries in 
Iowa may not invest in public utility bonds unless the book V'alue of the utility's 
outstanding st-ock is not less than two-thirds of its total funded debt. 
The test for Massachusetts savings ·banks' investments is another of those criti-
cal provisions referred to widely in otller jurisdictions and in private contracts 
and deeds. Public utility obligations are not eligible for investment unless the 
issuer's -outstanding fully paid C'apital stock and surplus is equal to at least sixty 
percent of its total funded debt. In addition, the aggregate principal of ·all mort-
gage bonds of the issuer must not exceed seventy five percent of the depreciated 
value of the fixed ·property of the company. 
An "authorized security" within the meaning of all statutes of the State of 
Minnesota (including those regulating banks and institutional investments) in-
cludes 1bonds of public utility corp-orations, subject to a number of tests, one of 
which is that the book value of the outstanding ·capital stock of the issuing cor-
poration shall at the time of such investment be equal to at least two-thirds of its 
total ·funded debt. In addition, the aggregate principal amount of bonds secured 
by the first or refunding mortgage (plus the principal amount ·of all the under-
lying outstanding ·bonds) shall not exceed sixty percent of the value of the physi-
cal property subject to the lien o·f such mortgage. 
iNew Hampshire savings banks are limited ·in their investments to securities <Yf 
those utility .companies whose total funded debt does not exceed sixty percent of 
their total C'apital. Tennessee fiduciaries are permitted to invest in public utility 
bonds provided,. among other tests, that the outstanding fully paid capital stock 
of the issuing utility shaH be equal to at least two-thirds of the toal debt secured 
by mortgage lien on ·any part or all of its property, and provided that the aggre-
gate princ'iP'al amount of bonds secured 'bY the mortgage (plus the principal of 
underlying outstanding bonds) shall not exceed sixty percent of the value of the 
physical property owned by the utility and subject to the Hen of the mortgage. 
!The State of Washington restricts its savings banks' investments in public utili-
ties bonds to corporations whose "outstanding fully paid capital stock together 
with premiums thereon and the surplus of the corporation shall be eQ·U'al to at 
least two-thirds of the total debt secured by mortgage lien on any part -or all of 
its property ... " In addition. the aggregate amount ·of •bonds secured ·b:v the first 
or refunding mortgage plus the ftmount of all the underlying outstanding bonds 
must not exceed sixty percent {)f the value of the physical property subject to the 
lien of the mortgRgPs :;:ec>uring thP total morlgRge deht.45 
As a .further legal limit.a·tion the laws of manv States as they relate to savings 
banks, trust funds, life insurance comnanies and other insurance companies are 
subject to specific rating limitations. In Ohio, bonds purchased for trust funds 
45 See appendix for cttattons. 
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must be rated in either the triple-A or double-A classifications as prescribed by 
S·tandard & Poor's and Moody's. In Main~, savings banks may invest il_l :bon~s of 
out of state corporations that are rated m one. of the fir~t three classlfications,; 
that is, triple-A, double-A, or single-A, as esta'bhshed by etther Standard & Poor s 
or Moody's. 
The legal obstacles to the effective implementation of the Rosenber~ 
plan would thus seem to be most substantial. One aspect of the l.eg~6 barriers has been examined by Harvey Y ampolsky and Lee White .. 
Before turning to an analysis of tha:t st~dy, ~t should be note~ tha~ It 
is limited to the question of the co;1s~Itutwnahty of Federall~gislatwn 
voiding existing indenture restrictions. It does n?t . deal With ma~y 
of the other questions raised here, notabl~ the existing legal _restric-
tions on ownership of utility bonds by savings banks, fidumanes, and 
other regulated investors. 
Constitutionality of Federal .. 'Vullification of E_wisting Indentures 
The Yampolsky-White· memo rela~es to s.ectwn 7 (a) of the ~raft 
bill which has been prepared to legislate th.e Rosenberg :plan, The 
Federal Utility Insurance Act of 1974." SectiOn 7(a) provides that-
In any case in which utility bond ind.entures ou~standing 
at the time new bonds insured under this A~~t are Issued set 
minimum levels of income coverage or m~ximum levels f~r 
debt to equity ratios, and the new bo:qds Insured under this 
Act would result in exceeding those levels, such levels shall be 
deemed null and void. 
They point out that, although there is no cl~use in th~ Co~~itution 
expressly forbidding the Congress from .pass~n~ laws n~pairing the 
obligation of contracts, any Federal law Impairi~~ them In a manner 
whi.ch the Supreme qourt found unreas.onable would do~~~;ess be 
held to be a deprivation of property without due p~oce~s. They 
state that the Supreme Court has upheld statutes which It ~elt ~ere 
"reasonable exercises of legislative power" even though they Impair~d 
the obligation of contracts in a literal sense.48 Yampolsky an~ Whi~e 
cite three factors which the Supreme Uou~ generally c<:m~Iders In 
determining if legislation applied retroactively to preexisting con-
tracts would violate the contract clause or the due process clause of the 
Constitution: 
1. 'l.'he nature of the public interest served by ,~he stdtute.-They con!end tha~ 
the court will be sympathetic when Congress acts to remedy ~ sen?us sub 
stantive evil resulting from an emergency situation, and retroactively 1s a nec-
essar:v recourse .. . " 49 • ~. The extent of the abrogation of the ass~ted ~.re-enactmen~ nght.-They 
state that the greater the alteration of legal nghts, the weak~r ~s ~he c~se for 
tlw constitutionality of t]1P statutP." 60 Althoug-h theY. state tha~ t.h1s IS .a d1ffic~l\ 
hypothesis to assess'' 51 Yampolsky and 'Vhite beheve that 1t 1s unhkely t a 
the decision to purch'ase the bonds would have ·been adversely affected by knowl-
edge of the proposed legislation.62 1 d 3 The nature of the right affected by a retroacti.ve statute.-They cone u e, aft~r weighing the three factors, that section 7 ?f the draft bill, would not be 
found to violate the due process clause of the Constitution. 
46 Harvev Yarnnolskv and Lee White. Constitutional Issue in the Federal Utility In-
surance Act of 197 .q, Washington, June 10, 1974. 
47 TbM., p. 1. 
48 Ibid., p. 2. 
411 Ibid., p. 4. 
GO Jhifl. 
61 Ibid., p. 5. 
a:a Ibid. 
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This report is not the appropriate vehicle for a definitive analysis of this legal 
question. Yet, a reading of the available legal materials would appear to indicate 
that, at the least, a ~erious Constitutional question would be raised by an at-
tempt by the Congress to void existing indenture requirements of outstanding 
electric utility bonds. 
lndependlfmt Recalculation of Interest Savings 
Chairman Rosenberg contends that his proposal would save electric utilities 
a very substantial portion of their interest costs ( $2.1 billion a year after 1977). 
This section is devoted to an independent recalculation of these savings. Assum-
. ing the legal feasibility of the sa.le of substantial amounts of government guar-
anteed electric utility bonds, a calculation of cost reduction must be developed 
in terms of the overall average cost of incremental capital. 
As a first step in such an analysis, it is appropriate to consider the differential 
cost of the sale of government guaranteed bonds as opposed to conventional bonds. 
There is a temptation to identify this interest cost reduction as the differen-
tial between long-term U.S. Government bonds and the bonds of electric utilities 
guaranteed by the Government. For the last 10 years new issues of double-A long-
term utility bonds have sold at a cost of a little more than 100 base points above 
the level of long-term tJ.S. government bonds (see Table 56). A basis point is 
defined as 1/000 of 1%. In 1973, new long-term double-A utility bonds sold at 
an interest cost of 75 basis points above long-term U.S. government bonds. It 
should be recognized, however, that the lower cost of long-term U.S. government 
bonds is a function not only of the lesser risk of such bonds relative to those of 
electric utilities, but also is a matter of marketability and breadth of market. 
TABlE 56.-BASIS POINT YIElD SPREAD BETWEEN AA NEW ISSUE lONG-TERM UTiliTY BONDS AND lONG-TERM 
U.S. GOVERNMENT BONDS 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
JaPuary ___ ------· ---------- +29 +21 +39 +117 +106 +95 +217 +147 +138 +140 February ___________________ +23 -f-16 +38 +58 +105 +95 +210 +93 +139 +SO March __ -- --- --------- ____ _ 
-f-15 +23 +41 +90 -f-105 +104 +199 +165 +142 +57 ApriL ____ ·-·---- ---------- +25 +26 -f-48 +84 +117 +122 +210 +146 +137 +75 May------------ __ --------_ +25 +26 +57 -f-88 +130 +143 +216 +175 +140 +56 June _______________________ 
+30 +36 +72 +97 +139 -f-147 +190 -l-196 +142 -f-66 July ___ ____________________ 
+29 +34 -f-69 +94 +153 +157 + 205 +170 4- 159 +76 AUfUSL------------------- +21 +37 +75 +96 +130 +166 +192 -f-187 -f-161 +71 September _________________ +23 +40 +llO +102 +104 +182 +176 +148 +165 -f-69 October ___ . ______ __________ +25 +37 +109 -f-94 +116 +162 +195 +1R2 -f-154 +76 November •. ---------------- +25 +33 +104 +98 +123 +174 +212 +171 +164 +72 December___ . ___________ . __ +28 +40 +110 +101 +119 +213 + 193 +163 +153 -f-80 
AveraJ!e __ -- --------- +25 +31 +73 +93 +121 +147 +201 +162 +150 +75 
Source: Data from various Salomon Bros. releases. 
As pointed out earlier, it is highly doubtful if the b-ondc; of electric utilities 
guaranteed by the government would sell at the same yield as federal I!'OVern-
ment obligations of similar maturity. A more appropriate comparison might well 
be ~et~ecn interest rates on U.S. agency bonds and comparable maturity utility 
obligatiOns (see Table 57). U.S. agenC'y bondR of 20-yPar maturity and more have 
been outstanding since September of 1970 and during thi~ time span, the rates on 
such agency obligations have averaged only about 25 basis points less than those 
of double-A new issuP long-term utility bonds. Since the totnl volume f)f U.S. 
agency bonds is roughly comparable to that of electric utilities. there would 
seem to be the same breadth of market in both situations. It should be noted that 
U.S. agency bonds possess certain charactPrist1c~ that governrnPnt guaranteed 
electric utility hond~ would probflbly not enjoy. Among these may bP inclu(led the 
fact tha.t mo~t of them are eligible as collatPral for federal rPserve b:mk aov:mces 
and discot~nts. to. member banks, they arP le'!al invf'stmf'nt~ for fedPrally-
chartered msbtnbons, an<l they may be held withont limit by nntional hanks. 
A few nre hRCkPit bv the fnll fnith Rnd C'TPdit of the TJnitPd Rtnte.o;; Rnii mnnv nre 
gnarantePii by the TrPasury or ~upnorted by the is~ning al?ency's right to borrow 
from thP Treflsury. For sevPral of the tvt'M'~ of ai!'PnC'v hond~ thf' intPrest f'arned 
on the securities is exempt from sta·te and local taxation.113 ' 
53 See Fedf>ral Financing Bank, Federal Financin.Q Bank Bill Offering, July 11. 1974. p. 2. 
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TABlE 57.- BASIS POINT YIElD SPREAD BHWEEN AA NEW ISSUES, LONG-TERM UTiliTY BONDS, AND 
U.S. AGENCIES 
1970 
January ______ _________ .• ________ _______ •• _. _________ ___ ___ . _____ _ 
February--- -- ---- _. _______ _______________ ___________ __ __ . __ _____ _ 
March __ ______ __ • _____ • __ •• _____ ____ . ___ ____________ ___ ___ • _____ _ 
ApriL __ --- ___ ---- ------- -_--------- ___ -- - __ -------- ------. - -- · --May ______ _____ . _________ _ . _______ _______ ___________ . _. _ .. __ . ___ _ 
June ________ ___ ___ ________ _ ._ . ___________ __ _________ _____ _____ __ _ 
July _________ __ _________ ___ _____ _________ _ . _________ . ______ _ . ___ _ 
August. __ __ ------- ___________________ . __________________ ______ _ 
~~f~~~r~~~~~=======================================- - ---------51-November ------- ______ ------ ------ __ _____ ______ ____ 53 
December. ______________________________ ------- . ___ 20 
Source: Data from varicus Salomon Bros. releases. 
1971 
-9 
15 
61 
6 
-2 
9 
-13 
17 
-8 
12 
21 
17 
1972 
19 
16 
27 
30 
26 
21 
30 
21 
20 
14 
19 
12 
1973 
3 
20 
16 
33 
22 
29 
32 
39 
27 
34 
30 
39 
In theory, the government guarantee should lead to a saving in interest cost. 
In practice, we often find that the federal agency issues-backed by "the full 
faith and credit of the United States"- are priced to yield the investor a higher 
return than quality corporate issues. For example, in late :\lay 1974, the Farmers 
Home Administration bond issue maturing in April 1989 was yielding 8.47 per-
cent, while Carnation Company's bonds of :\lay 1999 were yielding 8.40 percent. 
Similarly, the Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority long-term bonds were 
yielding 8.47 percent and General Electric's were at 8.40 percent.(>! 
Insofar as a comparison between U.S. agency obligations and federally guar-
anteed electric utility bonds is appropriate and ignoring the suggested ¥s of 1 per-
cent insurance fee, we would expect a reduction in interest costs of little more 
than 25 basis points, or * of 1 percent. Further, the substantial increase in gov-
ernment supported obligations coming on the market as the result of such a 
guarantee program would probably serve to narr-ow the spread between electric 
utility government guaranteed obligations on the one hand and conventional non-
guaranteed obligations on the other. 
By way of illustration, by 1967, corporate use of tax-exempt industrial rev-
enue bonds had increased to tne point where the municipal bond market had 
begun to show signs of strain. A study by the Investment Bankers Association 
at that time indicated that industrial revenue bonds in 196'7 alone had caused 
municipal bond rates in the general market to rise by approximately 1.4 of a 
percentage point. In addition to the costs to the llolders of outstanding bonds and 
preferred stock, who find that their downgraded obligations can be sold only at 
a lower price in the market, is the matter of the common stock of the company. 
Among the scholarly studies made with respect to the effect of the capital struc-
ture on a firm's average weighted cost of ca.pital are those that claim the capi-
tal structure to be irrelevant. It is suggested to be simply a matter of allocating 
a total identifiable risk of the firm among classes of securitiE'S.55 The extE>nsion 
of the long-term debt of an electric utility under this theoretical construction 
would require a Yastly increased return on common equity to reflect adequately 
the added risk incident to a 20 percent proportion of common equity in the capi-
tal structure. Traditional financial theory, on the other hand, holds that while 
the addition of debt to a capital structure will serve to redu~e the average 
weighted cost of capital up to a certain point, the continuing addition of debt has 
the ultimate effect of increasing the average cost.&e 
OYer the years electric utilities haYe sougl:.t this point of lowest average 
weighted co~t of capital for their capital structure. While it is spurious to argue 
that the precise point of lowest cost has been specifically identified for all com-
panies, it seems most likely that to increase the long-term deht to the levels 
sugf!'ested by Commissioner Rosenberg would haYe an unfavorable effect on the 
firm's average weighted cost of capital. This would be true notwithstanding the 
reduction in the cost of incremental debt by 25 hasis points or more. The net 
l'ffect of a government guarantee of a new Lond sold by an electric utility would 
serve only to moYe the point of lowest aYerage cost of capital to a slightly higher 
proportion of debt in the capital structure, accompanied uy a weakening of the 
quality of outstanding securities. 
54 "~nfety nnrl bRrl!nins in nJrency bonds." Business We.ek, June 1. 1974. p. 64. 
55 Franco Mouil?liani and Merton H. MHler. '"rhe Co!'lt of Caplt11l. Corporation Finance 
and the Tht>or:v of Inve!'ltment." American Econf)mic Review, June 1963. 
150 B. Braham and L. Dodd, Security Analys.is, Third Edition, 1951. 
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Commissioner Rosenberg refers explicitly to the reduced incremental cost of 
financing that would result from his propos~. ~ederal guarantee plan. In so 
doing, he makes specific reference to the possibility of a 25 percent lower cost 
of capital. In arriving at this figure, however, he makes some rather extreme 
assumptions: (1) all of the debt of the firm is guaranteed, a~d at an ~reasonably 
low rate, (2) there is no preferred stock, (3) common eqmty constlt~tes 20 per-
cent of the total capital structure, and ( 4) the return on common eql!Ity revenue 
constant. 
· It is clear by his example 67 that he is addressing ~imself here n?t to the cost 
of incremental financing but to a complete restructurmg of the capital structure 
of the typical utility. Such a situation could only come to pass under un~sual.a~d 
extended circumstances. If the sale of government guaranteed electric utll~ty 
bonds-continues long enough, all existing bonds will.mat~re a~d be replaced Wl~h 
government guaranteed bonds, but tha't is not the situatwn llkel;r to be faced m 
the 1970's. Further, he assumes absolutely no preferred stock. Unllke the bonds of 
the company, all of which have an ultim~te maturity, most preferred stocks 
have no sinking fund and, of cour~e, no matunty. . 
I1t is not reasonable to anticipate that the utilities will be inclined to call m 
the 3.5 to 5 percent preferred stocks that have been outstandi~g for man~ yea;~­
and which have long since been discounted by the market. Smce elect~lC utlllty 
capital structures are increasing at a compound annual rate of appr~ximart:e~y 7 
percent -and since utilities retain approximately 30 percent of their earnmgs 
avai•labie on common stock, it would take approximately 25 years to reach an 
80 percent debt level-assuming the sale of nothing but government guaranteed 
bonds. If we are to be impre~sed by the prospect of a 2~ perce~t reduced cost .of 
capital, we must be content with both extreme assumptwns With respect tp dif-
ferential interest costs and a time horizon of nearly 25 years. If on the other 
hand our interest lies with the near and intermediate term of 1 to 5 sears, the redu~tion in average cost is not anly small but is accompanied by a decline in 
the quality of the company's outstanding bonds, preferred stock, and common 
stock. 
Relation to Utilit-y Rates and Regulations 
As ·a solution to the unfavorable side effects of the guarantee of new bonds 
issued by electric utilities, it might be suggested that higher rates would permit 
both a higher interest coverage relationship for outstanding bonds and preferred 
stocks and a higher return on common equity. However, given such higher rates, 
it would be unnecessary to have the federal guarantee of the new bonds of the 
electric utility. In a very real sense the proposal of government guar~ntee of 
the new bonds of an electric utility is offered as a substitute for appropriate rate 
increases. It seems highly probable, however, that the effectiveness of pleas for 
rate increases would be severely weakened with the advent of government guar-
antees of new electric utility bond issues. The net effect would be an increa~ed 
emphasis upon incremental financing with a disregard for the interests of exist-
ing security holders. To facilitate new financing through government ~arantees 
at the expense of existing securities could make it most unlikely that mvestors 
will again be attracted to purchase the conventional securities of electric utilities. 
Furthermore if electric utilities are required to obtain prior approval of the 
FPC prior to issuing their bonds-they would have to do so in order to obrtain 
the federal guarantees under the Rosenherg plan-that would exacerbate the 
existing problems of regulatory lag. Meeting federal as well as state regulatory 
requirements would be expected to lengthen rather than shorten the process. 
In addition to the overhead expense involved in preparing and defending appli-
cations to a federal commission, the possibility of substantial increases in financ-
ing costs would arise. Given the volatility of financial markets, the delay in ob-
taining federal approval could force uti'lities rto miss periods when interest rates 
are low and, hence, their securities can be sold at relatively low yields, with or 
perhaps even without the fE-deral endorsement. 
57 See Exhibit 17-A of Rosenberg Paper. 
CHAPTER 7. PROPOSED CHANGES IN PUBLIC POLICY: OTHER PRoSPECTS FOR CHANGE 
Many other prol!osals, in addition to suggestions for federal credit guarantees 
have been offered m order to deal with the substantial financial pressures facing 
the electri~al utility industry. These vary from large tax subsidies and other 
federa.l assistance limited to electrical utilities to generalized incentives to pro-
mote mvest.ment throughout the. 1!-ation. A great many of the proposals center 
on changes m the structure of utility rates and in the system of regulation. This 
chapter attempts to examine representative proposals in each of these cate-
gories. 
CHANGES IN UTILITY REGULATION 
. In a letter sent t~ all 50 governors in early July 1974, Federal Energy Admin-
Istrator John Sawhill called for an overhaul of state utility regulations to make 
th~r;n. more responsive to national energy policy. He specifically urged that 
utihtles be allowed an automatic "pass through" of fuel and operating costs. 
At pres~nt, at .least some portion of higher fuel costs can be passed through 
automatically m most states. No state, however, has authorized an automatic 
procedure for passing through total operating costs.1 Certainly, the analysis in 
Chapter IV sho'!etl the ~re!lt state.-by-state variation in pass-through and other 
regulatory practices, variations which do not seem to have any justification other 
than happenstance. 
Regulator-y Lag 
If all regulatory commissions were to adopt the practices of the most advanced 
commissi!lns, a verr considerable overall reduction could be achieved in regula-
tory l.ag m the Umted States. Such reduction in administrative delay-and in 
the high cost of many of the administrative proceedings that are involved-
would surely contribute to an ease in the financial pressures now experienced 
by electric utilities. 
Future Test Years 
A number oi. regulatory commissions are moving to the use of future test 
years. The chairman of the Missouri Public Service Commission, James F. Mauze, 
was quoted as stating late in June 1974: 
In a short time, we hope to be using a 12-month future test year in 
all cases. We want the best current information obtainable and we have 
been working on ways to get it and make the best use of it.2 ' 
.Th.is approach is des~g?ed to avoid the "revolving door" phenomenon whereby, 
withi_n months of a deciSlOn to grant a rate increase, a utility returns for another 
~ate .mcrea.se b~aus~ of further increases in costs. Mr. Mauze described this as 
an mcredibly mefficient way to regulate. It wastes our time, the utility's time 
and the resources of the rate-payers and investors .... In the current infiationar~ 
stat~ of the eco~omy, sound regulation requires that rate-making be forward-
lookmg and not bed to outdated information." 3 
. Leon Keyserling, who bas been associated with numerous labor and consumer 
Issues, has urged the use of future test years in utility rate-making: 
.... I firmly believe that a past test year should be replaced by a model 
which bases the rate of return upon looking a few years ahead ... the 
rate of return should be based upon a moving average, looking a few 
years ahead.• 
Mr. Keyserling points out that errors may arise and can be corrected. He 
concludes: 
1 Federal Energy Administration, Governors Urged To Help Ease Utility Problems Press 
Release E-74- 28H. Jul;v 3. 1974. ~ 
19;,f~~r;B:Wllensky, "Ruling Lag Plagues Utilities," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 24, 
3 Ibid. 
• Keyserling, op. cit., pp. 515-516. 
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But to base the rate of return upon a past 'test year' starts with a 
gross error, instead of starting with a reasonable position, subje<!t to 
correction later on.u 
Even if the regulatory bodies do not use such a mechani.sm in their rat~ de~i­
sions, they certainly should have access to the information at some pomt m 
the regulatory process. 
A Change in the Investment Base 
A number of investment analysts have proposed a change in the method in 
which regulatory commissions estimate the rate b~se for ratemaking_ purposes 
(the lower the base, the higher percentage return 1s shown by ~ny gi':en level 
of earnings). Spcifically, construction work in progress g~nerally IS n<?t mclud~d 
in the rate base. Nevertheless, an allowance for the estimated carrymg cost IS 
permitted as a capital charge with a corresponding credit to income. James Stark 
of Lehman Brothers contends that ":\'lost security analysts regard t·his as book-
keeping sleight-of-hand" and take a jaundiced view of the allowance when assess-
ing quality of earnings.11 
A rough estimate of the amount of such construction work in ~rog_ress on t_he 
part of investor-owned electric utilities is $25 billion. The total IS hke!y to. m-
crease substantially in the future because of growth, longer construction time 
for nuclear power plants, and inflation. Stark urges the inclusion of these ca.pital 
costs in the utility's rate base.7 The argument for maintaining the status quo is 
that current customers should not have to pay for future capacity. The argument 
for change is that maintaining the financial viability of electric utilities ~s .a 
likely of concern to existing as well as future users. If ~ change were. ~a~e It IS 
likely that it would be phased in on an incremental basis, so as to mm1nnze the 
resultant rate increases. 
Charges tor Late Payments 
Unlike most other lines of business, many utilities are not ~uthorized to char~e 
interest or penalties for late payment of bills (as sho~'?. m C_hapter 5) .. T.lus 
practice further increases the borrowing needs of the utilities without providmg 
any o:trsetting income. In retail trade, in comparison, extra charges for late pay-
ments are nearly universal. . 
In recognition of its unusual financial diffic~lties, the Consolida~ed Ed~son 
Company was recently authorized to charge I~s large (so-called mdus~~al,) 
customers interest of 1.5 percent a month. 'Vh1le only 62,000 of the utility s 
2.8 million customers are affected, they make up 57 percent of the utility's ann~al 
revenues. Government agencies- federal, state, and local-represelllt~. a maJOr 
portion of the utility's outstanding accounts receivable of ~9·? million as ?f 
April 1974.8 Obviously, other state commissions could make s1m1lar changes m 
what are often archaic billing practices, at least as measured by the standards 
of the 1970's. Certainly prompt payment of their utility bills by governme~t 
agencies would seem to be an obvious response to the needs of cur~ent condi-
tions. It is not apparent why in some jurisdictions, residentia~ and busmess users 
are charged extra for late payments, but government agencies are excused. 
Changes in Rate Structures and Company Practices 
As discussed in Chapter 5, many authorities advocate cha,nges in utility r~te 
structures as a means of reducing peak-load demands and thus decreasmg 
somewhat the need for further capacity on the part of this most capi~-int~n.s~ve 
industry. A review of recent statements by executives of some electri.c utih~es 
conveys an impression of great reluctance to follow a course of actwn wh1<:h 
would dampen down the demand for th~ir industry's I?r?du~t. Althougi;t that 1s 
a very natural reaction- if you truly believe that electnc1ty 1s a good thmg, th~n 
more would seem to be better than less-that approach does not .seem to ~- m 
accord with current national efforts to conserve _energy- nor 'Ylth the ns~ng 
long-run average costs facing the ind':lstr~. As pomted OH;t earlier, and unl~ke 
past experience. new electrical ca.pacrty 1s now substantially more expensive 
than existing capacity, both in terms of capital investment and total cost per 
kilowatt-hour. 
: 5~~·et· J.16~hark. in an unpublished address to the Atomic Industrial Forum, San 
Francisco, California, November 13, 1973, p. 8. 
~R~~id A. Andelman. "Con Edison to Bill Major Users 1.5% For Late Payment," The 
New York Times, May 14, 1974, p. 1 et f!. 
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The demand for electrical power is uneven, a factor which tends to increase 
costs. In most regions, there is a summer seasonal peak, as well as daily peaks 
during the mornings and late afternoons. Typically, there are large slack periods 
at night and in the early morning. 
During the slack periods, the most efficient generating plants are operating. 
During the peak periods, the most inefficient generating units are brought on 
stream. The average load factor for the electrical utility industry in 1973 was 62 
percent, with very substantial variations among individual companies. Thus, 
much of the equipment was underutilized. As a public utility, of course, each 
company in the industry has to maintain sufficient equipment to meet peak 
demands. 
However, if the electrical load could be made more level, the most efficient units 
could be operated to capacity most of the time and the relatively inefficient ones 
could be used to the minimum extent possible. Since electricity cannot be stored 
directly, if the efficient units were used to capacity during the off-peak hours, 
there would be a net saving in the total energy consumed. 
Potential uses of off-peak power include electrical vehicles, electrical storage 
heating, pump storage, and industrial processes. The British electrical sup)lly 
system has achieved substantial reductions in peak demands and has improved 
the load factor by stimulating the use of off-peak night storage heating. 
The Federal Energy Administration and the Federal Power Commission are 
jointly evaluating proposals for a pilot demonstration of the feasibility of off-peak 
power use. FEA is also examining proposals to study three related aspects of 
electric utility rates: long-run marginal cost trends, rate flattening, and peak-
period pricing. 9 
Federal Energy Administrator Sawhill has urged ·new rate structure alterna-
tives, including variable pricing for electricity, with lower charges for off-peak 
hours. He asked the governors to discourage promoticm. practices "such as ad-
vertising and cost-reduction on all-electric homes." 
There may be important changes which the companies themselves can make. 
Many of the managements are already doing so. For example, advertising and 
related promotional activities could be fundamentally redirected. Rather than 
urging uses such as air conditioning which tend. to heighten the peak load prob-
lems of the industry and thus accentuate its need for capital, consumers could 
be encouraged to rely more heavily on off-peak uses of electricity, such as space 
heaters and hot water heating. The result would be a more economical use of 
existing capacity and thus a dampening of the pressures for rapid rate increases. 
Rather than a ban or severe restrictions on utility advertising, as has been done 
In some states, what is needed is a positive program of customer education on 
how to use electricity more efficiently with especial emphasis on curbing use dur-
ing peak periods. 
A prime candidate for conservation efforts is air conditioning, a relatively small 
but strategic usage; air conditioning is a major contributor to the summertime 
peak load for utilities. An indirect method of dampening such demand, and 
adopted by some companies, is to charge a higher summer rate. Home and office 
insulation might make an important contribution here, as well as in the space-
heating field. As mentioned previously, federal labeling efforts are underway to 
encourage consumers to purchase appliances that are more efficient and hence 
more economical to operate, rather than those that merely have a lower purchase 
price. 
Multiplicity of Government Regulations 
Spokesmen for the electric utility industry frequently complain about the mul-
tiplicity of approvals that are required before a new electric generating plant can 
be put into operation. The average person may discount this concern until he or 
she actually sees the extensive and repetitious nature of these controls. The ac-
companying schedule of authorizations required for the construction and operation 
of a si·ngle generating plant was prepared by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 
(Table 58). In the case Gf the proposed Fulton facility, the Philadelphia Electric 
Company has to obtain 24 different kinds of approvals from five federal agencies, 
five state agencies, two townships, and a regional commission. The required per-
mits and licenses range from approval of its towers by federal and state aviation 
agencies to the state environmental agency authorizing a trestle across Peters 
Creek. 
o Sawhill, op. cit., p. 10. 
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TABLE 58.-MULTIPLICITY OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORIZATIONS 
REQUIRED FOR THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF A NUCLEAR 
GENERATING PLANT 
PROPOSED FULTON GENERATING STATION OF THE PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 
Agency Nature of authorization 
Federal: 
Atomic Energy Commission ______ _ 
Atomic Energy Commission ______ _ 
Atomic Energy Commission ______ _ 
Atomic Energy Commission ______ _ 
Corps of Engineers _____________ _ 
Corps of Engineers _____________ _ 
Environmental Protection Agency __ 
Federal Aviation Administration __ 
Federal Aviation Administration __ 
Federal Aviation Administration __ 
Department of Transportation ____ _ 
State: 
Department of Environmental Re-
sources -----------------------
Department of Environmental Re-
sources -----------------------
Department of Environmental Re-
sources -----------------------Department of Environmental Re-
seurces ~~~~-------------------
Department of Environmental Re-
sources -----------------------Department of Environmental Re-
sources -----------------------Department of Labor and Industry_ 
Pepartment of Transportation ___ _ 
State Police-Fire MarshaL ______ _ 
:public Utility Commission _______ _ 
Local: 
Construction permit. 
Operating license. 
Byproduct material license. 
Special nuclear materials license. 
Dredging in navigable streams and 
tributaries permit. 
Construction of structures in navi-
gable streams and tributaries. 
National pollution discharge elimina-
tion system permit. 
Construction of meteorological 
towers. 
Construction of cooling towers. 
Construction of transmission towers. 
Authorization to transport fuel in ap-
proved containers. 
Air pollution permit for auxiliary 
boilers and radioactive off-gas facil-
ities. 
Industrial waste permit for thermal, 
chemical, and radioactive liquid 
discharges. 
Water obstruction permit for trestle 
across Peters Creek. 
Stream-encroachment permits for con-
struction extending into the Sus-
quehanna River. 
Sewage permit. 
Certification of water quality for 
plant water~ 
Use and occupancy permit for build-
ings. 
Notice of construction (same as Fed-
eral Aviation Administration). 
Flammable liquids permit to store and 
use potentially hazardous mate-
rials. 
Certificate of necessity to exempt 
plant buildings from local zoning 
ordinances. 
Drumore TownshiP--------------- Building permit. 
Fulton TownshiP---------------- no. 
Susquehanna River Basin Commis-
sion -------------------------- Surface water withdrawal. 
Source: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Draft Environmental Statement 
Related to the Proposed Fulton Ge.nerating Station Units 1 and 2. PhiladeZph!ia 
Electric Oompany, Dockets Nos. 50-463 and 50-464, May 1974, p. 1-2. 
Representatives of the electric utilities contend that existing procedures un-
necessarily delay the process of getting new power plants, especially nuclear, into 
operation. The Vice Chairman of Commonwealth Edison Company contends that 
"there is no justification for continual and repetitious litigation of the same ques-
tions over and over again, and always with the same intervenors represented by 
the same attorneys." He urged that the pros and cons of a particularly energy 
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installation decision be reviewed "once and for all," pointing out that a power 
station delay may involve continuing costs of up to a million dollars a week.10 
A recent survey by the Atomic Industrial Forum of 95 nuclea:r power plant pro-
jects of 37 different utilities reported that 70 out of the 95 have experienced 
delays ranging from 2 to 66 months. An average delay of 24.3 months was reported 
for plants under construction, and 25.9 months for those awaiting permits. 
By far, the most frequently cited reason for the powerplants being behind 
schedule was governmental licensing and regulatory requirements. Many of the 
utilities urged elimination of the required public hearing prior to issuance of the 
operating license. This would still leave a public hearing before a construction 
permit is granted. On· the average, this move is estimated to speed up construction 
by three to four months. An even larger speedup, on the order of seven to eight 
months, could be achieved by allowing site preparation work before a construc-
tion permit is issued.11 
The process whereby the Atomic Energy Commission reviews proposed nuclear 
power installations has been criticized by many observers. Professor Paul Joskow 
of MIT has focused on the AEC's guide for preparation of environmental impact 
statements required by the National Environmental Policy Act: 
When this Guide is read for the first time, one's gut reaction is that 
of horror. If all major construction projects in the economy had to go 
through this kind of administrative review, would anything ever get 
built? ... More careful reflection leads me to believe that some of these 
initial fears may be well founded ... this whole approach to environmen-
tal protection may generate more paper work than protection.12 
Professor Joskow suggests a more straightforward approach. Rather than re-
quiring applicants to prepare extensive analyses which AEC will then review on 
an individual basis, he presents the alternative approach of the Commission sim-
ply specifying the safety and effluent standards that it is using as evaluation 
criteria and telling the company to design a system that meets the standards. He 
offers a pessimistic evaluation of the present procedures: 
In the short run the result will probably be substantial delays in the 
construction and operation of nuclear plants, forcing many utilities to 
build additional fossil-fuel capacity to satisfy the demand for electricity. 
While these delays buy time to obtain further information about the 
environmental impacts of nuclear power, this time is not costless. Society 
pays for it by using alternative fossil-fuel technologies (having their own 
environmental problems) which may, in retrospect, turn out to involve 
higher total social costs than does nuclear power.13 
Some changes in federal regulatory procedures seem likely to increase costs 
and/or delays in the generation of electric power. For example, the Atomic Energy 
Commission recently adopted amendments to its Rules of Practice to make spe-
cific provision for members of the public to request a proceeding to modify, sus-
pend -or revoke an AEC license.1' Previously, while the rules did not preclude 
such requests, there were no specific procedures for doing so. Pr-ofessor Arthur 
Murphy of the Columbia University Law .School, in testimony before the Con-
gressional Joint C-ommittee on Atomic En-ergy, urged that intervenors should be 
given an opportunity to appear at regulatory hearings, but that their ability to 
contribute sho~ld be examined by hearing offi.cials.15 
In response to this problem, the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) has 
recommended legislation whiCh w-ould result in slowing down the rise in utility 
construction costs by reducing the long delays now experienced in bringing 
nuclear power plants into operation: 
1. To help achieve earlier decisions on facility siting. 
2. To diminish the possibility that license decisions may become delaying 
factors. 
3. To encourage and take advantage of generic design approvals. 
10 Gordon R. Corey, Oentral Station Nuclear Electric Power in Meeting the Energy 
Orisis. a lecture at the City College of New York. May 14. 1973. p. 3. 
11 
"Government is m11in atom plant roadblock," Industry Week, May 27. 1974. pp. 24-25. 
1ll Paul L. Joskow, "Approving nuclear power plants: scientific decisionmaklng or ad-
minlstrntive charade?," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 5, No. 1, 
Sprinl!' '74. p. R27. 
13 Ihilf., o. 3R2. 
u Atomic Energy Commission. News Release T-150, Aprtl 5, 1974. 
15 Oliphant Washington Service, Aprll 26, 1974. 
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4. To offer different approaches for facility licensing and thereby add flexibility 
to the present process.16 
In testimony before the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, an 
Assistant Administrator of the FEO stated that " ... it is difficult to accept un-
reasonable delays caused by the licensing process" in the case of facilities which 
are identical or essentially duplicates of plants previosly designed, constructed, 
or reviewed.11 
The federal official also urged alteration of the dual 'hearings procedure which 
has prevailed under the concept of treating each reactor on a "one of a kind 
basis." Presently, section 189a of the Atomic Energy Act requires a public hearing 
before issuance of both the construction permit and the operating license. He 
recommended eliminating the mandatory hearing at the construction permit stage 
"where no valid contested issues are raised, and no real purpose is served by a 
public hearing." 18 
If a hearing is held at the construction permit stage, FEO urged that it be 
comprehenesive e.nd thus render further hearings unnecessary unless there are 
changes that could significantly affect public health and safety. 
The FEO also pointed out that the time required and 'the diversion from their 
primary duties imposed by prolonged hearings and licensing procedures is "a 
serious problem" for both management and technical personnel in the utilities 
and in other organizations participating in the review process. "This si•tuation 
detracts from the quality of professional input, as well as job progress." 19 
Adequacy of Earnings 
Despite the opportunities for improvements in the regulatory process and in 
utility rate structures, there would still seem to be a key and no doubt still 
fundamental role for the adjustment of rates to reflect the substantial rise in costs 
being experienced by the entire economy and especially by the electric utility 
industry. As shown in earlier chapters, adequacy of earnings is basic to the 
ability of electric utilities to perform their franchised function of meeting rising 
demand for electricity on the part of an expanding population and growing 
economy. 
William Simon, the Secretary of the Treasury, underscored the need for 
adequate electric utility earnings in recent Congressional testimony on economic 
growth: 
... the lc>w rates of profitability allowed by the rate-making authori-
ties are threatening to destroy the industry's wbility to raise the enormous 
volume of capital it needs to do its job. The electric utilities require 
higher earnings to assure that adequate electric power is available for 
all of us in the future.20 
William Rosenberg, 'Chairman of the Michigan Public Service Commission, 
has been quoted as coming to a very similar conclu::;ion: 
There is logic and necessity to price increases and we shouldn't mis-
lead the puhUc.21 
Dr. Andrew F. Brimmer, believeing that a series of emergency assistance 
such as that given to Consolidated Edison was not to 'be forthcoming, has pre-
sented his preferred alternative: 
Instead, I am personally convinced that a more sympathetic-and 
timely-response of regulators to requests for rate adjm:;tments will 
enable the vast majority of :firms to cope with their problems.22 
The route of rate increases of courRe contrasts sharply with proposals for 
government subsidy of consumer fuel bills, or for some part of them. Aside from 
the inflationary impact that would result from increased government deficit 
1e Statement by Robert H. Shatz. Assistant· Administrator of the Federal Energy Office 
beforP the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy at the Hearings on Nuclear Power Plant 
Sitin~r and Licensing, March 21. 1974, p. 2. 
17 Tbir7.' n. 3. 
18 Ibid., p. 4. 
19 Tbirl., n. 5. 
20 Statement of the Honornble Willi"m E. s;mo?t. Secretnr11 of the Trensuru, before the 
Subrommittee on Economic Grotcth of the Joint Economic Committee, Washington, June 26, 
1974. n. 7. 
21
.Tohn Teare. "Rates Decided by Unlikely Trio," Lansing State Journal, May 19, 1974, 
p. B;-2. 
211 Br-immer, op. cit. 
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spending in the current economic environment, it must ·be realized thrat a sub-
sidy does nothing to encourage consumers to conserve or to use energy more 
efficiently. 
ANOTHER ROUl'iD Q1, TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT 
Considerable interest is developing in the possibility of fostering another 
round of technological advancement in the electrical utility industry. Although 
such innovation could help to increase efficiency and thus slow the trend of 
rising costs, the lead time for such development is quite long. It is unlikely 
that any of the increased efficiency will occur during the nel..'t few years, 
when :financial constraints •are apt to be most critical. 
Nevertheless, fostering technological progress in the industry may •be a means 
of assuring that the present :financial difficulties will not •become permanent. 
Four basic technical approaches are receiving considerarble attention: the dual 
use of energy, the improvement of combustion efficiency, recovery of waste iheat, 
and using refuse as a fuel. 23 
Dual use of energy 
The Federal Energy Office states that recent studies suggest that fuel con-
sumption for energy can be reduced by 30-40 percent by developing multiple 
energy industrial centers. These centers would combine the gener•ation of elec-
tricity and the production of industrial steam. At present, an electric utility 
may be building a cooling tower to dispose of heat left after the generation of 
electricity, while nearby a fa'Ctory is producing heat to run a foundry. 
The National Science Foundation has initiated a project in Michigan to 
study the feasibility of this approach, drawing upon the combined resources 
of industry, state government, and a major university. An alternative approach, 
also ·being examined· under National Science Foundation auspices, is the "en-
ergy park" in which power-generating facilities are clustered together, rather 
than dispersed throughout a region. Progress in developing a "superconduct-
ing" mode of power transmission (in which there is no energy loss) or one 
using extra-high voltage (with reduced power loss) would determine the feasi-
bility of such parks. 
Improving combustion efficiency 
The Federal Energy Office is studying new approaches that might permit 
higher combustion efficiencies within existing furnaces as well as new designs. 
One potential change is more widespread use of automatic controls to eliminate 
waste from oversupply of air (the operating efficiency of a utility boiler is 
partly determined by the amount of air present in the combustion mixture at 
one time). 
Waste heat recovery 
A variety of federal agencies (the Federal Energy Office, the Federal Power 
Commission, the Council on Environmental Qnality, and the Environmental 
Protection Agency) are considering using the environmental impact statement, 
and the process whereby such statements are reviewed, as a means to foster 
new ways of recapturing waste heat and using it more productively. FEO 
points out that one means for recovery of waste heat is through greater use of 
recuperators. Waste heat might also be used for preheating incoming fuel and 
air for improved combustion. Alternatively, it might be used for agriculture.2' 
Refu.rte as a fuel 
Municipal solid waste has a heat value of about two ... thirds of low sulfur 
coal. No adverse boiler effects have been observed in units using solid wastes to 
supply about 10 percent of their energy requirements. The Union Electric 
Company recently announced plans to establish a Solid Waste Utilization Sys-
tem capable of handling essentially all of the solid waste generated in the entire 
metropolitan St. Louis area. Plans call for the system to be in full operation by 
mid-1977.25 It is expected to pay for itself through such factors as the heating 
value of the burnable material, dumping fees, and the sale of recyclable material. 
23 Testimonu of Jo1m C. Sawhill; Administrator, Federal Energy Office, before the Senate 
Commerce Committee on S. 2582, Electrical Energ11 Conservation Act Washington June 17 
19i4. nn. 5- 10. , ' ' 
2• Thif1., p. 9. 
25 Union Electric Company, Report of Stockholders' Meeting, April 23, 1974, pp. 7-8. 
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In addition, the utility will be alleviating a major environmental problem for 
large metropolitan areas, the disposal of solid wastes. FEO estimates that ap-
approximately 5- 10 percent of the U.S. electrical energy demand could ulti-
mately be produced from the Nation's municipal solid wastes. 
A National Gridf 
Several members of the Congress have proposed a National Grid Act to establish 
a public corporation to provide for power planning and pooling of electricity on 
a national basis ( S. 1025 and H.R. 4998). The suggestion for a national grid 
has a plausible ring to it and ha~ gained some popular support. A recent editorial 
in Business Week stated: 
There is some evidence ... that a national power distribution grid 
could reduce the need for peak power generating capacity by as much 
as 25%. Individual utilities could share loads and bring down the costs 
of capacity expansion. 2t! 
The reality turns out to be less euphoric than the surface appearance. It seems, 
on inspection, that the electric utility industry already is obtaining most of the 
~eJ?efits of. a national grid through the existing nine regional grids. For example, 
It IS not unusual for the Commonwealth Edison Company of Chicago to ship 
energy packages of 1,000 megawatts to eastern utilities. The generating capacity 
behind such a distribution, in turn, may come from the company's own facilities 
or from those of cooperating utilities further north, or west or south. 
The major argument against the notion of a national grid is that there is not 
a significant load diversity between the Eastern and Pacific time zones during 
the pe~k p~riods of summer demand. In 1971, the maximum coincident peak 
load diversity between the east and west coasts of the United States was esti-
mated at only 100 megawatts. 
Summer peak loads are temperature sensitive and tend to result in :flat load 
curves which remain at high levels for several hours. This tends to largely 
eliminate any difference in time of occurrence of peak loads because of difference 
in clock time.27 For example, many people tend to run their air conditioners 
around-the-clock during heat spells. 
?-'~ere are important economic limitations to the transfer of power from one 
utility system to another. Typically the most critical restriction is not the lack of 
transmission facilities, but the availability of fuel. During last winter's fuel 
oil problems, the amount of electrical energy transferred to the northeast was 
generally limited by the availability of coal, and not by major transmission 
bottlenecks. 
More?ver, a national grid is an overbuilding of existing transmission lines. 
Hence, It would add to the amount of transmission facilities which would have 
to be installed and financed. 
CHANGES IN FINANCIAL PRACTICE 
More use of leasing and convertible debentures 
. The evolution of the c~pital markets has resulted in a complementarity of 
mvestor demand and busmess supply with respect to forms of investment in-
~truments. The large sums of money required for expansion of the electric utility 
mdustry have dictated a close adherence to a rather narrow range of invest-
ment securities. First mortgage bonds and debenture bonds have provided the 
bulk of extern~! financing for these companies, with the primary market in 
recent !ears bem~ trust funds and pension and profit sharing plans, both public 
and p~vate. St~ai~ht preferred stock has played a larger role in electric utility 
financ~ng than m mdustrial firms. Common stock has rounded out the typical 
financmg pattern. 
The use of such privileged securities as convertible bonds and preferred stock 
or. 'Y~rrants has played a very small part in the overall financing of the electric 
ubhtles. Although there is a marginal demand for these special types of 
28 
"Guidance for the Utilities." Business Week May 25 1974 164 Th 25 
estimntPrl rt>rltlf'tfon il'l not of total use but only 'of the 20 percenf·or Ie.ss w1ich fser~::~ 
po~er (25%X20%=4%). 
Edison Electric Institute, Ten-Year Report on Load Diversity, New York, 1974. 
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securities, this demand is typically so limited that it cannot accommodate the 
basic capital needs of the industry. In 1969, Commonwealth Edison initiated 
the use of the intermediate term note. That company has continued to utilize 
maturities of four, five or six years from time to time. Other companies have 
also issued this type of security, but the total demand has been quite limited. 
A West Coast utility has negotiated intermediate-term loans with the Bank 
of Tokyo, and other utilities are studying the Eurodollar market.28 
As the supply of these intermediate term issues on the market has increased, 
the interest cost differential between intermediate term and long-term maturities 
has been reduced. In June 1974, Commonwealth Edison sold an additional issue 
of 5-year notes at an estimated savings relative to 30-year maturities of only 
15 basis points. In recent years Commonwealth Edison has issued long-term 
warrants, as has Tampa Electric. It thus appears that the electric utility in-
dustry has not only been conscious of the availability of alternative forms of 
investment instruments, but has attempted to take advantage of them when 
opportunities have arisen. 
The use of warrants and convertible securities is considered appropriate under 
two circumstances. First, for financially strong firms there may be instances 
in time when such securities may be strategically used in limited quantity. Second, 
such preference securities may be used by companies that find it difficult to raise 
capital on any other basis. In this latter instance, it is important to keep in 
mind that Incremental financing is accomplished at the expense of existing 
security holders. Give these two basic applications of the use of preference secu-
rities, it is obvious that their role in the financing of the electric utility industry 
promises to be a very small one, as in the past. 
Of greater significance in recent years has been the matter of leasing. The 
principal advantages to companies of leasing equipment have been two-fold. In 
the first place, these contracts have not been reflected on company balance 
sheets.:zv This has had the effect of slowing down the rate of interest coverage 
deterioration as customarily calculated. The second advantage relates almost 
exclusively to tax economies. In some instances tax advantages have been 
achieved through the shorter depreciation life obtained by the leasing firm in 
the ownership of assets. In other cases the lease arrangement has made it possible 
to take adyantage fully of depreciation expense offsets or investment tax 
credits against the profits of the leasing firm or its parent when the lessor 
has had inadequate profits to fully take advantage of such expenses and credits. 
Rental rates are adjusted to reflect tax benefits. 
While the use of the lease device undoubtedly will continue to be important 
for electric utilities especially as it relates to such special types of equipment 
as the nuclear cores for nuclear power production and unit trains for the trans-
port.ation of fuel, it is unlikely that there will be any major growth in the 
leasmg arrangement as a form of financing. There is a strong movement in the 
accounting profession, bolstered by recent actions of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, to require the inclusion of lease obligations as a long-
term liability on the balance sheet rather than merely as a footnote . 
~other form of specialized financing is that relating to the support of pol-
lut~o:r;t .control and waste disposal facilities. Financing to accommodate these 
a~tlv1t1es was exempted from the provisions of the 1968 Revenue and Expen-
diture Control Act that severely restricted industrial revenue bond financing 
Such securities are sold through local or state governmental authorities with 
the result that the interest is exempt from federal income taxes, and often 
fr~m local and st~te. taxes as well, even though the utility pledges the payment 
of mterest and pnncipal. _The volume of such financing has increased strikingly in 
the last three years and IS expected to reach significant levels in the near future. 
In the fi;st .10 months of 1973, over $579 million of these bonds were issued, a 
substantial mcrease over the $127 million in 1972 (see TablP. 59). 
J 28 " 1Can9 utilities get the megabucks to build all those megawatts?," Electrical World, une , 1 74. p. 285. 
P·~l~· Ur.t . . lr:lntzt>ll. ':Len !lin~ in the Electric Utility Industry and How to Account for It" Uu tc t tty Fortntghtly, March 28, 1974. ' 
41-160 0 - 75 - 34 
• As cf October 1973. 
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TABLE 59.-ELECTRlC UTILITY POLLUTION CONTROL BONDS 
(Doll:~r amounts in thousands) 
1972 
Number Amount 
Source: Ebasco Services, Inc., as reported in Electrica! World, June 1, 1974, p. 288. 
19731 
Numbt~r Amount 
It h~s been ~~t~mate~ that from 22 to. 30 percent of the cost of nuclear power 
producmg facilities Will be for pollutiOn control purposes. With many such 
plants now under construction or on the drawing boards and with the cost of 
tbe typical 11~ megawatt nuclear plant costing approximately $500,000,000, this 
~ype of fin.ancmg could become of great importanee to the industry in the near 
future. It IS also true that the cost saving!': to the electric utilities resulting from 
the use of taxfree bonds represents an equivalent loss of revenues ot the Treasury 
Department. It may be the better part of prudence to assume that the Treasury 
Department will either have to increase its revenues from other sources or will 
narro'Y the definition of qualifying pollution control projects for this type of 
financmg. 
. Some co~panies use ~hese bo~d.s despite their opposition to the general prin-
Clple o~ prVIate enterprises obtammg such government aid . One energy company 
executive has been quoted as follows: 
Exxon generally feels that prviate enterprise should finance on its 
own. We've gone this route because the bonds have been authorized by 
Congress and used by a number of corporations. Not to take advantage 
of the bonds would put us at a competitive disadvantage.30 
About 10 percent of the tax-exempt bonds sold in 1974 are estimated to be for 
corporate, not governmental. purposes. Partially because of the influx of these 
corporate borrowers, the municipal bond market has been under considerable 
pressure from rising interest rates. Some of the 17 states that have interest rate 
ceilings on their tax-exempt general obligation bonds are finding the interest 
rates they face rapidly approaching the legal limits. 
S?me electric utilities have made other adjustmf:'nts to the difficult financing 
enVIronment. In July 1974, Consumers Power Company of Michigan issued 
bonds maturing in 20 years, and which wi11 be nonrefundable for at least 10 years. 
Traditi.onally, utilities have issued 30 year bonds, providing only fiv~ years of 
protectiOn against early refunding. Annual sinki:::J.g fund payments. to begin in 
1979, are expected to retire ahout 75 percent of the bonds before final maturity 
.in 1966. This is a provision which has been seldom employed on previous utility 
ISSUeS. 
The utility also issued convertible preference stock, a departure from the in-
dustry's traditional reliance on nonconvertible preferr~d. The new preference 
shares can be converted into common after October 31, 1974, and also will be 
safeguarded by a sinking func to retire all of the shares by 1994.31 The entire fi-
nancing package appears designed to attract investors who are concf'rned with 
the risk that is now attached to electric utility investment, a risk that appears 
to be greater than in previous years. 
30 Rfch~rrl R. Lee:er. "More Comuanies Sell Tax-Exemnt Bonds for Pollution Control, 
Savina Millions." The w,zz Street Journal. July 8. 1974. p. 22. 
31 "Consumer!'! Power SPtl:: UOO Million Issue With Provisions to Lure Wary Investors " 
The Wall Street Journal, July 3, 1974, p . 10. ' 
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Other utilities are relying on relatively new forms of project financing that 
effectively keep the project requirements off the company's income statement 
until the new equipment goes into service, yet while permitting the utility to 
retain control over the financing as well as construction. Tucson Gas and Electric 
has announced plans to create its own trust to raise and administer the project 
construction funds. 32 Via the trust arrangement, a utility may line up bank loans 
commercial paper, and similar short-term and intermediate-term credit instru: 
ments which enable it to reduce the normal "allowance for funds used during 
construction." Another technique is the single payment bond, which has appeal 
to pension funds. 33 
The previous chapter covered the impact of increased leverage on the interest 
coverage of electric utility companies and the relationship of that increased 
leverage to legal restrictions. While regulatory authorities have not established 
specific legal limits within which companies must manage their capital struc-
tures, extreme positions by individual companies could be met with strong oppo-
sition. There would seem to be little prospect of reducing the cost of electric 
utility financing by substantial incrPases in the leverage in company capital 
structures. 
The typical electric utility has, in fact, increased its leverage in the last ten 
years in an effort to offset increased cost pressures on earnings. Such decisions 
were undoubtedly made in the expectation that such cost pressures would ease 
and that traditional capital structure positions could be regained. The chronic 
nature of cost pressures which have now become acute has resulted in a difficult 
position for tlw electric utility industry. In retrospect, it might be argued that 
wi.th steadily increasing embedded interets costs, it would have been more appro-
priate to have reduced the proportion of long-term debt in order to maintain 
traditional interest coverage ratios. The combination of reduced earnings, increas-
ing embedded cost of debt, and increasing leverage have all contributed to the 
deterioration in interest coverage ratios. It seems almost certain that not only 
will the industry be unable to expand its long-term debt component of the capital 
structure, but that the sale of common stock will have to proceed at an increased 
rate in order to establish capital structure levels compatible with adequate inter-
est coverage ratios and appropriate returns on common equity. 
DIFFERENTIAL TAX BCRDEJI\S 
As might be expected, some individual utility executi-ves have advocated gov-
ernment tax subsidies as a way of easing their financial pressures. Although 
such nction would require Congressional approval , it would not be subject to 
the close and continuing scrutiny that is normally given to appropriation bills 
~roviding for direct payments from the Treasury. The economic impact of course 
Is t~e same. A dollar less in tax receipts increases the federal budget deficit as 
surety as does a dollar of additional direct expenditure. There does not appf'ar 
to be any economic justification for exempting elecrric utilities from paving their 
full and fair share of taxes. • 
What may be a more relevant question is whether the existing tax burden on 
thf' .electric utility industry is fair. Even the most cursory examination of the 
subJect reveals that this desirable situation is not always the case. At the federal 
level, u~ilities only receive a 4 percent investment tax credii, whereas all other 
compames gen~rally are allowed a 7 percent credit for their capital investment. 
Tab.e 60 contams the TreaRury Department's estimates of the revenue cost of 
liberaliz~ng tlw investment credit for a sample of 39 large electric utilities. If 
the credit had been raised from 4 percent to 7 percent in 1972, the payments of 
federal co~porate income tax by the 39 companies would have been $63 milliou 
less than they actually were (a reduction from $537 million to $474 million). 
B~c~use the cr~dit is limitf'd. to 50 percent of taxable income, the bulk ( $122.5 
million) of the mcreased credit could not have been used in 1972 and would have 
been carried over into future years. 
If the incomP limit Wf're raised from 50 perC'ent to 100 percent, the federal 
ta~ .payments by the 39 electric utilities would have been reduced by $140.5 
million and only $44.9 million of the credit would have been unused nnd carried 
over. 
32 
"Tucson G&E Refines Project-Financing Plan To Retain Control " Electrical Week 
l\Iav 6. 1974. p . 5. ' ' 
33 ~lberJ: .c: Bn rkwi~1. "The Stngle Payment Bond : An Innovative Financing Technique " 
Publtc Uttltttes Fortmghtly, l\Iay :l, 1974, pp. 3- 7. ' 
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TABLE 60.-REVENUE COST OF LIBERALIZING INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT FOB 39 
ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN 1972 
[In millions of dollars] 
Oate(loru 
Raising the credit from 4% to 7%: Impact 
Increased credit in 1972------------------------------------------- $63.0 
Carryover to future years---------------------------------------- 122.5 
Raising the credit to 7% and raising the income limit to 100%: 
Increased credit in 1972------------------------------------------ 140.5 
Carryover to future years---------------------------------------- 44.9 
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury. 
In an earlier period, it may have been the case that electric utilities could be 
counted on to make a high level of investment in new plant and equipment with-
out as generous incentive as is received by other companies. In the present cir-
cumstances, however, that approach appears to be outmoded and based on un-
realistic assumptions. Placing electric utilities on a parity with other industriel'l 
in the tax incentives received for new capital investments would seem to be highly 
desirable. Moreover the provision limiting such credit to 50 percent of net income 
benefits companies with high earnings and penalizes utilities with low net income. 
It also encourages using "middlemen'' (leasing companies) in order to gain some 
portion of the tax credit through indirect and hence most costly means. 
High Ta:c Burdens of Investor-Owned Electric Utilities 
It is primarily at statP. and local government levels, however, that the disparity 
between the tax •treatment of investor-owned utilities and other taxpayers is most 
apparent. The relatively high state and local tax burdens borne by electric utili-
ties can be traced back to relatively recent periods when the underlying circum-
stances were quite different than at present. In a st·andard work on public utility 
economics written in 1947, Professor Emery •.rroxel pointed out how and why 
local jurisdictions levied heavy taxes on utilities: 
Being large, frequently prosperous, and handy sources of tax revenue, 
corporations are taxed more heavily ·than property owners and proprie-
torship businesses. And public utility companies, which are quasi-public 
enterprises ana often have large and quite stable earnings, are taxed 
even more heavily than other corporations .... Local governments, 
indeed, often preferred to eliminate unreasonable earnings with fran-
chise taxes and franchise obligations instead of price reductions or new 
service obligations." 
Troxel made a similar observation concerning state governments: 
The earnings of utility companies attracted the attention of the au-
thorities who wanted more tax revenue. These companies often were 
large, had excellent earnings, and lacked strong political support. Legis-
latures knew that further taxation of them was a safe political way to 
increase the tax revenue.315 
Table 61 lists those cities which were reported in the Municipal Yearbook for 
1972 as taxing public utility receipts but not having a general sales tax. Some 
local governments that have both forms of taxation may levy higher rates on 
utilities than on other sales, but d11ta are not readily available. The data in the 
yearbook are limited to 391 cities of 25,000 or more that supplied information. 
In more recent times, the tax treatment of the Consolidated Edison Company 
of New York has received very considerable public attention. In a widely cited 
article, Professor Irving Kristol has described what he termed the "mugging" 
of the Consolidated Edison Company, "not by ordinary criminals, but by elected 
public officials ... " 315 Kristol explains the nature of the special tax on utilities, 
which is distinct from and in addition to its lo~al .property tax : 
This consumer tax is not specified as such on one's electric bill-it is 
simply hidden in the total. That practice, of permitting the city to tax 
its citizens while making it appear that Con Ed was charging them for 
service, was instituted by the company long ago, as part of its strategy 
to pacify revenue-hungry politicians by quietly appeasing them.37 
u Emery Troxel, Economics oJ Public Utilities, New York, Rinehart and Co., 1947, p. 251. 
315 Tbid., pn. 251- 252. 
80 Irving Kristol. "The Mugging of Con Ed," The WaZZ Street JournaZ, May 17, 1974, 
p. 10. 
l'f Ibid. 
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TABLE 61.-SPECIAL LOCAL TAXES ON PUBLIC UTILITIES, APRIL 1971 
SELECTED CITIES WITH TAXES ON UTILITY RECEIPTS BUT NO BALES TAXES 
Ci•ties With Over 500,000 Population 
Atlanta 
Dallas 
Detroit 
Dayton 
Honolulu 
Miami 
Cedar Rapids 
Fort Lauderdale 
Greensboro 
Jacksonville 
Little Rock 
Niagara Falls 
Arlington (Mass.) 
Davenport 
Dubuque 
Fargo 
Fort Smith 
Midland 
Muncie 
Newport 
Oak Park 
Odessa 
Ogden 
Anniston 
Beloit 
Bismarck 
Burlington 
Clearwater 
Coral Gables 
DeKalb 
Florence 
Grand Forks 
Grand Island 
Greenville 
Kirkwood 
Lakeland 
Marietta 
Kansas City (Mo.) 
Memphis 
Milwaukee 
Cities With 250,000 to 500,000 Population 
Minneapolis 
Norfolk 
Wichita 
Cities With 100,000 to 250,000 Population 
St. Petersburg 
Springfield (Mo.) 
Syracuse 
Utica 
Waco 
Cities With 50,000 to 100,000 Population 
Ontario 
Oxnard 
Palo Alto 
Pasadena (Tex.) 
Reno 
Roseville 
Saginaw 
St. Joseph 
Salem 
Sioux City 
South Gate (Calif.) 
Cities With 25,000 to 50,000 Population 
Minnetonka 
Missoula 
New London 
North Miami 
Norwood 
Nutley 
Owensboro 
Pocatello 
Rocky Mount (N.C.) 
Rome 
St. Cloud 
Shawnee 
Southfield 
Midwest City (Okla.) West Orange Wilson (N.C.) 
Source: Municipal Yearbook, 1972, pages 285-290. 
That strategy clearly has not worked, according to Professor Kristol. The 
high. electricity bills have resulted in the company becoming unpopular with the 
public and hence a ready target for attack by political candidates and others. 
In a relatively freewheeling interview on the occasion of his retirement as chair-
man of the New York State Public Service Commission Joseph C. Swidler 
voiced similar sentiments. He placed much of the blame fo~ the problems of the 
ConsolidatE>d Edison Company on a series of indifferent or even hostile city 
administrations-"it's been good politics to kick Con Ed around." 38 Swidler 
88 David Bird, "Con Ed Troubles Are Laid To City," The New York Times, June 2, 1974. 
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also stated that over 20 cents of every revenue dollar received by the utility is 
paid to the city and that the city relies on Con Ed for $1 out of every $12 it 
collects in all taxes. 
The extent to which many local governments have come to depend on the 
capital-inteusive electric utility industry for property tax reYenues is a closely-
related aspect of the problem. For example, when the New Yorl\: State legisla-
ture began to consider easing the capital burdens of Consolidated Edison by 
taking over some of its facilities, New York City officials pointed out. that the 
city stood to lose about $45 million a year in real estate ~ax receipts. The 
company pays a total of $227 million in annual taxes to the City. 
In a letter to the Governor of New York, the city Controller made an interest-
ing point (which indirectly underscored the contribution of investor-owned utili-
ties to the local community) : 
Since the city depends upon the real estate tax for 26 percent of 
total J:evenues it is vital at this stage to establish the principle that 
our tax base ~nd ability to finance future expense budgets will not be 
eroded by state take-over of utility holdings of any kind or location.39 
The problem described here may have become most evident in New York City, 
but it hardly is limited to a single utility. It is not unusual for. local political 
leaders to oppose utility rate rises and simultaneously urge heavier reliance on 
special utility taxes as a means of avoiding an unpopular general property tax 
increase. ' 0 • • 
The heavy tax burden borne by investor-owned electric utility systems con-
trasts sharply with the tax exemption afforded to the government-operated or 
government-financed power systems. Table 62 shows that the subsidy to these 
other electric utilities (in terms of taxes rhus not paid) was estimated at $911 
million in 1970 and at over $11 billion for the 15 year period 1956-1970.n 
Although such computations are by their very nature based on a series of asSUIJ?·P-
tions and estimates, the numbers used here are the lower of two separate senes 
developed by the Edison Electric Institute.~~ . . 
Although the precise measurE'ments may differ, corro.b?~atwn of the su~­
stantialLv larger tax burden borne by investor-owned utilities than by public 
power units can be founil in a number of other studies. 
The Conference Board has estimated that, in 1968, the taxes foregone by 
government-owned electric utilities-that is the taxes .th.at they would hav~ ~ad 
to pay if they were privately owned-came to $342 milhoJ?-. Another $42 _II~I~lio~ 
of taxes were similarly foregone on the part of cooperatively-owned utilities. 
TABLE 62.-ESTIMATED TAXES UNPAID, GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNMENT-FINANCED POWER AGENCIES 
[In thousands of dollars) 
Estimated federal tax 
deficiency 
Estimated other tax 
deficiency 
Estimated total tax 
deficiency 
1970 only 1956-70 1970 onl)' 1956-70 1970 only 1956-70 
Federal power agencies. _______ ____ __ 
Municipals _____ -- - _______ - ---- --- --
State, district and county _________ ___ _ 
Total Government. ______________ ___ _ 
REA-financed rural electric coopera-tives ___________ ______________ ____ 
Total Government-owned and 
Government-financed power 
$59,740 $1,008, 128 
170, 373 2, 842,929 
55,977 887,793 
286,090 4, 738,850 
104,919 1, 603, 185 
$89, 860 $837.487 $149, 602 $1, 845, 615 
224, 002 2, 047. 439 394, 375 4, 890, 368 
72,553 675.708 128. 530 1, 563, 501 
386,417 3, 5&0, 634 672, 507 8, 299,484 
133, 807 1, 150, 532 238,726 2, 753,717 
syl~efQs~nly _ _ __ _ _ _ __ ___ _ _ __ 391, 009 _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ 520, 224 _________ --- 911, 233 ------------
1956through 1970(15 yr) _______________ 6, 342,035 ------------ 4, 711,166 --- --- -- -- - - 11,053,201 
Source: Edison Electric Institute, Government Power, 1974, p. 107. 
ae "City Seeks State Payment for a Consolidated Edison Take-Over," The New York 
Times, MAy 2. 1974 p. 24. 
40 "League Mav Fi~rht UttUtieR." St. Louis Post-Disnntch, March 17. 1974. p. 10C. 
u For detailed computation of these figures, see Edison Electric Institute, Government 
Power, 1974. nn. 107- 118. ._. 100 105 4ll For an alternative set of estimates :vieldinl! highe~ results. Ree Ibt""., pp. - . 
•a Bernarrl A. Ge1b. Ta:r-E!I'empt Business Enternnse-Its Ea:tent ,!md Impact on Taa: 
Reven11es, NPW York. Conference Board. 1!l71. n. 61. The "preferred estimates are used 
here. For substantially higher estimates, see Ibid., p. 67. 
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National Economic Research Associates has estimated that government-owned 
and/or financed electric utilities received subsidies in excess of $1.6 billion 
in 1967. Of this amount, the federal government provided $1.2 billion or 76 per-
cent, with the remainder provided by state and local governments. '.fhe research 
organization estimated that the annual subsidy will exceed $4.2 billion by 1980." 
One major type of subsidy that these government-assisted utilities receive is 
in obtaining capital at a co8t lower than that available to investor-owned enter-
prises. Federal projects other than the Tennessee Valley Authority obtain capital 
,directly from the U.S. Treasury. 'l'hey benefit from the fact that the government's 
cost of borrowing is less than the cost to private enterprise. 
Similarly, cooperatives assisted by the Rural Electrification Administration 
have until recently obtained their capital directly from the federal government 
and the bulk of it at a highly subsidized rate set by statute-2 percent. TVA's 
position as an agency of the federal government enables it to borrow at the 
government "agency" rate, rather than at thP. higher private rate. It also need 
not raise high-cost equity capital. Municipally-owned utilities are able to raise 
capital at low rates because no federal income tax is imposed on municipal 
bond interest. 
The second major source of subsidy to the government-assisted utilities is 
their freedom from direct taxation. They normally pay no federal or state 
corporate income taxes and no property taxes, although s0me modest payments 
in lieu of local property taxes are made. No suggestion is made here to extend 
similar subsidies to privately-owned utilities. Rather existing preferences might 
be reduced. 
OTHER PUBLIC POLICY PROPOSALS 
A final category of proposals which have been advocated to assist financing 
electric utilities consists of those changes in public policy which are not limited 
to a single industry, but would help to reduce the rate of inflation and other-
wise increase the availability of funds for saving· and investment. 
Clearly, more effective use of monetary, fiscal and other macroeconomic policies 
designed to deal with the general inflationary situation facing the United States 
would help the electric utility indlll)try. However, there is such ample reason to 
support these efforts independent of their effects on a single industry that it 
would not seem to be fruitful to further develop that theme in this report. 
Reducing Government Credit Subsidies 
On the other ,hand, there is one aspect of general economic policy which, on the 
basis of this study as well as other considerations, would seem to be worthy of 
much greater public attention-the need to promote an overall economic climate 
which will yield a larger flow of private saving to finance the rapidly increasing 
investment requirements facing the nation. As the analysis of the proposed 
federal credit guarantees brought out, attempts to provide the electric utilities 
with a larger slice of an inadequate "pie" of investment funds will be self-
defeating. 
Even if they legally caa be accompanied, such specialized credit subsidies re-
sult in rising interest costs as the favored borrower-with government assist-
ance-forces some other borrower out of the credit markets. Moreover, the typi-
cal pattern is for the potential borrowers so forced out to push for special credit 
legislation on their behalf, which will only result in another round of interest 
rate increases and governmental intervention. Clearly, the game of musical 
chairs, particularly when played for such high stakes is not in the overall public 
interest. 
To advocate providing adequate funds for electric utilities and ignoring the 
consequences for other industries does not constitute appropirate public policy. 
Rather what is needed are various actions to increase the size of the savings 
pie, the capital pool available for private investment. There are useful things 
that government can do or do differently. 
First of all, it needs to be acknowledged that not only are government deficits 
inflationary hut. aJ~o. l1eNlllHf' financing thosE' budl!et deficits draws on the pri-
vate savings pool, they reduce the amount of iin-estment funds available to the 
privflte Pconomy. Conversely, federal surpluses permit a reduction in outstanding 
fpderal deht and lwnce E'nhance the private ~aving pool. A r£-cent study by the 
Brookings Institute estimates that a ft>deral budget surplus on the order 
4
' NAtional Economic ReRenrch Associates. Inc .. Subsidy Received by Governmettt-Owned 
and/or Financed Electrir Utilities, New York, June 1970, pp. 3-4. 
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of $10 billion (on a full employment basis) wlil be required in 1980 to bal-
ance investment and saving without higher levels of real interest rates.46 
Reducing the 'l'a:D Burden on Saving 
The second thing that government can do is to give greater weight to the 
incentive to save in the composition of the tax structure and of government 
spending programs. Thus, in raising a given dollar volume of revenues, more 
of the taxes levied can come out of funds that otherwise would be available for 
consumption rather than savings. One basic approach has •been suggt!sted by John 
R. Bunting, Chairman of the First Pennsylvania Bank in Philadelphia, who 
has urged the following: 
What we have to do ... is to continue to transfer resources, on 
a relative basj.s at least, from the consumer sector to the producer 
sector of our economy over the next two and a half years ... 
Specifically, we need more savings by consumers ... ·Savings is pre-
requisite to investment. 
The major source of savings in America is the average-income earner. 
He could be encouraged by making interest tax exempt on regular sav-
ings accounts and on retail certificates of deposit up to $20,000 at com-
mercial banks, mutual savings banks and savings and loan associa-
tions." 
Other suggestions along these lines include the liberalization of capital gains 
taxation, possibly an exemption for the first $1,000 of caiptal gains income or 
that portion of the rise in asset values which results from infiation. Other pos-
sibilities including increasing the current $100 dividend exclusion on the fed-
eral individual income tax.'7 
A more fundamental tax change would be to substitute an expenditure or value 
added tax for all or a part of the present income taxes. Such new forms of 
taxes would by definition exempt savings and investment and base the revenue 
burden on the consumption rather than the production of output. As has been 
amply demonstrated in the public finance literature, an expenditure tax could 
be made as progressive as an income tax.46 'l'hat would be more difficult in the 
case of a value-added tax, but provisions can be enacted which reduce or even 
eliminate its regressivity." 
Reduce FederaZ Discouragements to Saving 
As was pointed out in an earlier chapter, many government spending programs, 
although they may help further other objectives, reduce the incentive to savings. 
This is particularly true of the many income-maintenance transfer payments, 
which also turn out to be the largest and most rapidly growing portion of the 
entire federal budget. The substantial increases in social security taxes also 
have reduced the amount of disposable income available for savin.e:. 
FederaZ Programs and Inflation 
A related possibility is the modification of the various federal programs which, 
even though often unwittingly, give an infiationary bias to the economy. One 
of the most comprehensive catalogues of such proposals was developed by Dr. 
Maurice Mann, former Assistant Director of the U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget and now president of the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Fran-
cisco.150 Although a detailed examination of Pach of these proposals is beyond 
the scope of this study, the overall category warrants some attention. Dr. 
Mann's catalogue follows : 
1. The Davis-Bacon Act. As pointed out earlier, this law requires the Federal 
Government (and federally-assisted programs) to pay higher wage scales on 
construction projects than is generally warranted by ha~ic su:nply and demand 
conditions in labor markets. In effect, wage scales established in this way set 
a fioor for ?ther wages in the relevant market area. 
45 Bleckman. op. cit., pp. 267- 268. 
"John R. Bunting, Tight Money Is Not Enough," The New York Times, June 27, 1974, 
p. 3- 1. 3-6. 
47 "Tax reform for capitalists," Business Week, June 1, 1974, p. 36. 
"See Advisory Commission on Inter~overnmental Relations, The Expenditure Ta::e, 
Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 
• For a balanced discusRion of the pros and cons of the VAT, see Charles E. McLure and 
Norman B. Ture, Value Added Tax: Two Views, Washington, American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research, 1972. 
&o Maurice Mann, "Public Policies: Promises, Problems and Innovations." in Michael E. 
Levy, editor, Oontrr,in.ing Inflation in the Environment ot the 1910's, New York, Conference 
Board, 1971, pp. 32-33. 
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2. The Robinson-Patman Act. Although originally designed to reduce the buy-
ing advantages of chain stores and other mass distributors, it has been inter-
preted in such a way as to inhibit price cutting in many markets. 
S. The Jones A.ct. This statute requires that all ships used in domestic trans-
portation or fishing be constructed in U.S. yards. It is effectively a zero quota 
on foreign-made ships and has led, among other things, to the export of lumber 
from Alaska to Japan, while the "lower 48" States import lumber from Canada. 
4. Import quotas. A quota system works to isolate the U.S. market from the 
world market. As demand increases a quota system increases the gains (prices) 
going to domestic producers. In contrast, under an appropriate tariff system, 
an increase in demand tends to stimulate imports and thus restrain increases 
in prices. 
5. The "Buy American" policy. This practice, which is followed by the Fed-
eral Government and many states and localities, prescribes that American goods 
will be chosen ahead of foreign-made goods by ~ government or quasi-govern-
ment body, providing that U.S. goods are not priced more than a certain per-
centage above foreign-made goods. "Buy American" thus reduces the benefits 
of competition by ensuring U.S. producers a certain percentage markup over 
foreign costs. 
6. Re&aZe Price Maintenance Laws. These enable the seller of a product iden-
tified by a brand-name or trademark to set a minimum price below which the 
buyer may not go in making a subsequent sale. The purpose obviously is to pre-
vent retailers from competing in the prices charged for branded goods. The 
resale price maintenance arrangements are exempted from Federal anti-trust 
attack by the Miller-Tydings Act and the :McGuire Act. 
1. The question of union monopolies. When businessmen combine and agree to 
control the supply of goods and services in order to increase prices, the action 
is condemned as a conspiracy in restraint of trade as it should be. Dr. Mann 
states that when workers combine and agree to control the supply of labor in 
order to increase wages, a different rule seems to apply. More aggressive efforts 
to open union membership would be helpful. Aggressive and innovative steps 
to improve the functioning of our labor markets are also urged by Dr. Mann. 
8. Competitive re.<?trictions on banking and financial institutions. Restrictions 
have been imposed on the amount of interest payable on deposits, on the maxi-
mum rate of interest that can can be charged, on the composition of portfolios, on 
entry, and on branching. The net effect of these rules and regulations is to re-
duce competition. and to make our financial institutions and financial markets 
less efficient than they otherwise might be. 
9. Government programs that tend to raise prices or introduce rigidities in 
certain markets. These programs are typified by agricultural commodity price 
supports and by the stockpiling of a wide range of commodities deemed "essen-
tial for national security purposes." 
APPENDIX TABLE A.-VARIATIONS IN REGULATORY LAG IN ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE INCREASES, 1971-73 
(TIME FROM FILING OF APPLICATION TO FINAL ORDER FROM COMMISSION) 
[Percent distribution) 
0 to 6 6 to 12 12 to 18 18 to 24 24 to 30 Over 30 
Comapnies which 
received inter-
im increases 
prior to final 
order 
Date of final order mo mo mo mo mo mo Total Number Percent 
Jan. 1 to Mar. 31, 197L___ ___ ___ ___ _ 1 
Apr. 1 to June 30, 197L_______ ___ ___ 5 
July 1 to Sept. 30, 197L________ ___ __ 2 
Oct. 1 to Dec. 31, 1971________ ______ _ 5 
Jan. 1 to Mar. 31, 1972__________ _____ 7 
Apr. 1 to June 30, 1972________ _______ 3 
July 1 to Sept. 30, 1972___________ ____ 4 
Oct. 1 to Dec. 31, 1972______________ _ 12 
Jan. 1 to Mar. 31,1973______ _________ 6 
Apr. 1 to June 30, 1973______ _____ __ __ 7 
July 1 to Sept. 30, 1973______ ______ ___ 5 
Oct.l to Dec. 31, 1973____________ ___ 3 
10 4 -------------------·----
6 ------ ----- ---------------------
2 1 ------- -----------------
9 8 1 ----------------
13 2 2 - - -- ---- 1 
12 2 ------------ ------------
6 7 1 --- --- ----·- ---· 
10 1 -------------- - ------ - - -
9 1 4 1 ----- -- -
7 1 2 1 ----- - - -
5 7 ----- ------------ ---- -· -
10 1 2 2 --------
15 40 
11 1 9 
5 --- --- ----------23 6 26 
25 6 24 
17 4 24 
18 6 33 
23 2 9 
21 5 24 
18 3 17 
17 7 41 
18 5 28 
Total. _______________ _____ ___ --60 ___ 9_9 __ 3_5 __ 1_2 ___ 4_____ 2_11 ___ 51 ___ 2_4 
Percent distribution _______ ___ ·--- ___ ==28=. =4 ==4=6.=9==1=6=. 6= = 5=. 7===1.=9= = 0=. 5==10=0==. 0= . = __ =_= __ =_= __ =_== __ :;;:_= __ =_ 
Source: Edison Electric Institute, Electric Rate Case Decision Data Surveys. 
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APPENDIX TABLE B.-NEW CAPITAL AS PERCENT CF PERSONAL SAVING ON BOTH NATIONAL 
INCOME ACCOUNT AND FLOW Of FUNDS ACCOUNT BASES 
Investor-
owned Personal savings 
electric 
utilities National Flow of 
new capital income basis funds basis 
Year (millions) (billions) Percent (billions) 
1947--------------------------------- $611 $7.3 8.4 $11.5 
1948 _______ ------------------------ -- 1, 338 13.4 10.0 14.4 
1949 ____ -- -·-- ----------------------- 1,393 9.4 14.8 10.0 
1950 ••• ------------------------------ 1,246 13.1 9.5 14.8 195L ••••• __ •••••••••••••• ------ -•••• 1,495 17.3 8.6 22.2 
1952.-------------------------------- 1, 731 18.2 9.5 21.1 
1953 ------------------------------- - 2,348 18.3 12.8 22.0 
195-1 .•. • - ---------------------------- 1, 694 16.4 10.3 21.0 
1955 •••• - ---------------------------- 1,364 15.8 8.6 22.0 
1956 •••• - --------------------------- - 1, 452 20.6 7.1 27.0 
1957--------------------------------- 2,473 20.7 11.9 26.4 
1958.-----------------------•. ------- 2,277 22.3 10.2 29.7 
1959 .••• ----------------------------- 1,928 19.1 10.1 24.7 
1960 ·--- -- --------------------------- 1, 798 17.0 10.6 20.8 
1961 . ••• - - --------------------------- 1, 578 21.2 7.4 26.3 
1962 . ••• - --------------------.------. 1,448 21.6 6. 7 25.2 
1963 . •• --------------------.--------- 1,144 19.9 5. 7 27.0 
1964 .•• --------------------- •• ------- 1, 526 26.2 5.8 31.2 
1965 ____ _ - --- ..... -.-.- ... --------.-. 1, 446 28.4 5.1 33.3 
1966 ..••• - -----------.-.-.-.------ •• -- 2, 718 32.5 8.4 40.7 
1967-------------------------------- - 3,236 40.4 8.0 42.5 
1968 . •.• ---- ----------------.--- -·--. 3, 777 39.8 9.5 41.2 
1969 •••• - ------------.- .... -- •• -.-.-. 4,844 38.2 12. i 34.3 
1970 . ••• -- --------------- --·--.--- --- 7,886 54.8 14.4 63.1 
197L •••••• --.--- ••• ------.------ --·- 8,899 60.9 14.6 56.2 
1972 ••.• -------------------------.-- - 8,667 54.8 15.8 NA 
Percent 
5.3 
9.3 
13.9 
8.4 
6. 7 
8.2 
10.7 
8.1 
6.2 
5.4 
9.-l 
7. 7 
7.8 
8.6 
6.0 
5. 7 
4.2 
4.9 
4.3 
6. 7 
7. 6 
9.2 
14.1 
12.5 
15.8 
NA 
Source: EEl Statistical Year Books; Division of Research and Statistics, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System. 
APPENDIX TABLE C.-COMMON EQUITY AS PERCENT OF CAPITALIZATION (IN ELECTRIC RATE CASES SETTLED 
DURING PERIOD) 
less than 45 and 
Time period 25 25 to 30 30 to 35 35 to 40 40 to 45 over Total 
Jan. 11971 to Mar. 31, 1972.. _________ _ 0 1 47 27 4 5 
Apr. 1 to June 30, 1972 •• ---·-···--··-- 0 2 16 3 0 0 July 1 to Sept. 30, 1972 •••••••••••••••• 0 1 6 6 4 1 
Oct. 1 to Dec. 31, 1972 ................. 0 1 16 4 0 6 
Jan. 1 to Mar. 31, 1973.. ............... 0 0 14 10 0 0 
Apr. 1 to June 30, 1973 •••••.•.•..•.. • • 0 1 6 7 0 2 
July 1 to Sept. 30, 1973 ................ 0 2 9 6 0 2 
Oct. 1 to Dec. 31, 1973.. ............... 1 0 5 8 2 2 
Total. __ •• _________ ••••••• __ • •• 8 119 71 10 18 
Source: Edison Electric Institute, Electric Rate Case Decision Data Surveys. 
APPENDIX TABLE D.-OITATIONS FOR LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON 
MARKET FOR COMPANY SECURITIES 
Article 6, Section 235(13) (d), McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York. 
Article 6, Section 235(26) (a), McKinney's Consolid:ated Laws of New York. 
Section 1366 (a) , California Financial Code. 
Section 3&-96 ( 5), General Statutes of Connecticut, as amended. 
Section 682.23(9), Code of Iowa, 1971, as amended. 
Section 46(B), General Laws of Massachusetts, Chapter 168. 
Section 50.14, Subdivision 11, Minnesota Statutes, 1971, as amended. 
84 
21 
18 
27 
24 
14 
19 
18 
225 
Section 387 :8(1), New Hampshire Revised Status Annotated, 1955, as 
amended. 
Section 35-309, Tennessee Code, Annotated, as amended. 
Seotion 32.20.170, Revised Code of Washington, as amended. 
Title 11, Section 1109.10 and Title 21, Section 2109.37(P), Ohio Revised Code. 
Chapter 9, Section 626, Maine Revised Statutes, as amended 1969. 
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